{ "id": 5512650, "name": "Maggie Barnes, Plaintiff in Error, v. City of Chicago, Defendant in Error", "name_abbreviation": "Barnes v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "1925-06-17", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 29,437", "first_page": "464", "last_page": "467", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "237 Ill. App. 464" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "142 N. C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652689 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/142/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 W. Va. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W. Va.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5472170 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/225/0031-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 353, "char_count": 5685, "ocr_confidence": 0.531, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3165386967351216e-07, "percentile": 0.6256524994314341 }, "sha256": "62afc62a3c51c615f697bb8f0a8e23dcc01ca828c0f0f8e45caba52f169a4659", "simhash": "1:93734c9b67c7d5ef", "word_count": 1006 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:16.980379+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Maggie Barnes, Plaintiff in Error, v. City of Chicago, Defendant in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice O\u2019Connor\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nPlaintiff brought an action against the defendant, claiming that her son, John W. Simpson, had been killed by a mob and, therefore, she was entitled to recover by virtue of the provisions of \u201cAn Act to suppress mob violence,\u201d in force July 1, 1905 [Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 38, [f[f 537-542]. At the close of her case there was a directed verdict for the defendant, judgment was entered on the verdict and this writ of error followed.\nThe declaration was in two counts in each of which it was alleged that plaintiff\u2019s son, John W. Simpson, was lynched by a mob in the City of Chicago; that she was dependent upon him for her support and damages were claimed by virtue of the Act of July 1,1905. A general demurrer was sustained to this declaration, plaintiff elected to stand by her demurrer, the suit was dismissed at her costs and she sued out a writ of error from this court, where, upon consideration, an-' other division of this court held that the declaration stated a good cause of action and that the demurrer should have been overruled. Accordingly the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded. Barnes v. City of Chicago, 225 Ill. App. 31. Upon the re-docketing of the case in the trial court, the defendant\u2019s demurrer was overruled in accordance with the decision of this court and it filed a plea of the general issue. The case went to trial and at the close of the plaintiff\u2019s evidence there was a directed verdict for the defendant.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show that about six o\u2019clock on the evening of July 28,1919, a mob consisting of probably more than 100 people was assembled near Wabash avenue and 31st street in Chicago; that they were chasing one or more men east in 31st street and there was considerable shooting; that the deceased, John W. Simpson, a police officer of the City of Chicago, arrived on the scene about that time and endeavored to stop the mob and in the rioting he was shot as a result of which he died; that he left him surviving his mother, the plaintiff, who was dependent upon him for her support.\nWe think the evidence tended to show that there was a mob within the meaning of the Act and that it was assembled for the unlawful purpose mentioned in the Act, but we are of the opinion that the evidence showed that the deceased, Simpson, was not \u201clynched\u201d by the mob and since section 5 of the Act [Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 38, 541] limited recovery to the dependents of persons \u201clynched\u201d by a mob, there could be no recovery and, therefore, a directed verdict was proper. Section 5 specifically provides that where a surviving heir is \u201cdependent for support upon any other person who shall hereafter suffer death by lynching at the hands of a mob\u201d such heir may recover damages from the city in which such lynching occurs in a sum not exceeding $5,000. \u201cThe word \u2018lynching\u2019 has been defined by legal as well as other lexicographers, and according to such definitions, and as the term is generally understood, the illegal act commonly termed \u2018lynching,\u2019 as defined by Rapalje & Lawrence is \u2018mob vengeance upon a person suspected of crime.\u2019 Law Dictionary, 778. It is \u2018a term descriptive of the action of unofficial persons, organized bands, or mobs, who seize persons charged with or suspected of crimes, or take them out of the custody of the law, and inflict summary punishment on them, without legal trial, and without warrant or authority of law.\u2019 Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, p. 737. \u2018A common phrase used to express the vengeance of a mob inflicting injury and committing an outrage upon a person suspected of some crime.\u2019 State v. Aler, 39 W. Va. 558.\u201d State v. Lewis, 142 N. C. 626.\nIn the instant case there is no evidence nor is there any intimation that Simpson had committed or was suspected of having committed an offense. He was a police officer and at the time was discharging his official duties and it cannot be said within any meaning of the term that he was \u201clynched\u201d by the mob. It might well be that the law should cover such a case, but that is a question for the legislature and not for the courts. The legislature has seen fit to limit the liability of the city to the dependent heirs of such persons as are \u201clynched\u201d by a mob.\nAll that was decided on the former hearing- in this court was that since each of the two counts of the declaration charged that Simpson was lynched by a mob, it stated a cause of action. When, however, the case went to trial, the evidence disclosed that Simpson was not lynched, there could, therefore, be no recovery and the directed verdict was proper.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook county is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nThomson and Taylor, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice O\u2019Connor" } ], "attorneys": [ "E. H. Morris and Alva L. Bates, for plaintiff in error.", "Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, for defendant in error; Cora B. Hirtzel, Asst. Corporation Counsel, of counsel." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Maggie Barnes, Plaintiff in Error, v. City of Chicago, Defendant in Error.\nGen. No. 29,437.\nMunicipal corporations \u2014 hilling of police officer by riotous mob \u25a0 as \u201clynching.\u201d A police officer who, while in the discharge of his official duties, was shot while endeavoring to stop a riotous mob, and died as a result was not \u201clynched\u201d within the meaning of section 5 of the \u201cAct to suppress mob violence,\u201d in force July 1, 1905, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 38, If 541, and hence a verdict for the defendant city was properly directed in an action by the mother of the officer.\nError by plaintifi to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Franklin J. Stranskt, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed June 17, 1925.\nE. H. Morris and Alva L. Bates, for plaintiff in error.\nFrancis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, for defendant in error; Cora B. Hirtzel, Asst. Corporation Counsel, of counsel." }, "file_name": "0464-01", "first_page_order": 494, "last_page_order": 497 }