{ "id": 3094922, "name": "Rose Meyer, Appellee, v. Richmond E. Howlett, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Meyer v. Howlett", "decision_date": "1924-04-11", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "475", "last_page": "479", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 Ill. App. 475" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2992491 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/217/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4948764 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/287/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.N.S.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 A. L. R. 226", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Tenn. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8534054 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/140/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ill. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2425214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/300/0040-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 377, "char_count": 7578, "ocr_confidence": 0.533, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2631639244095532e-07, "percentile": 0.6129031074784669 }, "sha256": "44c5a00545452380bbc6b8d1c675dc4f87640c02e596ef0f116b2b9c0bc4ea2f", "simhash": "1:b0a26e887710faba", "word_count": 1372 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:31.592753+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Rose Meyer, Appellee, v. Richmond E. Howlett, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barry\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAppellee recovered a verdict and judgment for personal injuries due to a collision between the automobile in which she was riding and one owned by appellant, but driven by his wife. She charged, in her declaration, that appellant\u2019s wife was driving the car as the agent of her husband and that the collision was caused by her negligence. In addition to the general issue appellant filed a special plea in which he denied that his wife was driving the car as his agent or servant at the time in question. Appellee called appellant\u2019s wife as a witness. She testified that she was driving the car, going no place in particular, just out for pleasure, driving to be driving; that her daughter and a friend were with her; that the car was kept for pleasure and she drove it whenever she wanted to and had been doing so for about a year. No further evidence was introduced in support of the averment of the declaration that she was driving the car as the agent of her husband.\nAt the close of appellee\u2019s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence the court refused to direct a verdict for appellant and also refused to instruct the jury that appellee was not entitled to recover unless she had proven that the wife of appellant was driving the car as his agent or servant at the time in question. The question of agency was made an issue by the pleadings. The court refused to hold as a matter of law that appellee had failed to prove agency and then refused to require the jury to determine the question as one of fact.\nAppellee does not claim that she proved the averment of her declaration to the effect that the wife of appellant was acting as his agent. She takes the position that while the fact of such agency was made an issue by the special plea it was not necessary for her to prove it because, in Graham v. Page, 300 Ill. 40, the court said:\n\u201cThe weight of authority supports the liability of the owner of a car which is kept for family use and pleasure where an injury is negligently caused by it while driven by one of his children by his permission, and the reasoning of those cases seems sound and more in harmony with the principles of justice. We agree with the Supreme Court of Tennessee that where a father provides his family with an automobile for their pleasure, comfort and entertainment, \u2018the dictates of natural justice should require that the owner should be responsible for its. negligent operation, because only by doing so, as a general rule, can substantial justice be attained.\u2019 (King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217.) The subject received elaborate discussion and many authorities pro and con are cited in notes found in 5 A. L. R. 226, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59, and 41 id. 775.\n\u201cThe liability of defendant, and plaintiff\u2019s right to recover damages of him if his damages resulted from the negligence of defendant\u2019s daughter, is supported by the decided weight of authority and the general principles of law.\u201d\nThe court had previously held in Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, that a parent is not liable.for the tort of his minor child merely from the fact of their relationship; that in an action for damages for an injury occasioned by an automobile while being driven by the owner\u2019s minor son on a mission of his own, the relation of master and servant is not established by the mere fact that the purpose for which the father purchased the car was the pleasure of the family and that he permitted his son to use it for his own pleasure. In that case there was no evidence that the son was acting as the agent or servant of his father and the court held that the father was not liable for the negligence of the son.\nIn Graham v. Page, supra, the car was driven by the owner\u2019s daughter. The court did not overrule the Arkin case, supra, but distinguished it and said:\n\u201cShe was performing the business and duty of her father in the manner and with the means authorized by him. She was, if not the servant, at least the agent of her father in the performance of the duty or business. Liability does not, of course, rest on the mere relationship of parent and child. Cases may arise, and have arisen, where the facts proven created the relationship of master and servant between the owner of an automobile and a son employed to drive it for his father, but we think the' facts in this case created the relation of agency of the driver to the owner of the automobile.\u201d\nIf a parent is not liable for the tort of his child merely from the fact of their relationship, we are at a loss to understand why a husband should be held liable for the tort of his wife upon mere proof of the matrimonial tie. The agency of the wife is not established by proof of marriage. The statute is that, \u201cFor all civil injuries committed by a married woman, damages may be recovered from her alone, and her husband shall not be responsible therefor, except in cases where he would be jointly responsible with her, if the marriage did not exist.\u201d Cahill\u2019s Ill. St. ch. 68, \u00b6 4. At common law a husband was civilly liable for his wife\u2019s wrongful acts committed during coverture. 13 R. C. L. 1229. The statute was intended to relieve him from that liability, except in cases where he permits her to act as his agent or servant and in cases where there would be joint responsibility if there were no marriage. Mere proof of marriage does not prove that she was his agent or servant. In a case like the one at bar it was held that the husband was not liable for the negligence of his wife while she was driving his car for her own pleasure and that of her friends. Minasian v. Poff, 217 Ill. App. 8.\nUnder Arkin v. Page, supra, appellee is not entitled to recover. While the court made a broad statement in Graham v. Page, supra, which standing alone, supports appellee\u2019s contention, yet, in view of the fact that the Arkin case was simply distinguished and not overruled and the court said that, \u201cliability does not, of course, rest on the mere relationship of parent and child\u201d we cannot believe that a husband may be held liable solely because of the marriage relation in connection with the fact that he purchased and kept the car for the use and pleasure of the family. If the statute above cited does not control this case we cannot conceive of one where it would properly apply. The judgment is reversed.\nReversed with finding of facts.\nThe clerk will incorporate in the judgment the following: \u201cThe Court finds that appellee failed to prove that the wife of appellant was acting as his agent in driving the car at the time in question.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barry" } ], "attorneys": [ "Geers & Geers, for appellant.", "Paul P. Hoegen and Pope & Driemeyer, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Rose Meyer, Appellee, v. Richmond E. Howlett, Appellant.\nHusband and wife \u2014 husband not liable for wife's negligence in driving automobile. Under the provisions of Cahill\u2019s Ill. St. ch. 68, \u00b6 4, that \u201cfor all civil injuries committed by a married woman, damages may be recovered from her alone, and her husband shaU not be responsible therefor, except in cases where he would be jointly responsible with her, if the marriage did not exist,\u201d where a wife causes damage by her negligent driving of the family automobile the husband will not be held liable therefor solely because of the marriage relation and the fact that he purchased and kept the car for the use and pleasure of the family.\nAppeal by defendant from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. Silas Cook, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the March term, 1924.\nReversed with finding of facts.\nOpinion filed April 11, 1924.\nGeers & Geers, for appellant.\nPaul P. Hoegen and Pope & Driemeyer, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0475-01", "first_page_order": 503, "last_page_order": 507 }