{ "id": 3337330, "name": "Charles Grove et al. for use of Roy Hamm Post No. 101 American Legion, Appellees, v. The Board of Supervisors of Piatt County, Illinois, and Harvey Fay, County Clerk of Piatt County, Illinois. The Board of Supervisors of Piatt County, Illinois, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Grove ex rel. Roy Hamm Post No. 101 American Legion v. Board of Supervisors", "decision_date": "1927-10-31", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 8,059", "first_page": "241", "last_page": "248", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "246 Ill. App. 241" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "197 Ill. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 844020 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/197/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2599404 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/100/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 844019 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/197/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314368 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/82/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 871225 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/96/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Scam. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Scam.", "case_ids": [ 2474733 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/3/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Gilm. (Ill.) 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "case_ids": [ 2465780 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/6/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4723821 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/258/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5634546 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/231/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3222670 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/184/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ill. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4727498 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/259/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5390060 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/188/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4979001 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/292/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4725366 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/258/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3302560 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/210/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2733284 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/93/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5469954 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/151/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5485806 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/145/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ill. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4762523 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/263/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5404390 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/126/0174-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 629, "char_count": 11582, "ocr_confidence": 0.534, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8145080309951422e-07, "percentile": 0.7182789421313752 }, "sha256": "a72ca877c48f5958e37aee57401e499c4a291bff2fb89d7f7af7ad6979dc971d", "simhash": "1:8e4fef7e0c1d3508", "word_count": 2033 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:12.897381+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Charles Grove et al. for use of Roy Hamm Post No. 101 American Legion, Appellees, v. The Board of Supervisors of Piatt County, Illinois, and Harvey Fay, County Clerk of Piatt County, Illinois. The Board of Supervisors of Piatt County, Illinois, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Shurtleff\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nFrom an order of the circuit court of Piatt county awarding the writ of mandamus against the board of supervisors, an appeal is prosecuted. Appellees will hereafter be designated as petitioners and appellant as defendant. The petitioners presented to the defendant a petition \u201cfor and in behalf of Roy Hamm Post No. 101 American Legion\u201d for permission to operate a dance platform or dance hall. They tendered the fee required and answered all questions tending to show that they were qualified to receive the license or permit asked for. The board refused to grant the license. Thereupon, a petition for writ' of mandamus was filed and on the hearing the writ was awarded.\nThe law under which the application was made substantially provides, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 34, \u00b6 195: \u201cIt shall hereafter be unlawful for any person or persons to operate or maintain a public dance hall or road house for the use of the general public outside of the limits of any city, village or incorporated town without first obtaining a license therefor from the county board of the county where the public dance hall is situat\u00e9d, in accordance with the provisions of this Act.\u201d By section 2, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 34, \u00b6 196, county boards are given power to grant licenses for one year only and to revoke them. Section 3, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 34, \u00b6 197, authorizes the continuance of those halls then in operation until the board at its next regular meeting shall issue or refuse to issue a license under the provisions of the act. Section 4, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 34, \u00b6 198, provides: \u201cA license to operate or maintain a dance hall may be issued by the county board to any citizen, firm or corporation of the State, who\n\u201c(1) Submits a written application for a license, which application shall state, and the applicant shall state under oath:\n\u201c(a) The name, address, and residence of the applicant, and the length of time he has lived at that residence;\n\u201c(b) The place of birth of the applicant, and if the applicant is a naturalized citizen, the time and place of such naturalization; '\n\u201c(c) That the applicant has never been convicted of a felony, or of a misdemeanor punishable under the laws of this State by a minimum imprisonment of six months or longer.\u201d\nHe must establish that he is a person of good moral character and that the place or building where the dance hall or road house used for public dancing is to be operated or maintained reasonably conforms to all laws and health and fire regulations applicable thereto, and the observance of certain sanitary and moral regulations there prescribed.\nBy section 5, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 34, \u00b6 199, the county board is authorized to make a thorough investigation to determine the fitness of the applicant and the truth of the statements made in and accompanying the application, the decision on an application to issue or renew a license to be rendered within 30 days after the application is received.\nBy sections 6, 7 and 8, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 34, \u00b6\u00b6 200, 201 and 202, provision is made for revoking licenses; immoral practices are forbidden, and penalties provided therefor and for making false statements in applications for license or renewal.\nA demurrer to the petition was filed and overruled. An answer and a replication thereto were filed. The abstract shows that a demurrer was filed to the answer and on motion of defendants carried back to the petition and overruled. There is much confusion as to the actual proceedings in the circuit court as shown by the abstract.\nBut whatever the state of the pleadings in that respect, it is now insisted that the court erred in awarding the peremptory writ of mandamus. Petitioners insist that the insufficiency of the petition is not open to inquiry, a demurrer to it having been overruled, and that the judgment must be affirmed.\nThe writ of mandamus is a writ commanding an official or official board to perform a ministerial act where the law imposes the duty to act, and no discretion is vested in the official or board. Mandamus is governed by the rules of pleading applicable to other actions at law. (Dement v. Rokker, 126 Ill. 174; People ex rel. Edgar v. Board of Review of Cook County, 263 Ill. 326.) The petition for mandamus under the statute performs the function of a declaration in a suit at law (People ex rel. Rinard v. Town of Mount Morris, 145 Ill. 427; People ex rel. Payson v. Pavey, 151 Ill. 101), and takes the place of the alternative writ at common law (People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 133; City of Chicago v. People ex rel. Gray, 210 Ill. 84). It must state facts showing a clear and undoubted right to the relief demanded. (People v. Davis, supra; People ex rel. Molchan v. City Council of City of Streator, 258 Ill. 273; People ex rel. Albright v. Blair, 292 Ill. 139; People ex rel. Cooley v. Commissioners of Highways, 188 Ill. App. 56.) Unless the right of the relators to the relief is clear and undeniable and the party sought to be coerced is bound to act, the writ will not be awarded. (People ex rel. Brownrigg v. Brentano, 259 Ill. 359, 360.)\nThe act in question provides: \u201cFor the regulation of public dance halls or road houses used for public dances outside the limits of any city, village or town, \" etc. and does not provide for their prohibition. In section four of the act the word \u201cmay\u201d is to be construed as meaning \u2018 \u2018shall. \u2019 \u2019 Canal Com\u2019rs v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 184 Ill. 597, 604, in which case the court held:\n\u201cThe words \u2018may\u2019 and \u2018shall,\u2019 when used in a statute, will sometimes be read interchangeably, as will best express the legislative intent. The word \u2018may\u2019 will be construed to mean \u2018shall\u2019 when the public or third persons have a claim that the power ought to be exercised; but when the word \u2018shall\u2019 is used, where no right or benefit to any one depends on its imperative use that word may be held directory, merely, and by legislative intention to be used synonymously with the word \u2018may.\u2019 It is also permissible, in the construction of a statute, to transpose- words and sentences, if by so doing the legislative intention can be determined. \u2019 \u2019\nThe statute in question by its title merely purports to regulate dance halls, and if the act contains any power to prohibit, such powers would be unconstitutional and void. (People ex rel. Berlisheimer v. Busse, 231 Ill. 251, and People ex rel. Goldberg v. Busse, 240 v. 338, 342.) Where a statute admits of two constructions, one of which will render it valid and the other invalid, courts are bound to adopt the construction which will render it valid. (Baker v. Baker, 258 Ill. 418.) It therefore follows that the act in question is a valid, mandatory act as to all such persons and corporations who bring themselves within the provisions of the act.\nThe substance of defendant\u2019s answer was a denial that a proper and sufficient petition was presented to the board of supervisors, although the answer did admit that the \u201cpurported\u201d petition, set up in petitioners\u2019 petition in this cause was presented and denied. That petition in all matters complied with the act, and contained by way of exhibits numerous affidavits of citizens as to the good moral character of the applicants, which are not contradicted or denied. The only issue raised by the pleadings was an issue of law, although proofs were presented and there was a hearing before the court; but no proofs were presented other than the petition, documents and affidavits which were presented to the board of supervisors. No propositions of law were presented and there was no motion in arrest of judgment.\nDefendant contends that the petition presented to appellant by the petitioners was insufficient, for the reason that the petition was made by the petitioners \u201cfor and in behalf of Roy Hamm Post No. 101 of the American Legion,\u201d etc., and insist that there are no qualifications relative to \u201cThe Roy Hamm Post No. 101 of the American Legion\u201d set out in the petition. There is no merit in this contention. This is a suit at law and petitioners have the right to present the petition in their own behalf and to sue. As the Supreme Court said in Chadsey v. Lewis, 1 Gilm. (Ill.) 153, 159: \u201cThe suit is in the name of the proper person, and it makes no difference to the defendant for whose benefit it is brought. As was said in the case of McHenry v. Ridgeley (2 Scam. 309), the court will not inquire whether the plaintiff sues for himself, or as trustee for some other person. It is sufficient that he has the legal interest.\u201d\nIn Brownell Improvement Co. v. Critchfield, 96 Ill. App. 84, 90, the court held:\n\u201cIt is also contended by counsel for appellant that the suit is improperly maintained for the use of the Mexican Asphalt Paving Co., and in this behalf it is urged that the assignment of contracts to it by appellees is ineffectual to convey any right to a part, at least, of the damages recovered. But the appellees having the legal right to the damages, and the suit being maintained in their name as nominal plaintiffs, it is a matter of no consequence to appellant for whose use they sue or recover. In no event can appellant be prejudiced thereby. Atkins v. Moore, 82 Ill. 240.\n\u201cIn that case the Supreme Court said:\n\u201c \u2018The party in whom is the legal right of action may, as respects the defendant, bring his suit for' the use of whatever person he likes; that it is no concern of the defendant, for whose use the action may be brought, and that it is not necessary that the one for whose use a suit may be brought, should have any interest or connection otherwise with the subject of the suit.-\u2019 \u201d\nThis case was affirmed in 197 Ill. 61.\nIn Jones v. Maxton, 100 Ill. App. 201, 203, it was held: \u201cAll that was alleged in the declaration as to the party for whose use the suit was brought, while immaterial and unnecessary, did not vitiate the pleading,\u201d and this case was affirmed in 197 Ill. 248.\nAs well might petitioners set out in their petition that the application was made \u201cfor the use\u201d or \u201cgeneral benefit\u201d of the citizens of any other organization, or the persons of any particular locality, and it would be descriptive only, immaterial, but would not vitiate the petition. A reference to the act in question demonstrates that while a corporation may apply for and be granted a license or permit, there might be some difficulties in making out a proper petition and showing, for example, \u201cits place of birth,\u201d and its \u201cgood moral character,\u201d etc., all of which questions are not before the court in this case. Petitioners had the legal right to apply for the license and would be bound by the terms of any license or permit granted, and it is no concern of the defendant the particular class of citizens petitioners desired to serve, provided there was the necessity or desire to dance.\nThe only further contention made by defendant is that the provisions of the act render it optional with the board of supervisors to grant or refuse the permit. What we have already said fully covers that phase of the case.\nFinding no error in the judgment of the circuit court of Piatt county, that judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Shurtleff" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert P. Shonkwiler, State\u2019s Attorney, for appellant.", "Thos. J. Kastel, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Charles Grove et al. for use of Roy Hamm Post No. 101 American Legion, Appellees, v. The Board of Supervisors of Piatt County, Illinois, and Harvey Fay, County Clerk of Piatt County, Illinois. The Board of Supervisors of Piatt County, Illinois, Appellant.\nGen. No. 8,059.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1926.\nOpinion filed October 31, 1927.\nRobert P. Shonkwiler, State\u2019s Attorney, for appellant.\nThos. J. Kastel, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0241-01", "first_page_order": 301, "last_page_order": 308 }