{
  "id": 5589448,
  "name": "Rowland Gannon, Appellant, v. Mildred Kiel, Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Gannon v. Kiel",
  "decision_date": "1929-02-01",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "389",
  "last_page": "392",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "251 Ill. App. 389"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "292 Ill. 206",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        4981073
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/292/0206-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "101 Ill. 391",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2817719
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/101/0391-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "199 Ill. 254",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3262809
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/199/0254-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "319 Ill. 326",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5155244
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/319/0326-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "318 Ill. 11",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5151319
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/318/0011-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "296 Ill. 464",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5058129
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/296/0464-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 264,
    "char_count": 4034,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.521,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 7.454604561672698e-08,
      "percentile": 0.4445958046202694
    },
    "sha256": "825e342ea9c4ce8285381a88ebacf8e7fecce17c22b1d9504d0566652ae80b0b",
    "simhash": "1:177573afc65f9be6",
    "word_count": 699
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:15.181192+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Rowland Gannon, Appellant, v. Mildred Kiel, Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barry\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAppellee recovered a judgment in the city court of East St. Louis against appellant in an action of tort and procured an execution against his body. Appellant then filed a petition in the county court, under section 2 of the Insolvent Debtors\u2019 Act, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 72, If 2, asking to be discharged from imprisonment. Appellee answered and upon a hearing the court dismissed the petition and remanded appellant to the custody of the sheriff.\nThe declaration in the action in which appellee recovered judgment consisted of two counts. The first charged appellant with general negligence in the operation of his car which caused appellee\u2019s injury and that she was then and there in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety. The second charged that appellant, in reckless disregard of the rights of pedestrians, wilfully and wantonly drove his automobile against appellee, and wantonly and wilfully injured her.\nIn the law of negligence, if a person intentionally inflicts an injury he may be found guilty of wilful and .wanton negligence. If he does not intentionally inflict the injury but his conduct is such as to charge him with constructive or legal wilfulness he may be found guilty of wilful and wanton negligence even though he had no intent to injure anyone. Bernier v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 296 Ill. 464; Bremer v. Bake Erie & W. R. Co., 318 Ill. 11; Brown v. Illinois Terminal Co., 319 Ill. 326,\nIn an action of tort a defendant may be guilty of wilful and wanton negligence without malice being the gist of the action within the meaning of the Insolvent Debtors\u2019 Act, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 72, 5. That is by reason of the fact that his conduct may be such as to charge him with constructive or legal wilfulness even though he had no intent to injure anyone.\nIf issues are made upon all the counts in suit against an insolvent debtor, including one of which malice is the gist, a judgment upon a general verdict is responsive to such issues and prima facie establishes that malice was the gist of the action, and the burden is upon the petitioning debtor to show the contrary. Jernberg v. Mix, 199 Ill. 254.\nThe term \u201cmalice,\u201d as used in the Insolvent Debtors\u2019 Act, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 72, H 5, implies a wrong inflicted on another with an evil intent or purpose. It requires an intentional perpetration of an injury or a wrong on another. Such intention to commit the wrong is necessary to deprive the party of the right to a discharge from arrest or imprisonment under the act. First Nat. Bank of Flora v. Burkett, 101 Ill. 391; Seney v. Knight, 292 Ill. 206.\nIn the case at bar appellee admitted in her answer to the petition that the evidence in her case against appellant showed that appellant did not see appellee prior to the time of the collision. That being true, we are of the opinion that it cannot be rightfully said that malice was the gist of the action within the meaning of the Insolvent Debtors\u2019 Act, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 72, U 5. Appellant might be guilty of constructive or legal wilfulness so far as the law of negligence is concerned. Constructive or legal wilfulness, however, is not sufficient to show that malice was the gist of the action. How can it be said that appellant intentionally perpetrated the injury of appellee if he did not see her or know that she was present? As we understand the law, there must be an actual intention to perpetrate the injury and that it is not sufficient that appellant may have been guilty of constructive or legal wilfulness. Under appellee\u2019s admission we are of the opinion that the court erred in dismissing appellant\u2019s petition and remanding him to the custody of the sheriff. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to discharge appellant.\nReversed and remanded with directions.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barry"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "T. S. Morgan, for appellant.",
      "Pope & Driemeyer, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Rowland Gannon, Appellant, v. Mildred Kiel, Appellee.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1928.\nOpinion filed February 1, 1929.\nT. S. Morgan, for appellant.\nPope & Driemeyer, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0389-01",
  "first_page_order": 451,
  "last_page_order": 454
}