{
  "id": 5779602,
  "name": "Josiah Deyo v. Edwin Ferris",
  "name_abbreviation": "Deyo v. Ferris",
  "decision_date": "1887-12-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "416",
  "last_page": "418",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "24 Ill. App. 416"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "22 Ill. App. 154",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        4916796
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/22/0154-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 266,
    "char_count": 3876,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.455,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.170266683501625
    },
    "sha256": "a0df7b996ab8a49d803540d240d0e67a10c3ec267eef4a5318a313f880fd66ba",
    "simhash": "1:ebdc87c61b307278",
    "word_count": 705
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:43.290476+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Josiah Deyo v. Edwin Ferris."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Lacey, J.\nThis is the same case that was in this court and decided at its May term, 1886, (22 Ill. App. 154.) when this court held that the contract upon which the suit was brought was void under the Statute of Frauds and the cause was remanded to the court below.\nThai decision is referred to for a complete statement of the facts. At the March term, 1887, of the Circuit Court, the case was again tried and a judgment was again entered against appellant for \u00a775, the full amount of the original claim. From that judgment an appeal is again taken. The basis of the appellee\u2019s claim is this: The appellee and appellant are the owners of adjoining lands across which runs a wide swale unfit for cultivation without drainage; the appellee\u2019s is the lower heritance, and he had a ditch already completed across his land up to within about two rods of appellant\u2019s land. In the fall of 1882 the parties to this suit agreed between them that appellee should extend the ditch into appellant's land and the latter should pay him \u00a775. This contract was not reduced to writing.\nWe held when the case was here before, upon the evidence, that the subject of the contract was that in addition to the expense of extending the ditch about two rods onto appellant\u2019s land, the expense of which was trifling, it was in the contemplation of the parties that appellant should have the right of way for the fiowage of the water from his land through the ditch of appellee on his land, and that this right was a part of the consideration of the contract. After a careful examination of the case and the law we held that a parol agreement concerning the right of way for fiowage of water through a ditch on another\u2019s land is within the Statute of Frauds and void.\nHence it followed that the contract as a contract was void. We also intimated that there was a possible right of recovery on the part of appellee on the quantum, menoit for the work and labor done by appellee at appellant\u2019s request, in digging the small portion of the ditch to and on the appellant\u2019s land.\nWe find the record of the evidence much the same as it was when the case was here before. Its main features are not changed. It is now insisted that appellee had left the two rods at the upper end of his ditch unexcavated for the purposes of a farm crossing, and that the $75 was given him in part to compensate him for the expense of bridging the ditch. But this excuse can not avail for the reason that the bridge in itself was of no benefit to appellant, and he naturally would not want to pay $75 for such expense unless he got the right of way, and the bridge has not yet been built. Appellee himself testifies that the proposition made by him to appellant was \u201c to cut and extend the ditch through onto your land and make a good outlet for your tiling.\u201d\nThis proposition appellant accepted and the twenty or twenty-five feet on appellee\u2019s land and ten to fifteen feet \u201c onto appellant\u2019s\u201d land was dug. The proposition presupposed the right of way over appellee\u2019s land for drainage for appellant\u2019s tiling, otherwise how could there be \u201c a good outlet \u201d for the latter\u2019s tile?\nIt is evident the verdict for $75 can not be sustained.\nThis oi ight to have been manifest from the decision of this court when the case was here before.\n.For the error in not setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial, the judgment is revers\u00e9d and the cause remanded.\nReversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Lacey, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mr. Miles A. Fuller, for appellant.",
      "Messrs. J. C. Decker and C. C. Wilson, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Josiah Deyo v. Edwin Ferris.\nStatute of Frauds\u2014Fight to Floto Water through Drain.\nA parol agreement for a right to flow water through a ditch on another\u2019s land is void, such right being an interest in lands within the Statute of Frauds.\n[Opinion filed December 9, 1887.]\nAppeal from tlie Circuit Court of Stark County; the Hon. S. S. Page, Judge, presiding.\nMr. Miles A. Fuller, for appellant.\nMessrs. J. C. Decker and C. C. Wilson, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0416-01",
  "first_page_order": 410,
  "last_page_order": 412
}