{ "id": 3121212, "name": "E. W. Wallace, Appellee, v. Yellow Cab Company, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Wallace v. Yellow Cab Co.", "decision_date": "1925-10-06", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 30,159", "first_page": "283", "last_page": "287", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "238 Ill. App. 283" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "306 Ill. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5780711 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/306/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3045148 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/224/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5414795 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/202/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2866872 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/196/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 8499382 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/178/0066-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 396, "char_count": 7681, "ocr_confidence": 0.553, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.581536494647378e-08, "percentile": 0.5259221676630568 }, "sha256": "42bf99209e63c076ca0f4248d03d84bece4131397c1493aeedcc415af1bd7593", "simhash": "1:390ce980328e559a", "word_count": 1338 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:00:21.859488+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "E. W. Wallace, Appellee, v. Yellow Cab Company, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Gridley\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn an action, tried before the court without a jury, to recover damages to plaintiff\u2019s automobile because of defendant\u2019s cab colliding with it, in the intersection of Dearborn and Goethe streets, Chicago, on the evening of March 14, 1922, there was a finding and judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor for $215, and defendant appealed. Ho question is raised as to the amount of the damages awarded.\nThe undisputed facts are in substance as follows: The intersection is in a residential portion of the city. Plaintiff was driving his car north in Dearborn street, about six feet from its east curb, approaching the intersection. Defendant\u2019s chauffeur was driving its cab east on the south side of Goethe street, approaching the intersection. Each driver saw the other car before it reached the intersection. Plaintiff\u2019s car was approaching from the right of defendant\u2019s car. Each car continued on its course. The rear wheels of plaintiff\u2019s car had just passed the middle of Goethe street, in the intersection, when the collision occurred. There was little traffic in the streets at the time. Defendant\u2019s cab struck the rear wheels of plaintiff\u2019s car with such force as to push it against the curb at the northeast corner of the intersection, and cause its rear wheels to be broken off, its frame, one axle and some fenders to be bent and its doors and radiator to be damaged.\nThe evidence is conflicting as to speed of the two cars. Plaintiff testified that, just before he entered the intersection and when he first observed the lights of defendant\u2019s cab, approaching from his left and being then about a quarter of a block west of the intersection, he was driving his car at a speed of \u201cabout 15 miles per hour,\u201d which rate was continued up to the time of the collision. Defendant\u2019s chauffeur testified that as he approached Dearborn street his cab was moving at about 12 or 15 miles per hour, which speed he \u201cbelieved\u201d he maintained up to the time of the collision; that the reason he was going slow was because he knew his brakes were not in good condition; and that at the time of and immediately before the collision plaintiff\u2019s car \u201cwas going between 25 and 30 miles per hour.\u201d A clear preponderance of the testimony of all the eyewitnesses discloses that plaintiff\u2019s car entered the intersection first and had the right of way (section 33, Motor Vehicle Law, Cahill\u2019s St. 1921, p. 2364); and the physical facts of the collision show that defendant\u2019s cab was moving at a very excessive speed.\nWhile practically conceding that defendant\u2019s chauffeur was guilty of negligence, defendant\u2019s counsel contend that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, barring any recovery by him, because he was driving his car at a rate of speed in excess of 15 miles per hour. Section 22 of said Motor Vehicle Law (Ca-hill\u2019s St. 1921, p. 2360) has reference to passenger vehicles of the class of plaintiff\u2019s and defendant\u2019s, and provides: \u201cno person shall drive a vehicle of the first division as described in section 2 of this Act, upon any public highway in this State at a speed greater than is reasonable and proper having regard to the traffic and. the use of the way or so as to endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any person. If the rate of speed of any motor vehicle * * * of said first division, * * * operated on any public highway in this State where the same passes through the residence portions of any incorporated city, town or village, exceeds fifteen (15) miles an hour, * * * such rates of speed shall be prima facie evidence that the person operating such motor vehicle * * * is running at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper having regard to the traffic and the use of the way or so as to endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any person.\u201d And counsel\u2019s argument, as we understand it, is, that plaintiff was driving at a rate of speed prohibited by the statute, and, hence, he must be held guilty of negligence. We cannot agree with the argument or the conclusion. The statute does not fix a speed limit of 15 miles per hour in a residential portion of an incorporated city, but prohibits a rate of speed \u201cgreater than is reasonable and proper having regard to the traffic and the use of the way or so as to endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any person.\u201d (People v. Lloyd, 178 Ill. App. 66, 70; Berg v. Michell, 196 Ill. App. 509.) And it merely prescribes a \u201crule of evidence,\u201d viz., that driving a motor vehicle of the class mentioned in a residential portion of an incorporated city in excess of 15 miles per hour shall be \u201cprima facie proof of running at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable under the circumstances.\u201d (Gordon v. Stadelman, 202 Ill. App. 255, 259.) And leaves it to the jury, or in a case tried without a jury to the court, to say whether or not the running at a speed in excess of 15 miles per hour is \u201cgreater than is reasonable and proper having regard to the traffic and the use of the way,\u201d etc. (People v. Lloyd, supra.) In the present case, even if plaintiff was driving his car at a speed in excess of 15 miles per hour (though on this point the evidence is conflicting), we think the court was fully justified in finding that the speed at which plaintiff\u2019s car was running at and before the time of the collision was not unreasonable or improper, in view of all the facts and circumstances in evidence. And we think that the court was also justified in finding that the speed at which plaintiff\u2019s car was running was not the proximate cause of the collision, and that it was caused by the negligent failure of defendant\u2019s chauffeur to check the speed of the cab and allow plaintiff\u2019s car to pass in front of it. (Lenartz v. Funk, 224 Ill. App. 180, 185; Lerette v. Director General of Railroads, 306 Ill. 348, 353.) And clearly the finding and judgment are not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as counsel also contend.\nThe judgment of the municipal court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.\nAffirmed.\nBarnes, P. J., and Gridley, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Gridley" } ], "attorneys": [ "McGreaham, Blake & Sharp, for appellant.", "William A. Morrow and Walter M. Fowler, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "E. W. Wallace, Appellee, v. Yellow Cab Company, Appellant.\nGen. No. 30,159.\n1. Highways and streets \u2014 speed law as creating only rule of evidence. Motor Vehicle Law, sec. 22, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 95a, 1f 23, creates only a rule of evidence and leaves it to the jury, or court trying case without jury, to say whether or not running at speed in excess of 15 miles per hour is greater than is reasonable and proper.\n2. Highways and streets \u2014 when automobile\u2019s speed not unreasonable. In action for damages to automobile received in collision at street intersection, finding that plaintiff was not driving his car at an unreasonable or improper rate of speed held proper under the evidence.\n3. Highways and streets \u2014 when rate of speed not proximate cause of collision. In action for injury to automobile in collislon at street intersection, court held justified in finding that speed of plaintiff\u2019s car, if excessive, was not proximate cause of collision.\n4. Highways and- stbeets \u2014 when negligence of taxicab driver shown. In action for injury to automobile in collision with taxicab at street intersection, finding that chauffeur of defendant\u2019s cab was negligent in not checking the speed of his cab held proper under the evidence.\nAppeal by defendant from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John F. O\u2019Connell, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1925.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed October 6, 1925.\nMcGreaham, Blake & Sharp, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Morrow and Walter M. Fowler, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0283-01", "first_page_order": 313, "last_page_order": 317 }