{ "id": 5542914, "name": "Arthur W. Smallen, Appellee, v. Charles Aronson, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Smallen v. Aronson", "decision_date": "1929-06-26", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 33,320", "first_page": "540", "last_page": "545", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "253 Ill. App. 540" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "206 Ill. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5599699 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/206/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2578003 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/106/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3274058 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/203/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5626028 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/227/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ill. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4965006 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/289/0063-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 458, "char_count": 8860, "ocr_confidence": 0.497, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1557160347743625e-07, "percentile": 0.5827685320649968 }, "sha256": "1d2f2b6656cb836f198657ed4e6ca9b1154720441efbf31436b6034241ba8fe6", "simhash": "1:866f89f0110d3dc9", "word_count": 1537 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:33:35.432153+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Arthur W. Smallen, Appellee, v. Charles Aronson, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Holdom\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an action on the case for personal injuries. There was a trial before court and jury, which resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff with an assessment of damages at $1,500. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment being made and overruled, judgment for the amount of the verdict, $1,500, was entered, from which defendant prayed, perfected and prosecutes this appeal.\nNo questions arise on the pleadings or as to the amount of the judgment or challenge of any instruction given by the court to the jury. However, it is assigned for error and argued that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to sustain defendant\u2019s objections to certain testimony of one Harold Rosenwald, a witness for plaintiff, and in not allowing defendant to withdraw a juror and continue the hearing of the cause. The following is an account of the proceedings objected to by defendant, and which he argues constitute reversible error:\n\u201cMr. Bloomingston (to witness): Did you scratch out these various scratch-outs, this scratch-out that is done here?\n\u201cA. A man from the insurance company wrote that out.\n\u201cMr. Roemer: Now if your Honor please, I object.\n\u201cMr. Bloomingston: What is the matter?\n\u2018\u2018 Mr. Roemer: I have to make a motion to withdraw a juror.\n\u201cThe Court: That motion is overruled.\n\u201cMr. Roemer: Exception.\n\u201cThe witness continuing: The man sat at a desk in my office and kept on writing and asking me questions whether I recalled such and such, and he kept on writing, and when he got all through, he stated, \u2018Now will you read it over?\u2019 I signed the pages for him.\n\u201cMr. Bloomingston: What did he say to you about what his interest was in this matter; did he tell you that?\n\u201cMr. Roemer: I object.\n\u201cA. He said he was from the insurance company.\n\u201cThe Court: Objection sustained and that is stricken out.\n\u201cMr. Roemer: I want to renew my motion now if the court please, to withdraw a juror; it is quite palpable, your Honor.\n\u201cMr. Bloomingston: May I show you the decisions, any number of them?\n\u2018 \u2018 The Court: Yes, you may go ahead, I will overrule the motion for the present.\n\u201cMr. Roemer: Exception.\u201d\nAgain on redirect examination of the plaintiff by Mr. Bloomingston, with reference to a prior statement which the plaintiff admittedly signed right after the accident, the following occurred:\n\u201cQ. Did anyone at any time come to you from the defendant here and ask you to sign a statement? A. Yes, sir.\n\u201cQ. Did you sign it? A. I believe \u2014 yes, I did.\n\u2018 \u2018 Q. And you frankly ' told them everything you knew about this thing? A. I did.\n\u201cQ. Did you go to any lawyer\u2019s office, representing them?\n\u201cMr. Roemer:* I object to that.\n\u201cMr. Bloomingston: I just want to show.\n\u201cThe Court: Is that in reference to this paper?\n\u201cMr. Bloomingston: Yes, that is what I mean, in reference to the paper.\n\u201cQ. Did you go to a lawyer\u2019s office with reference to this paper? A. I do not know whether he is a lawyer or not. I imagine they were lawyers.\n\u201cMr. Bloomingston: Where did you see them?\n\u201cMr. Roemer: I object to that, if your.Honor please.\n\u201cThe Witness: In the Insurance Exchange Building.\n\u201cMr. Roemer: I object to that, and I make the same motion that I did some time ago.\n\u201cMr. Bloomingston: That is all. I am just asking what building it was; what building it was in.\n\u201cThe Court: He said it was in the Insurance Exchange Building.\n\u201cThe Witness: In the Insurance Exchange.\n\u201cMr. Bloomingston: In the Insurance Exchange.\n\u201cThe Witness: Yes, sir.\n\u201cQ. Was that where you signed that paper in question? A. It was.\n\u201cQ. Did you go there voluntarily, that is of your own account or were you invited up there? A. I was invited up there.\n\u201cRenewal of motion by defendant to withdraw a juror and overruling of same by the court.\u201d\nThe foregoing recitation states everything which defendant claims occurred of an objectionable nature at the trial. Defendant argues that in an action to recover for personal injuries caused by defendant\u2019s negligence, it is reversible error for the plaintiff to inform the jury, directly or indirectly, that the defendant is protected by casualty insurance against liability. The authorities cited by counsel for defendant are all to the effect that \u201cany reference to the fact that a party sued is protected by an insurance policy from the payment of damages is improper\u201d for the jury and that so doing is reversible error. Bishop v. Chicago Junction Ry. Co., 289 Ill. 63, and other cases cited to a like effect.\nWe think the difficulty with defendant\u2019s contention lies in the fact that the witness did not testify at any time that defendant was protected by accident insurance. Neither was that fact disclosed to the jury by statement of counsel in argument or otherwise. We think it is apparent that what the witness did testify .to was innocuous so far as tending to show the fact, if it was a fact, that the defendant was covered by accident insurance. The witness was simply describing the conditions under which the document before him was in some places \u201cscratched out.\u201d One of the answers was, as above r\u00e9cited, \u201ca man from the insurance company wrote that out.\u201d And another time, referring to the man he answered, \u201cHe said he was from the insurance company,\u201d and then he testified that he went to the office in regard to the matter about which he was testifying, which was \u201cin the Insurance Exchange Building.\u201d That is the sum and substance of all that was said by the witness Rosenwald on that subject. From such testimony the jury could not find any foundation for assuring that defendant\u2019s liability in the case on trial was covered by accident insurance. If they did, they must draw on their imagination, which would be entirely unwarranted. We have no right t\u00f3 assume that from the words used by the witness there was an intimation that defendant was insured against the accident in suit. The answers given by the witness, were pertinent to this testimony, which was not subject to objection. We have no right to assume from the fact that- the verdict itself or the amount assessed as damages not being challenged, .that the references to an insurance company did injuriously affect any of defendant\u2019s rights. In Eldorado Coal & Coke Co. v. Swan, 227 Ill. 586, the court said:\n\u201cAppellant asks that the judgment be reversed because appellee\u2019s counsel, after adverse rulings of the court, asked questions which implied that the appellant was insured in a casualty company, and that the judgment, if one should be rendered, would be paid by such company. Error is usually only-assignable on the rulings of the court. The court promptly ruled against appellee\u2019s right to inquire into the irrelevant matter suggested by the questions, but the questions were repeated to other witnesses. The conduct of counsel in thus seeking to place before the jury matters not involved in the issue is censurable in the highest degree, and if the amount of the verdict were such as to raise a suspicion in our minds that the jury had been influenced by this misconduct, or if the case were a close one on the facts, we would not hesitate to reverse the judgment for this reason alone. But since the verdict was rather below the usual amount awarded where the injury has been sustained such as the evidence shows here, and the case is reasonably clear on the facts, there is no reason to suspect that the jury were actuated by prejudice or passion.\u201d\nThese remarks are very apropos to the instant case, for in that case plaintiff was guilty of bringing before the jury the fact that defendant was covered by insurance,' and yet the court refused for that error alone to reverse the judgment. In this case there was no such suggestion, and as the amount of the verdict is not challenged, it is apparent that the jury were not influenced in their assessment of damages by the witness Rosenwald\u2019s using the words \u201cInsurance Company\u201d without any other details.\nIn Wrisley Co. v. Burke, 203 Ill. 250, it was held not to be reversible error where from the testimony of a physician for plaintiff it incidentally appeared that such physician was paid by \"the accident insurance company. There was an affirmance on this point on the same ruling in the same case in the Appellate Court, 106 Ill. App. 30. Chicago City R. Co. v. Carroll, 206 Ill. 318, is to a like effect. Defendant\u2019s objections to the testimony of Rosenwald, hereinabove recited, were properly overruled, and the overruling of defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw a juror and continue the case was without error.\nThe judgment of the superior court being right is affirmed.\nAffirmed,\nWiesoh, P, J., and Ryher, J., concur,", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Holdom" } ], "attorneys": [ "Wolf & Love, for appellant; Stephen Love, of counsel.", "John A. Bloomingston, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Arthur W. Smallen, Appellee, v. Charles Aronson, Appellant.\nGen. No. 33,320.\nOpinion filed June 26, 1929.\nRehearing denied July 8, 1929.\nWolf & Love, for appellant; Stephen Love, of counsel.\nJohn A. Bloomingston, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0540-01", "first_page_order": 564, "last_page_order": 569 }