{ "id": 5543996, "name": "Nina Scharfenstein, Administratrix of the Estate of Whitney C. Scharfenstein, Deceased, Appellee, v. Forest City Knitting Company and Security Building Company, Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Scharfenstein v. Forest City Knitting Co.", "decision_date": "1929-03-04", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 7,948", "first_page": "190", "last_page": "206", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "253 Ill. App. 190" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3309632 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/247/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5572417 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/189/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5780692 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/306/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2755678 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/175/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3081799 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/143/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Fed. 816", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 5741084 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/249/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2802905 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/165/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4780191 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/265/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3128264, 3128040, 3119372, 3127151, 3124630 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/239/0669-01", "/ill-app/239/0669-04", "/ill-app/239/0669-03", "/ill-app/239/0669-05", "/ill-app/239/0669-02" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2727300 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/161/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2443935 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/324/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4793581 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/268/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3334317 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/224/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2894389 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/192/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2884098 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/193/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2560148 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/109/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3436049 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/251/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3332725 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/224/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ill. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5205634 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/330/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5055402 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/296/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4979463 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/292/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4852618 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/276/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3343511 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/221/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5629114 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/229/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ill. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4830130 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/272/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3379941 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/233/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 849053 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/239/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5781919 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/306/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5503316 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/164/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5168962 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/63/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3307489 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/211/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2860965 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/112/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5503851 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/164/0340-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 960, "char_count": 23764, "ocr_confidence": 0.487, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3842869999983139e-07, "percentile": 0.6411707786824637 }, "sha256": "5f8e67a53706d9349230c0199373854b82a87cf5b5d912996faf2291377e3a7b", "simhash": "1:ac5db5f2eebbc5bf", "word_count": 4027 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:33:35.432153+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Nina Scharfenstein, Administratrix of the Estate of Whitney C. Scharfenstein, Deceased, Appellee, v. Forest City Knitting Company and Security Building Company, Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Boggs\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAn action on the case was instituted by appellee against appellants in the circuit court of Winnebago county, to recover for the death of appellee\u2019s intestate, alleged to have been caused through the negligence of appellants.\nThe original declaration was filed April 2, 1927. On March 11, 1928, an amended declaration was filed to which appellants filed separate demurrers. Said demurrers being overruled, appellants severally filed pleas of the general issue, of the statute of limitations, of partial payment, pleas that if there was any right of action, it was in favor of the Illinois Central Railroad Company under the doctrine of subrogation, and pleas of release of the Illinois Central Railroad as a joint tort-feasor. Demurrers filed to the special pleas were sustained. A trial was had, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for $8,000. To reverse said judgment, this appeal is prosecuted.\nTwo switch tracks or leads run in a southwesterly direction from the west line of Francis Street in the City of Rockford. The southerly one serves appellant, Forest City Knitting Company\u2019s plant, lying south of it; the northerly track serves the Rockford Drilling Machine Company, whose building lies north of it.\nAppellant Security Building Company was constructing a building and garage for the Forest City Knitting Company, and had employed'Putney Brothers to make the excavation therefor. In making said excavation, certain of the dirt was placed between said switch tracks.\nOn the afternoon of December 16, 1925, a switch engine, the crew of which included appellee\u2019s intestate, was backing in a southwesterly direction, pulling two cars, on the track of the Rockford Drilling Machine Company. Appellee\u2019s intestate had thrown the switch which caused the engine to enter the track leading to the Rockford Drilling Machine Company\u2019s plant, and had given the signal to back up.\nThe engineer heard some one \u201chollow,\u201d and stopped the engine. When appellee\u2019s intestate was next seen, he was under the footboard of the engine. The foot-board was bent back against the brake beam, which was across Scharfenstein\u2019s leg, but did not touch it. Howard Janes, the foreman of the appellant building company and Holding Anderson, secretary and treasurer of said company, went to the place where the engine had stopped and tried to raise the footboard from Scharfenstein\u2019s body, breaking a piece of 2x6 timber in the attempt. The engine was then moved some 5 or 6 feet in order to extricate appellee\u2019s intestate. He was fatally injured, and died a few hours thereafter.\nIt is first contended by appellants that the original declaration did not state a cause of action, in that it attempted to recover under the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act, Cahill\u2019s St. ch. 114, \u00b6 321 et seq., and that no recovery could be had against appellants under that act, as they were not common carriers; that the amended declaration, being filed more than one year after said injury, would be barred under the State statute of limitations, and that the court erred in sustaining demurrers to said pleas.\nWhile the declaration set forth that appellee\u2019s intestate was engaged in interstate commerce, and alleged damages of $25,000, this would not render said declaration bad as against appellants under the State statute, if the facts averred set forth a cause of action-even though stated defectively. The allegation as to the amount of damages is one of form, and, if 'not objected to on the trial, cannot be taken advantage of on appeal. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. of Illinois v. Bagley, 164 Ill. 340-342. It may be amended after verdict. Tomlinson v. Earnshaw, 112 Ill. 311-313. See also Beidler v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 211 Ill. 628-640.\nThe original declaration charged in substance that on December \u25a0 16, 1925, while appellee\u2019s intestate, a switchman for the Illinois Central Railroad Company, was switching certain cars to be used in interstate commerce, and while he was in the exercise of due care for his own safety, the engine upon which he was. riding struck certain dirt or refuse belonging to appellant knitting company, placed there by appellant building company without the knowledge of appellee\u2019s intestate, \u201cand with the knowledge of the Forest City Knitting Company and under their direction, and that said dirt had become frozen and impact and covered with snow so as to be hidden from view by the said Whitney C. Seharfenstein, deceased,\u201d and that appellee\u2019s intestate was thrown under the locomotive, etc. and sustained the injuries in question.\nIt is further urged that said original declaration does not allege a duty on the part of appellants to appellee\u2019s intestate, a neglect thereof with resulting injury, etc. It is only necessary that the pleader state facts from which the law will raise a duty, and its omission and resulting injury. When that is done, an allegation that the act was negligent is unnecessary. Taylor v. Felsing, 63 Ill. App. 624-628, affirmed in Taylor v. Felsing, 164 Ill. 331-335; Miller v. S. S. Kresge Co., 306 Ill. 104-106. Appellants owed to appellee\u2019s intestate the duty not to place obstructions along the switch tracks of his employer so as to endanger his life while in the exercise of his duties as such switchman.\nIn suits for wrongful death, the \u201ccause of action\u201d is the wrongful act, neglect or default causing death, and not merely the death itself. Mooney v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 414-423; Crane v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co., 233 Ill. 259-262. When a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the cause of action is the thing done or omitted to be done, which confers the right upon the other to sue. Greene v. L. Fish Furniture Co., 272 Ill. 148-156; Mooney v. City of Chicago, supra. The original declaration stated a cause of action against appellants, although defectively.\nThe amended declaration, after alleging the placing of said dirt, etc., averred that appellee\u2019s intestate \u201cwas riding on the footboard of the engine which was backing; that the running board struck the refuse and dirt which appellants had negligently and carelessly dumped along and adjacent to said switch track, so that it was broken and bent . . . and said deceased was thrown from said running board or foot-board upon said engine, down to and upon the ground,\u201d etc.\nThe cause of action, both in the original and amended declarations, was the alleged wrongful depositing of said dirt, along said tracks, with the resultant injury to appellee\u2019s intestate. The amended declaration did not state a new cause of action. See Swift Co. v. Gaylord, 229 Ill. 330-334. The statute of limitations does not apply to matters of mere pleading, and it should not be given that effect indirectly by holding that an imperfect statement of a cause of action is no statement of it. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Aufmann, 221 Ill. 614-620.\nIt is next insisted that there can be no recovery against appellants, for the reason that said dirt was placed on said tracks by employees of Putney Brothers, who were claimed to be independent contractors.\nWhile the men who did the work were employed and paid by Putney Brothers, all or certain of said dirt was placed by the express direction of appellants. Howard Janes, a foreman for appellant building company, testified that Mr. Hubbard, the secretary of appellant knitting company, on inquiry as to where to put the dirt from said excavation, said, \u201c \u2018Put the dirt between the switch tracks. \u2019 I told the men to put the dirt between the switch tracksJ\u2019 This witness further testified that the Security Building Company was desirous of disposing of the dirt as inexpensively and close by as it could. \u201cThat was the object in my talking with Mr. Hubbard.\u201d\nHilding Anderson, the secretary and treasurer of appellant building company testified that the disposal of said dirt was left to Mr. Janes. He was then asked the following questions and made the following answers:\n\u201cQ. Well, that was within his (Mr. Janes\u2019) part of the work, the disposal of the dirt as he wished to or could?\n\u201cA. With the consent of the owners.\n\u201cQ. By that you mean you would not put it on any land there without the consent of the person who had charge of the land?\n\u201cA. Charge of the building, \u2014 owner of the building; I don\u2019t know who owned the land, but in charge of the building.\n\u201cQ. Did the Forest City Knitting Company have anything to do with that (disposal of the dirt) ?\n\u201cA. Yes, they told us where they wanted it.\u201d\nWith reference to the excavating of the dirt, this witness testified: \u201cI called Mr. Putney on the phone, that I wanted him over at that job to get that dirt out the next day.\u201d\nAdam K. Putney, witness for appellants, testified:\n\u201cThe Security Building Company requested me to send a team and the man and the slip and the extra man. I don\u2019t recall whether I saw them personally or whether they telephoned us. ... I don\u2019t recall that they told me what they wanted them for. According to my records they worked one day and a half. I was not there. I told them that the Security people wanted a team to go down there, and they went.\u201d\nE. E. Snyder, an employee of Putney Brothers, testified on behalf of appellants that he assisted in said excavating. lie further testified: \u201cWe got our orders from some man from the Security people. ... I put it down like they said.\u201d\nIn determining whether or not a party is an independent contractor or an employee, \u2018 \u2018 The right to control the manner of doing the work is the principal consideration which determines whether \"the worker is an employee or an independent contractor. (Decatur Railway and Light Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 472.) The test of the relationship is the right to control. It is not the fact of actual interference with the control, but the right to interfere, that makes the difference between an independent contractor and a servant or agent. . . . An independent contractor is one who contracts to do a specific piece of work, furnishing his own assistance and executing the work either entirely in accordance with his own ideas or in accordance with a plan previously given him by the person for whom the work is done, without his being subject to the orders of the latter in respect to the details of the work. (LaMay v. Industrial Com., 292 Ill. 76; Meredosia Drainage District v. Industrial Com., 285 id. 68.) . . . The fact that payment is to be made by the piece or the job or the day or the hour does not necessarily control where the workman is subject to the control of the employer as an employee and not as a contractor. Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 296 Ill. 329; Amalgamated Roofing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 300 id. 487.\u201d Nelson Bros. & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 330 Ill. 27-29.\nThe testimony of Janes and Anderson is to the effect that while Putney Brothers\u2019 men did the excavating, the direction as to where the dirt was to be placed was left with Janes, and he placed it under the direction of appellant knitting company. In other words, the details of the work were under the direction of appellants. '\u2022 Putney Brothers were not independent contractors. Decatur Railway and Light Co. v. Industrial Board, supra, 474.\nIt is next insisted that the court erred in giving appellee\u2019s instruction No. 6. It is contended that this instruction directs a verdict; that it omits the question of proximate cause and does not submit the defenses sought to be made by appellants.\nIf the facts stated in said instruction were affirmatively found to exist from the evidence, it would warrant a recovery. The finding of such facts would in effect determine that appellee\u2019s intestate was thrown from said engine instead of having slipped therefrom; that the proximate cause of his injury was the piling of said dirt along the tracks, and that said dirt was placed there with the knowledge and under the direction of appellants. The court did not err in giving this instruction. See North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Aufmann, 221 Ill. 614-621; James S. Kirk & Co. v. Jajko, 224 Ill. 338-343; Devaney v. Otis Elevator Co., 251 Ill. 28-41.\nIt is next insisted that the court erred in giving appellee\u2019s eighth instruction, in that said instruction referred to appellee as the widow of said deceased. As the evidence disclosed that she was the sole next of kin, it was not error to give said instruction.\nIt is next insisted that the court err\u00a7d in refusing appellants\u2019 ninth, twelfth, thirteenth, eighteenth and nineteenth instructions.\nThe ninth and twelfth instructions sought to direct the jury\u2019s attention to the duty which the Illinois Central Bailroad Company owed to appellee\u2019s intestate, to furnish him with a safe place to work. That question was not an issue in the case, and the court did not err in refusing to give these instructions. There was no evidence on which to base appellants\u2019 thirteenth instruction, and the court did not err in refusing the same. Appellants\u2019 eighteenth and nineteenth refused instructions, so far as they stated correct principles of law, were covered by other instructions given. Twenty-one instructions were given on behalf of appellants.\nIt is next contended by appellants that the court erred in sustaining a demurrer to the plea of payment by the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and in sustaining an objection to the offer in evidence of the instrument entered into between appellee and said railroad company at the time said payment was made.\nSaid instrument is as follows:\n\u201cFor and in consideration of the sum of seventy-five hundred ($7500.00) dollars, received by me as administratrix of the estate of Whitney C. Scharfenstein and as widow and sole heir of said Whitney C. Scharfenstein, deceased, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I as such administratrix of said estate and as such widow and sole heir do hereby covenant and agree not to sue the Illinois Central Railroad Company nor any of its officers, servants or employees on account of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever and more especially on account of the death of the said Whitney C. Scharfenstein, deceased, resulting from injuries received while in the employ of said Illinois Central Railroad Company and working as switchman with switch engine 247 when he was thrown under same at Rockford, Illinois, on the 16th day of December,. 1925.\n\u201cIt is expressly understood and agreed that this instrument is not a release to the Illinois Central Railroad Company nor to any other person whosoever, but is simply a covenant not to sue the said Illinois Central Railroad Company, its officers, servants or employees on account of the said death.\u201d\nThe construction of said contract was for the court. Traders\u2019 Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 109 Ill. App. 246; Scarlett v. National Live Stock Ins. Co., 193 Ill. App. 488-491; Devine v. Rosenbaum Bros., 192 Ill. App. 30-36. It is not a release of any right of action, against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, hut is a covenant not to sue. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Averill, 224 Ill. 516-521, 522. There were no extraneous facts set up in the plea which would permit of the introduction of evidence as to any intention of the parties different from the language of the instrument.\n_>