{ "id": 3373305, "name": "Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company, Appellant, v. Moses M. Lieberman et al., trading as Joseph L. Lieberman Iron Company, Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad v. Lieberman", "decision_date": "1927-10-04", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 31,702", "first_page": "503", "last_page": "508", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "245 Ill. App. 503" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3128227 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/239/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2926335 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/207/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3106051 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/236/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5415617 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/202/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Atl. 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N. E. 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ohio St. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St.", "case_ids": [ 981467 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st/113/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 N. Y. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 1969356 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/234/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Pac. 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Kan. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 1249781 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/119/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2998712 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/216/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ill. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5806027 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/140/0021-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 479, "char_count": 7818, "ocr_confidence": 0.551, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3115058982846373e-07, "percentile": 0.6245868002342994 }, "sha256": "5a5bf367677a34d0658764aa7d3390d7f3d8858939ef5708e6665941f2bc2715", "simhash": "1:36c785e41640b5d9", "word_count": 1304 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:59:36.655682+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company, Appellant, v. Moses M. Lieberman et al., trading as Joseph L. Lieberman Iron Company, Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barnes\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an appeal from a judgment for costs against plaintiff in an action to recover a balance of $212.82 for freight and damage charges accruing for an interstate shipment of scrap iron, after deducting $69.40 realized from the sale of the iron after defendants\u2019 refusal to pay such charges.\nThe shipment was under a uniform bill of lading, dated June 9, 1920, from Circleville, Ohio, to East Chicago, Indiana, designating J. Krakowitz as shipper to Republic Iron & Steel Company, and routing for delivery by plaintiff.\nBy letter of June 16 defendants requested plaintiff to have the car diverted to the Interstate Iron & Steel Company, at the same destination, saying therein \u201ccharges following,\u201d and promising the original bill-of lading' as soon as received. The same day defendants wrote the agent of the initial carrier to have the \" bill of lading corrected for reconsignment to the Interstate Iron & Steel Company, giving the same destination and delivery, saying they had purchased the car and when seller sent defendants the original bill of lading it would be able to surrender the same. In another letter to plaintiff of June 23 \u201cconfirming conversation\u201d had that day with one of plaintiff\u2019s representatives with reference to the car, which was referred to therein as \u201cnow refused by the Republic Iron & Steel Company on your rails at East Chicago, Ind.,\u201d defendants stated \u201cit is understood you will have this car reassigned to the Interstate Iron & Steel Company, East Chicago, Ind., IHBelt Delivery, and allow all charges to follow. * * * and we hereby agree to guarantee you against any loss due to our inability to surrender at this time the original bill of lading. # * * and will also guarantee payment of all transportation charges. \u00ae * # Kindly acknowledge receipt of these instructions.\u201d (Italics ours.) This letter was acknowledged by plaintiff\u2019s letter of June 23, saying the car had been \u2018\u2018 ordered diverted to the Interstate Iron & Steel Company, East Chicago, Ind., all charges to follow, as per your request.\u201d\nThe latter company also rejected the shipment and so notified plaintiff on July 7. Referring to the rejection in a letter of July 12, defendants advised plaintiff \u201cto notify and accept dispositions orders from J. Krakowitz, * * * collecting all demurrage and freight charges.\u201d\nPlaintiff held the car, as the proof tends to show, until August 26, when the scrap iron was sold for $69.40, at the best offer plaintiff was able to secure.\nThe legal car rate from point of shipment to ultimate destination was $78.28, the demurrage under the national car demurrage rules, from July 8 (date of defendants\u2019 refusal) to August 26 (the date of sale), $198, and the war tax $5.94, a total of $282.22. Crediting the $69.40 realized from the sale defendants were sued for the balance of $212.82.\nNo witnesses were offered by defendants:\nThe above state of facts is not questioned except as to the period for which demurrage was chargeable, there being no express proof of plaintiff\u2019s possession of the car between August 2 and August 26. But in view of plaintiff\u2019s unquestioned possession after said refusal up to August 2, and likewise on the date of sale, we think the proof raises a presumption of plaintiff\u2019s continuance of possession during that interval. (Vol. 1, sec. 41, G-reenleaf on Evidence; Choisser v. People ex rel. Rude, 140 Ill. 21, 35; Thompson v. Crains, 216 Ill. App. 300, 311.)\nDefendants contend that their expressed understanding in their letter of June 23, that plaintiff was to allow \u201call charges to follow\u201d should be construed to mean only for transportation from the original consignee at East Chicago, Ind., to the Interstate Iron & Steel Company at the same destination. The same letter expressly guaranteed \u201call transportation charges\u201d and indicated their ownership of the bill of lading, which on the day they requested diversion of the shipment they asked to have corrected for reconsignment to the latter company. Not only do we think it clear that they thus assumed and intended to assume liability for all charges for transportation under the bill of lading, but by accepting the freight and reconsigning it they received the benefit of the transportation and became liable therefor as consignees. (Case v. Union Pac. R. Co., 119 Kan. 706, 241 Pac. 693, 694.) It was held in New York Cent. R. Co. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N. Y. 261, that \u201cthe consignee becomes liable for the freight charges when an obligation-arises on his part from presumptive ownership, acceptance of the goods and tlie services rendered and benefits conferred by the railroad company.-\u2019 \u2019 In that - case it was said that when the defendant wrote a letter directing the delivery without notifying the plaintiff that it was not the owner of the goods, it acted as a consignee or volunteer, and accepted the goods by an act of ownership in giving such directions. Here defendants not only claimed to have purchased the car, but assumed ownership of the bill of lading and guaranteed its surrender. This same view of liability is taken in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Rice Coal Co., 113 Ohio St. 34, 148 N. E. 349, and in Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. National Asbestos Mfg. Co. (N. J. L.), 127 Atl. 184. In the latter case it was said, citing decisions of the United States Supreme Court, that \u201cit has been definitely established that under the uniform bill of lading the consignee, by accepting the shipment, becomes liable for the lawful freight charges accrued thereon to the carrier,\u201d and that the exercise of control in a reshipment necessarily implied acceptance. This doctrine has been accepted by this court in Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Monarch Lumber Co., 202 Ill. App. 20, and in New York Cent. R, Co. v. Platt & Brahm Coal Co., 236 Ill. App. 150.\nIn the latter case defendant relied on a contrary ruling by the third division of this court in Chicago, I. & S. R. Co. v. D. E. McMillan & Brother Coal Co., 207 Ill. App. 58, to which that division has adhered in Pere Marquette R. Co. v. American Coal & Supply Co., 239 Ill. App. 139. The opinions in those cases were based somewhat on facts from which the court found that the act of the consignee in reconsigning the shipment did not constitute such a constructive act of ownership as to render him liable for the freight, charges from the original point of consignment, or from the point where the shipment was first diverted. Whatever force may be given to the distinctions there made between the facts of the several cases analyzed, which we find it unnecessary to discuss, we think there can be no doubt that the facts of this case indicate not only constructive acts of ownership by . defendant but show an express promise on their part to pay such charges. Having exercised ownership over the contents of the car and thus impliedly accepted them and the benefits of the transportation, we are constrained to hold that defendants are clearly liable for all such charges, and accordingly reverse the judgment and enter one here for appellant for $212.82, the case-having been tried without a jury:\nReversed with findings of fact and judgment here.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barnes" }, { "text": "Gridley and Wells, JJ.,\nconcur.\nFindings of fact: We find that defendants accepted the shipment in question and agreed to pay all transportation charges therefor, and afterwards refused to pay the same, and that plaintiff held the car in his possession 43 days, subject to the national car rules as to demurrage.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Gridley and Wells, JJ.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Glennon, Cary, Walker & Murray, for appellant; L. Beers-Jones, of counsel.", "Benjamin B. Morris, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company, Appellant, v. Moses M. Lieberman et al., trading as Joseph L. Lieberman Iron Company, Appellees.\nGen. No. 31,702.\nOpinion filed October 4, 1927.\nGlennon, Cary, Walker & Murray, for appellant; L. Beers-Jones, of counsel.\nBenjamin B. Morris, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0503-01", "first_page_order": 555, "last_page_order": 560 }