{
  "id": 863715,
  "name": "First National Bank of Michigan City et al. v. Simon D. Haskell and Henry E. Brown",
  "name_abbreviation": "First National Bank of Michigan City v. Haskell",
  "decision_date": "1887-11-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "616",
  "last_page": "618",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "23 Ill. App. 616"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "17 Ill. 321",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2593973
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/17/0321-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:bbb75b6331ec1671",
    "word_count": 668
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:14:28.772601+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "First National Bank of Michigan City et al. v. Simon D. Haskell and Henry E. Brown."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Bailey, J.\nIn this case Haskell, Brown & Company brought suit by attachment against William Mellors and William Mellors, Jr., and caused the First National Bank of Michigan City and others to be summoned as garnishees. The answers of the garnishees having been traversed, a trial was had upon the issues thus formed before the court, a jury being waived, resulting in a finding and judgment against the garnishees. Ho questions of law were raised at the trial, and the only contention now is, that the evidence fails to support the finding and judgment. We are of the opinion that the question thus presented is not open to consideration here, owing to the fact that the bill of exceptions does not purport to contain all the evidence. Under .such circumstances, it will be presumed that there was sufficient evidence before the court to \u25a0warrant teh judgment.\nThere are certain recitals in the bill of exceptions which counsel for the appellant insists are sufficient to show that all the evidence is preserved. We think otherwise. The\u2019 bill recites that on the trial of the issues between the plaintiffs and the said garnishees \u201c there was given in evidence, on behalf of said interpleader, the following deposition of Walter Tail, together with the exhibits therein mentioned, which deposition was alsd considered by the court in the issues between the said plaintiffs and the said garnishees.\u201d After the copy of the deposition and exhibits, it again recited as follows: \u201c The plaintiffs offer in evidence in support of their side of the issues in this case, the following deposition of William Blinks and William 37. Mellors, and also the statutes of the State of Indiana, in words and figures following.\u201d The documents thus offered are inserted, and that the bill recites that \u201c the plaintiffs also offered in evidence the deed of assignment under the laws of Indiana, from the defendants to William Blinks, which deed is as follows.\u201d After the copy of said deed is the following: \u201cIt was conceded on the trial that the plaintiffs were residents of the State of Illinois when this suit was begun and still are; and thereupon the court announced that his finding was against the interpleader and garnishees.\u201d These are all of the recitals in the bill of exceptions bearing upon the question.\nWe are unable to perceive how a legal conclusion can follow from these recitals that all the evidence heard on the trial is preserved in the record. It should be remembered that the bill of exceptions is the pleading of the party alleging errors, and like all other pleadings it is to be construed most strongly against the pleader. It is suggested that the word \u201c thereupon \u201d should be construed as meaning \u201c upon the foregoing evidence,\u201d so as to make the case analogous to Reed v. Bradley, 17 Ill. 321. Such, however, is not the usual signification which the rule of interpretation above referred to, should give it. \u201cThereupon\u201d is an adverb signifying, according to Webster, \u201cimmediately,\u201d \u201cat once,\u201d \u201cwithout delay,\u201d and it is in that sense that it would ordinarily be understood in the connection in which it is here used. To say the least, it fails to give to the bill of exceptions that degree of certainty which the rules of pleading require.\nThe judgment will be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Bailey, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Messrs. Harvey H, Anderson and John W. Ela, for appellants.",
      "Messrs. Tenney, Bashford & Tenney, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "First National Bank of Michigan City et al. v. Simon D. Haskell and Henry E. Brown.\nPractice\u2014Bills of Exceptions\u2014Evidence\u2014\u201c Thereupon.\u201d\n1. Where the trial is by the court and the bill of exceptions does not purport to contain all the evidence, it will be presumed that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the findings and judgment.\n2. The bill of exceptions, being the pleading of the party alleging error, is construed most strongly against him.\n[Opinion filed November 9, 1887.]\nAppeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; Jhe Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding.\nMessrs. Harvey H, Anderson and John W. Ela, for appellants.\nMessrs. Tenney, Bashford & Tenney, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0616-01",
  "first_page_order": 612,
  "last_page_order": 614
}