{
  "id": 3223183,
  "name": "Ralph Crandall, Appellant, v. Coyne Electrical School, Inc., Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Crandall v. Coyne Electrical School, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1930-03-11",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 33,864",
  "first_page": "322",
  "last_page": "325",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "256 Ill. App. 322"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "206 N. Y. 188",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.Y.",
      "case_ids": [
        60435
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ny/206/0188-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "16 Vt. 683",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Vt.",
      "case_ids": [
        4420861
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/vt/16/0683-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "241 Ill. 398",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5655817
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/241/0398-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "61 Ill. 177",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2460535
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/61/0177-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 297,
    "char_count": 4501,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.539,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.3426102428064824e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6316155883991692
    },
    "sha256": "b0207cc736fbc01cac342e94f2cae28fa60019ebbcefb154f5c74d0993cb9031",
    "simhash": "1:9b53461190c69e13",
    "word_count": 807
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:44:31.530905+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Ralph Crandall, Appellant, v. Coyne Electrical School, Inc., Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barnes\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is a suit to recover a tuition fee of $240 paid by plaintiff, when a minor, to defendant. A jury was waived and the issues were submitted to the court upon an agreed state of facts. The finding and judgment were for defendant.\nThe material facts agreed to are: Plaintiff, when 20 years of age, entered into a written agreement whereby defendant was \u201cto furnish him a course of electrical instruction as taught by it at its school in Chicago,\u201d for which he paid $240 tuition fee. He had no parents or legal guardian. He attended defendant\u2019s school for approximately 5 weeks, when he left and did not return. He made a demand for the return of the money and disaffirmed the agreement both before and after reaching his maturity and defendant refused to return the money. Defendant is willing, ready and able to carry out its contract.\nOn such state of facts the court ruled that the contract was valid and \u201cone for necessaries of life,\u201d and the real question is whether or not it can be said from such agreed facts that \u201ca course of electrical instruction\u201d is \u201ca necessary.\u201d\nIt was said in McKanna v. Merry, 61 Ill. 177: \u201cThere is no positive rule by means of which it may be determined what are, and what are not, necessaries. Whether articles are of a class or kind for which infants are liable, or whether certain subjects of expenditure are necessaries, are to be judged of by the court. Whether they come within the particular class, and are suitable to the condition and estate of the infant, is to be determined by the jury as matter of fact. \u201d In 22 Cyc. 597, the author says: \u20181 The question as to what are necessaries is a mixed one of law and fact,\u201d and refers to the case just cited.\nIt is not questioned that a contract of an infant, is, in general, voidable by him and that he may disaffirm the same either during or after his minority, whether the contract be executed or executory, and recover the money he has paid thereon. (Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 241 Ill. 398.) But appellee relies on the claim that the contract in question was for a necessary. It is recognized that a proper education is a necessary. But what is a proper education depends on circumstances. (31 C. J. 1079.) A common school education is said to be a necessary in this country. (Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683; International Textbook Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188.) In the latter case it is said that circumstances, however, may exist where a more liberal education might properly be found a necessary as a matter of fact. It was there sought to apply the word \u201cnecessaries\u201d to a contract by an infant for a course of instruction in \u201cComplete Steam Engineering.\u201d The court held that its application in that case depended on the circumstances and situation in the life of the infant. Holding that the burden of proof was on the party suing on the contract to show what it agreed to provide was a necessary the court said that in the absence of facts of the real circumstances and whether the infant was in a situation to bind himself by a contract for necessaries, the course of instruction contracted for was not a necessary within the meaning of the law.\nAnd so here, we find nothing in the agreed state of facts, in the absence of proof of any other circumstances as to plaintiff\u2019s state and condition in life or what was suitable to his condition, estate and needs, that enabled the court to say that \u201ca course of electrical instruction\u201d was \u201ca necessary\u201d for him, either as a matter of fact or of law. The burden of proof was upon defendant to sustain its plea that such instruction was in the nature of a necessary suitable to the infant. (22 Cyc. 598.) The meager state of facts agreed upon is not sufficient to warrant the court\u2019s conclusion.\nAccordingly the judgment will he reversed and a judgment entered here against appellee for $240, and interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent from August 30, 1927, the date when plaintiff began his suit, there being no proof in the record as to the date of the demand for the return of the money.\nReversed with a finding of fact.\nScanlan and Gridley, JJ., concur.\nWe find that the money sued for and held by appellee is not money given and held for necessaries.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barnes"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Albert E. Grammer, for appellant; Stephen S. Snyder, of counsel.",
      "Leopold Saltiel, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ralph Crandall, Appellant, v. Coyne Electrical School, Inc., Appellee.\nGen. No. 33,864.\nOpinion filed March 11, 1930.\nAlbert E. Grammer, for appellant; Stephen S. Snyder, of counsel.\nLeopold Saltiel, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0322-01",
  "first_page_order": 394,
  "last_page_order": 397
}