{
  "id": 3040164,
  "name": "Louis Grossman, Appellee, v. E. H. Nichols, Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Grossman v. Nichols",
  "decision_date": "1921-12-30",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 26,830",
  "first_page": "297",
  "last_page": "302",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "223 Ill. App. 297"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "233 Ill. 487",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3378261
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/233/0487-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 448,
    "char_count": 8416,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.489,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.08728269485981616
    },
    "sha256": "50d5964171d4ed67fef1e57acc5b877ed7015902b52073c19033ecd78a7cbf18",
    "simhash": "1:af8717c40f02b319",
    "word_count": 1392
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:26:13.743666+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Louis Grossman, Appellee, v. E. H. Nichols, Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Barnes\ndelivered the opinion of the / court.\nPlaintiff brought this suit on an insurance policy to recover damages resulting from loss of his automobile by fire. It was tried without a jury and the finding and judgment were in his favor in the sum of $1,000, the full amount the policy called for.\nThe only point made and argued on this appeal is that under the evidence there could be no judgment against defendant as the liability rested upon his principal, Illinois Auto Insurance Association.\nThe association is not a corporation. It was merely an organization, as admitted, \u201cconsisting of the subscribers of that association.\u201d Who they were or how many other than plaintiff is not shown. Prom the evidence it appears to be a case of an undisclosed and concealed principal for whom defendant acted as agent, nominally its \u201cattorney in fact.\u201d The service of summons was upon Nichols, but he did not appear at the trial. The affidavit of defense was made by one B. Dale Crawford as agent of \u201cdefendant.\u201d Both from the statement of claim and the title of the case, Nichols must be deemed the sole defendant, his description in the title being surplusage.\nThe testimony was meager.' Plaintiff was his only witness except that he called said Crawford, under section 33 of the Municipal Court Act (Cahill\u2019s Ill. St. ch. 37, \u00b6 421), who. had countersigned the policy as \u201cPresident Advisory Board,\u201d the duties of which were not explained. At the time of the hearing Crawford was no longer connected with said association. While objection was made to calling him as a- witness under section 33, the objection need not be considered for he was later called as the only witness for the defense. Aside from the policy and other documentary evidence and a witness called in rebuttal of evidence not necessary to be referred to, no other witnesses were called or evidence heard.\nThe policy purports to be one by \u201cSubscribers at Illinois Auto Insurance Association\u201d to indemnify and insure plaintiff, referred to as the \u201csubscriber,\u201d against loss or damage to his auto by fire, etc. It purported to be issued \u201cin consideration of a payment of membership fee, annual dues and assessment,' and of the statements and warranties contained in the subscriber\u2019s application and power of attorney and subscriber\u2019s contract.\u201d It states that it is issued \u201cby the association\u201d subject to enumerated \u201cconditions, limitations and agreements.\u201d One of them requires that \u201csubscribers shall notify the attorney in fact at the Association, hereinafter called the \u2018Manager,\u2019 \u201d of any accident or loss or claim. The witnessing clause reads: \u201cIn witness whereof the subscribers of the Illinois Auto Insurance Association have severally caused these presents to be executed.\u201d It is signed by \u201cE. H. Nichols, Attorney in Fact, Secretary-Treasurer,\u201d and countersigned by said Crawford as \u201cPresident Advisory Board,\u201d and one Coombs as \u201cGeneral Manager.\u201d There was no evidence as to the latter or his duties. The policy, as above stated, refers to the \u201cAttorney in fact\u201d as the \u201cManager.\u201d\nDefendant produced plaintiff\u2019s application as a subscriber, but only its first clause is abstracted. It reads:\n\u201cI do hereby appoint E. H. Nichols, of Chicago, Illinois, my attorney in fact to procure such insurance from the Illinois Auto Insurance Association of Chicago through the exchange of several but not joint contracts, to bind me to the subscriber\u2019s contracts in said association and to act for me as set forth in the policy contract and the said subscriber\u2019s contract which are made a part hereof.\u201d\nSo far as abstracted the policy and said application, which will be construed as a part of the contract, refer to no other party than Nichols in bringing the so-called subscribers, whoever they may be, into the mutual relation evidently contemplated but not made fully apparent from the record. What may be their liability towards one another does not appear. From the cited clause in the application blank it would appear that the liability of each was several and not joint, and that therefore to recover against them would necessitate as many suits as there were subscribers. . But defendant, in keeping with the apparent policy of concealment and unwillingness to disclose his principal, did not appear at the trial in person, and made no defense except through the testimony of Crawford, which impresses us as carrying out such policy. He merely identified his own and Nichols \u2019 signatures to the insurance policy; said he was no longer connected with the association; that the association was one of automobile owners engaged in the automobile business; that he could not name any particular member of it; that he supposed they received money for insuring automobiles; that he received compensation for his services from Nichols, and that he made some investigations with regard to plaintiff\u2019s loss, and gave other testimony with regard to identity and value of plaintiff\u2019s automobile, which, in view of rebuttal testimony and failure to argue such evidence, we need\u2019not review. That more information might have been given that would disclose the business of the association and who besides Nichols conducted it, is apparent.\nWe need not discuss the general principles of agency or whether the policy discloses an intention to bind defendant as attorney in fact. It seems rather to be a case of an undisclosed principal. Plaintiff seems to have had no means of ascertaining whom Nichols represented, and the defense indicated no purpose to enlighten him on that subject. The suit is against Nichols individually, who seems from the evidence to have been the main executive officer, secretary and treasurer of the alleged association. He can hardly complain of a judgment against him individually when on a prima fade cas\u00e9 of his liability as such he made no attempt to explain the designation \u2018 \u2018 attorney in fact, \u2019 \u2019 or to show for whom he was acting. If there is a liability on the part of other subscribers he, under such circumstances, and not plaintiff, is in a position to know who they are and to seek contribution. Presumably, if the association was a going concern, there were numerous subscribers. Plaintiff could hardly be required to bring suit against each of them. The case is analogous to that of Warfield-Pratt-Howell Co. v. Williamson, 233 Ill. 487, where the court said that the language as well as the spirit of the agreement \u201cshows plainly that the subscribers did not contemplate that they would be required to bring five or six hundred suits at law in order to collect for a loss, or that they would be called upon to individually defend suits that might be brought against them by other subscribers for losses.\u201d The court there said that it was of the opinion that the \u201cmanager represents all the subscribers, and that a judgment against him in an action at law or a decree in an action of equity is binding upon the indemnity company.\u201d Hence we think the judgment should be affirmed.\nA motion was made to strike the bill of exceptions. It will be denied. Whatever its defects, plaintiff stipplated without reservation that it might be incorporated in this record.\nAffirmed.\nGridley, P. J., and Morrill, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Barnes"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "George H. Sugeue, for appellant; Melville B. Thomson, of counsel.",
      "Williams & Byer and Lawrence E. Dowd, for appellee ; Julian C. Byer, of counsel."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Louis Grossman, Appellee, v. E. H. Nichols, Appellant.\nGen. No. 26,830.\n1. Insurance\u2014party against whom action on automobile policy is properly brought. In an action upon an automobile insurance policy in an unincorporated association, held that defendant was acting as agent of an undisclosed principal, nominally as its attorney in fact, and that suit was properly brought against him individually.\n2. Appeal and error\u2014when objection to calling person as witness need not be considered. An objection, in an action on an automobile insurance policy issued in the name of an unincorporated association, to calling as a witness, under section 33 of the Municipal Court Act (Cahill\u2019s Ill. St. ch. 37, \u00b6 421) one who signed the policy as \u201cPresident Advisory Board,\u201d need not be considered where such person was later called as the only witness for the defense.\nAppeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hrank. E. Reed, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1921.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed December 30, 1921.\nGeorge H. Sugeue, for appellant; Melville B. Thomson, of counsel.\nWilliams & Byer and Lawrence E. Dowd, for appellee ; Julian C. Byer, of counsel."
  },
  "file_name": "0297-01",
  "first_page_order": 325,
  "last_page_order": 330
}