{
  "id": 5498389,
  "name": "Mack Shrontz, Plaintiff in Error, v. Frank L. Thyfault, Defendant in Error",
  "name_abbreviation": "Shrontz v. Thyfault",
  "decision_date": "1924-01-07",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 7,197",
  "first_page": "228",
  "last_page": "232",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "231 Ill. App. 228"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "249 Ill. 470",
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      "reporter": "Ill.",
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        5645117
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    {
      "cite": "191 Ill. 215",
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    {
      "cite": "160 Ill. 415",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:11:21.824833+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Mack Shrontz, Plaintiff in Error, v. Frank L. Thyfault, Defendant in Error."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Partlow\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nOn January 30, 1922, the plaintiff in error, Mack Shrontz, filed his bill in the circuit court of Kankakee county against the defendant in error, Frank L. Thyfault, to set aside a sheriff\u2019s deed to defendant in error, dated October 11, 1921, for certain land in Kankakee county, on account of alleged irregularities in the proceedings, and praying for leave to redeem from the sale. An answer was filed by the defendant in error, and on November 1, 1922, a decree was entered as prayed which gave the plaintiff in error the right to redeem upon his paying certain specific amounts therein stated, which amounts had been paid by the defendant in error, including \u201csuch an amount as may be agreed upon by the parties hereto, or may hereafter be fixed by the court, as a reasonable solicitor\u2019s fee incurred by said defendant in the defense of and on account of this suit.\u201d On December 16, 1922, during the same term of court, on motions of the defendant in error, the chancellor heard proof as to the amount of the solicitor\u2019s fee and a separate decree was entered ordering plaintiff in error to pay $200 solicitor\u2019s fee to the defendant in error. To review that decree a writ of error has been prosecuted.\nPlaintiff in error contends that two questions are presented by this appeal: First, the right of a court of chancery to allow a solicitor\u2019s fee and tax the same as costs against the plaintiff in error in a case where a decree was entered granting the relief prayed for by the plaintiff in error; and second, the right of a court of chancery to allow a solicitor\u2019s fee where there was no competent proof as to the usual and customary charge for such services between parties capable of making a contract, or where the fee to be charged was the subject of contract.\nThere were two separate decrees entered, one on November 1, 1922, and the other on December 16, 1922, and both appear in the record. From the first decree no appeal was prayed, the evidence taken under it was not properly preserved by a certificate of evidence, and no error has been assigned upon it. It is apparent from the argument of plaintiff in error that his complaint is against the second decree which fixes the amount to be paid. In the second decree, after the finding as to the amount to be paid, is the following: \u201cComplainant prays an appeal from the allowance of solicitor\u2019s fee herein to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, motion allowed by defendant filing bond,\u201d etc. This is the only place in the record where an appeal is prayed, and this decree is followed in the record by the evidence taken relative to the amount to be allowed, but there is no evidence in the record taken under the first decree. Under this condition of. the record, we are constrained to hold that there was no appeal from or assignment of errors on the first decree, which made the payment of a solicitor\u2019s fee by the plaintiff in error a condition precedent on which the deed was to be set aside. If the first decree was not appealed from and errors were not assigned upon it, then its provisions are binding on the plaintiff in error and he will not be heard to complain of the action of the chancellor in providing for a solicitor\u2019s fee as a precedent condition to setting aside the deed and allowing the plaintiff in error to redeem.\nEven if it be conceded that both questions raised by plaintiff in error are properly before this court for review, neither contention of plaintiff in error can be sustained. All through his argument plaintiff in error insists that this solicitor\u2019s fee was taxed as costs against him. This is not true. The first decree found that certain specific amounts had been paid out by the defendant in error in obtaining the sheriff\u2019s deed, and the decree provided that these amounts should be repaid by the plaintiff in error before he would be permitted to redeem. Under this decree plaintiff in error was not required to pay any of these amounts, including the solicitor\u2019s fee, if he did not see fit to do so. The decree provided that \u201cin default of plaintiff in error paying the defendant in error the several amounts therein required to be paid within ninety days from date, that the bill from thenceforth stand dismissed with costs to be taxed,\u201d so the only effect of this decree was to permit him to redeem upon his payment of these amounts.\nIt is a well-settled principle of law that when equity is applied to for the cancellation of a deed, the court is not bound to pass upon the question as a matter of absolute right. It is within the sound discretion of the court to grant or refuse relief according to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In all cases where the intervention of a court of equity is sought, the court will, in granting relief, impose such terms upon the parties as it deems the real justice of the case requires, and if the plaintiff refuses to comply with the terms, the bill will be dismissed. These terms usually embrace all payments which have been made by the parties against whom the relief is sought. Those conditions are imposed under the maxim that \u201che who seeks equity must do equity.\u201d DeWalsh v. Braman, 160 Ill. 415; O\u2019Connell v. O\u2019Conor, 191 Ill. 215; Springfield & N. E. Traction Co. v. Warrick, 249 Ill. 470; Flemming v. Tallerday, 289 Ill. 508. The last-cited case was very much like the one at bar. A bill was filed to set aside a sheriff\u2019s sale and deed for irregularities. A decree was entered in favor of the complainant. The decree provided that he should reimburse the defendant for certain specific items which the defendant had paid out in obtaining the sheriff\u2019s deed, and included a solicitor\u2019s fee of $150 incurred in that suit. From that decree an appeal was prosecuted to the Supreme Court and the decree was affirmed. This case sustains that part of the decree which requires the payment of a solicitor\u2019s fee as a condition precedent to the right of the plaintiff in error to relief under his bill.\nThe second contention of the plaintiff in error is that there is no competent evidence to justify the fee allowed. Two witnesses testified that in their opinion a fair and reasonable compensation for the services performed in the case would be $200. No evidence was offered by plaintiff in error to contradict this testimony. We think the evidence was sufficient to justify the chancellor in fixing the fee at $200.\nWe find no reversible error and the decree will be affirmed.\nDecree affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Partlow"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Edward P. Harney, for plaintiff in error.",
      "Eden B. Gower and Walter J. Nourie, for defendant in error."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Mack Shrontz, Plaintiff in Error, v. Frank L. Thyfault, Defendant in Error.\nGen. No. 7,197.\n1. Appeal and error \u2014 failure to appeal interlocutory decree as bar to review on error from subsequent decree. A decree requiring complainant to pay the purchaser\u2019s solicitor\u2019s fees as a condition precedent to setting aside a sheriff\u2019s deed is not reviewable on error from a second decree fixing the amount of such fees, where no appeal was prayed from the first decree, the evidence was not preserved by a certificate thereof and no error has been assigned, although there is recital in the second decree that the complainant \u201cprays an appeal from the allowance of solicitor\u2019s fee\u201d followed in the record by the evidence taken relative to the amount.\n2. Judicial and execution sales \u2014 requiring reimbursement of purchaser as condition precedent to redemption not taxation of costs. A decree requiring complainant seeking to set aside a sheriff\u2019s deed to reimburse the purchaser, including his solicitor\u2019s fees, as a condition precedent to redeeming and that in default of such payment the bill shall stand dismissed with costs to be taxed, does not tax the solicitor\u2019s fees against complainant as costs, payment thereof not being compulsory under the decree.\n3. Judicial and execution sales \u2014 imposition of terms proper as condition to setting aside sheriff\u2019s deed. In a proceeding in equity to set aside a sheriff\u2019s deed, it is within the sound discretion of the court to make the repayment of the purchaser\u2019s actual disbursements, including solicitor\u2019s fees, a condition precedent to setting aside the deed.\n4. Attorneys and counsellors \u2014 sufficiency of evidence to fix allowance for solicitor\u2019s fees. An allowance of ?200 to be paid by complainant for solicitor\u2019s fees to defendant as a condition precedent to setting aside a sheriff\u2019s deed to the latter is sustained by the uncontradicted testimony of two witnesses that such amount constitutes a fair and reasonable allowance for the services performed by defendant\u2019s solicitor.\nError by plaintiff to the Circuit Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. A. W. DeSklm, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1923.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed January 7, 1924.\nEdward P. Harney, for plaintiff in error.\nEden B. Gower and Walter J. Nourie, for defendant in error."
  },
  "file_name": "0228-01",
  "first_page_order": 282,
  "last_page_order": 286
}
