{
  "id": 5860685,
  "name": "Amanda L. Prehn, Appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Prehn v. Metropolitan Life Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1932-06-28",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 35,786",
  "first_page": "190",
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    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:59:32.583380+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Amanda L. Prehn, Appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Gridley\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn an action of the first class in assumpsit, commenced on May 8, 1931, and based upon defendant\u2019s certificate or policy of accident insurance, there was a trial without a jury in December, 1931, resulting in the court finding the issues for plaintiff, assessing her damages at $1,000, and entering judgment in that sum against defendant. This appeal followed.\nIn plaintiff\u2019s statement of claim she alleged that on December 31, 1924, Fred B. Prehn' entered into an insurance contract (copy attached) with defendant; that all premiums thereon were paid; that the contract provided that in the event that Prehn (the insured) should die as the result of and within 90 days from an accident, defendant would pay to the named beneficiary (plaintiff, wife of insured) the sum of $1,000; that on September 12, 1930, Prehn \u201cgot up quickly from a chair in a switch shanty of the Chicago Rapid Transit Co.,\u201d- located.at Desplaines avenue in Forest Park, Illinois; that in so doing he \u201cruptured his spleen\u201d; that as the result of the accident he died on September 17, 1930 (five days later); that plaintiff as beneficiary is entitled to receive the sum of $1,000; that she has frequently demanded of defendant the payment of said sum; but that defendant has refused and still refuses to pay the same, etc.\nIt appeared on the trial that defendant had issued a \u201cGroup Policy\u201d of accident insurance, covering employees of the Chicago Rapid Transit Co., and also had issued. certificates to employees, including the particular certificate, No. 3745, to Prehn on December 31,1924. By agreement a copy of the Group Policy was introduced in evidence at the same time that plaintiff introduced the original certificate sued upon. The terms, conditions and limitations with respect to the insurance as contained in the Group Policy are substantially the same as mentioned in said certificate, in which on its face it is stated that, subject to the terms and conditions of Group Policy No. 26, Prehn is insured for $1,000, \u201cagainst the results of bodily injuries sustained while insured under said policy and caused directly and independently of all other causes by violent and accidental means, to wit: If such injuries shall, within ninety (90) days from the date of accident, result in any one of the losses named in the following schedule, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company will pay the amount specified in such schedule.\u201d\nThen follows the schedule in which it is stated that for \u201closs of life\u201d the full amount ($1,000) will be paid; and it is further stated that \u201cindemnity for loss of life of the insured is payable to Amanda L. Prehn, beneficiary,\u201d and that \u201ccertain limitations in said Group Policy are described on the last page hereof,\u201d and that \u2018 this certificate shall be void if any premiums be not paid when due.\u201d On the back or last page of the certificate are stated, among others, the following \u201climitations\u201d:\n\u201cThis insurance shall not cover . . . accident, injury, death or other loss caused wholly or partly by disease or bodily or mental infirmity or by medical or surgical treatment thereof, or by hernia, ptomaine or by bacterial infection (except only septic infection of and through a visible wound accidentally sustained).\u201d\nIn defendant\u2019s affidavit of merits, sworn to by its authorized agent, one of the mentioned defenses is that due and proper notice and proofs of loss were not given to defendant. On the trial plaintiff\u2019s evidence showed the contrary to be the fact and this defense was abandoned by defendant. The only other mentioned defenses in the affidavit are (1): That the insured\u2019s death \u201cwas not caused as a result of bodily injuries sustained while insured, or caused directly and independently of all other causes by violent and accidental means,\u201d and (2) that said death \u201cwas contributed to or caused by other causes than violent and accidental means.\u201d\nOn the trial plaintiff\u2019s witness, E. E. McFadden, testified in substance that during and prior to September, 1930, he was employed by a railroad company at night as a towerman or switch tender, and Prehn as a collector of fares on trains by the Chicago Rapid Transit Co.; that they frequently saw each other in the same cabin or shanty; that both usually, worked each night from about midnight until about 6 o\u2019clock a. m.; that shortly after midnight and early in the morning of September 12, 1930, both were in the shanty and Prehn was waiting for a train to make collections; that it was warm and Prehn was sitting in a chair which was tilted back against the sill of an open window; that the witness called Prehn\u2019s attention to the fact that a train was coming and Prehn got np from the chair, \u2018 a little faster than a fellow ordinarily would,\u201d and walked out of the door; that \u201che arose by letting all four legs of the chair hit the floor\u201d; that the witness and Prehn were afterwards during the night frequently together in the shanty; that Prehn complained of his back hurting him; that he continued to perform his duties until about 6 o\u2019clock a. m., when he ceased working and left the shanty; and that the witness did not thereafter see him alive.\nPlaintiff\u2019s witness, Rev. Ira L. Livingston, a Presbyterian minister, living in Forest Park, Illinois, and a friend of Prehn, testified in substance that he had known Prehn for about four years and frequently saw him; that on the morning of Saturday, September 13, 1930, he saw him in bed at his home; that he was apparently suffering intensely; that he \u201cwould writhe in bed and put his hand on his back\u201d and at times exclaim \u201cthis is terrible\u201d; that prior to this time and during the month of September the witness had seen him four or five times, and noticed nothing unusual in his conduct, and he \u201cappeared to be going about in the usual way\u201d; that prior to this visit he had \u201cnever known him to have a sickness\u201d; that, however, \u201con June 14, 1930,\u201d he \u201cfell from a scaffold while painting the church\u201d; that the scaffold was not more than 12 or 14 feet high; that the witness saw him \u201cplaying baseball\u201d on an evening about 10 days after his fall from the scaffold; that he appeared vigorous at the time; and that Prehn was a large man and weighed about 225 pounds.\nPlaintiff\u2019s witness, Dr. Chester W. Trowbridge, a physician and surgeon of extensive experience and who attended Prehn at his home and at the West Suburban Hospital in Oak Park, Illinois, from September 13 until September 17, 1930, when he died, testified in substance that he first saw him in bed at his home; that he complained of severe pains in the \u201cright sacro-iliac region\u201d and other pains in the abdominal region; that he had a normal temperature, a normal pulse and a slight abdominal rigidity; that his pains were so severe that the witness was \u201calmost unable to move him for examination\u201d; that he administered morphine to relieve the pain and gave instructions for treatment by his wife; that on the same evening (September 13) he was again summoned to the home and found the same symptoms; that upon inquiring as to the probable cause, Prehn told him (referring to said morning) that \u201che had been leaning back in his chair, that in his haste to arise from the chair he had felt a pain in his back, which had increased, and that he had become worried as time went on\u201d; that upon further inquiry Prehn \u201crecited an incident of his falling off a scaffold or ladder while painting a church\u201d; that the witness called twice on the second day in the morning and in the evening; that in the evening Prehn\u2019s \u201ctemperature had risen to 103 and he was decidedly worse\u201d; that on the following day he was with difficulty removed to the West Suburban Hospital; that thereafter further treatments were had and several other physicians and surgeons connected with the hospital were called in consultation; that examinations were made of the abdominal region to see if there was evidence of acute abdominal disease and X-rays were taken \u201cof the hip and sacroiliac region to see if there was a fracture and all this was negative\u201d; that, finally, on September 17, \u201cthe patient\u2019s condition became so serious and his abdomen so distended that we decided that an explorative operation was imperative\u201d; that the patient \u201cwas semiconscious and a local anaesthetic was given\u201d; that with the assistance of two physicians and internes and nurses, the witness performed an operation; that the patient\u2019s abdomen was opened and \u201cwe found a markedly distended bowel which was discolored\u201d; that the patient\u2019s condition then \u201cbecame so serious and his pulse so bad that we deemed further interference could not be attempted, and I saw that he would die on the table if I continued, so I sewed him up and removed him to his room and he expired about 15 minutes later\u201d; that on the same day, with the permission of Prehn\u2019s widow, a post-mortem examination was made by Dr. Piette, the pathologist and director at said hospital; and that the witness together with other physicians were present at the examination. The witness further testified as to said examination \u201cthat the,whole internal cavity was opened; that we found a severe hemorrhage in the lesser peritoneal cavity; a peculiar clot about the size of a large grape fruit was removed; ive fo%md a ruptured spleen; the spleen had a laceration of about 2% to 3 inches in length; there was a blood clot in it that showed evidence of some degeneration or death of the spleen substance; the capsule or sack of the spleen was also lacerated; there was also a scar in the spleen, which I took for granted as evidence of some prior injury; the scar was about 1% inches long and it might be months or years old; the 2% inches\u2019 laceration of the spleen (above mentioned) was, I would say, two or three days old, due to the fact that there was a black blood clot in this lacerated area; we made no examination of the sacro-iliac region that I spoke of, because the examination as made satisfied everybody as to the cause of death, and assuming it was accidental, I called the coroner\u2019s office; prior to that I had no idea whatsoever as to the cause of death; this man was approximately 35 or 36 years of age, was quite fleshy, and weighed perhaps 225 to 230 pounds.\u201d\nDr. Trowbridge further testified that he not only had an opinion as to the cause of Prehn\u2019s death but that he 1mew the cause, and that it was \u201chemorrhage due to a ntptured spleen.\u201d To a hypothetical question, based upon the testimony of the witnesses McFadden and Livingston and his own observation of the patient, he expressed the opinion that \u201cthe spleen was ruptured as the result of a sudden muscular movement,\u201d and upon being asked \u201cwhether a sudden or quick rising from this chair could have caused a rupture of the spleen,\u201d he replied: \u201cMy opinion dates back to his fall off the ladder; I believe that his fall off the ladder caused a slight laceration in the spleen underneath the capsule, and that this further exertion on his part completed the act; by further exertion I refer to when he arose from the chair.\u201d He further expressed the opinion that \u201cthe scar that he found on the spleen might have been caused by his falling from the scaffold.\u201d On cross-examination the witness further testified that he did not examine the spleen after it was removed from the body, but that he was present while it was being examined; that it was abnormally large and had adhesions on it; that an internal viscus can rupture from muscular exertion; that, in answering the hypothetical question and stating that the rupture of the spleen could have been caused by the sudden rising from the chair, he \u201ctook into consideration, the other accident which occurred in June, 1930\u201d; that said accident in June \u201cmost assuredly contributed to his condition\u201d; that the direct cause of the lacerated spleen \u201cwas external violence of recent origin, i. e., within two or three days.\u201d On redirect examination the witness further testified that the injury received from the accident in June \u2018\u2018wouldn\u2019t cause his death, but caused a diseased spleen and the additional accident caused his rupture\nPlaintiff\u2019s witness, Dr. Eugene C. Piette, who performed the post-mortem examination, testified at length as to what he then discovered. His testimony is to the same effect as that of Dr. Trowbridge, except that he \u201cdid not find any scar on the spleen capsule or within the spleen tissue.\u201d He testified in part: \u2018\u2018 There were some adhesions present in the abdominal cavity unquestionably of old origin. As a rule these adhesions are interpreted to be of traumatic origin. The spleen was considerably enlarged and there was a tear or rupture therein over an inch in size.\u201d He expressed the opinion from said examination that Prehn\u2019s death was caused by \u201closs of blood into the abdominal cavity caused by the rupture of the spleen.\u201d In answer to a lengthy hypothetical question he expressed the opinion that the rupture in the spleen that he found upon such examination could have been caused by the hypothetical man being seated in a chair tilted back, and rising quickly, and bringing the chair down on its four legs. On cross-examination he testified that the accident of falling from the scaffold in June, 1930, of which he had heard, \u201cmay have left certain changes within his body.\u201d On redirect he testified that the only body changes that he found on the post-mortem examination that might be attributable to the scaffold accident were \u201cmultiple adhesions in the peritoneal cavity.\u201d\nExcept for one witness called to identify the postmortem examination record, signed by Dr. Piette and which defendant introduced in evidence, defendant\u2019s only evidence was the testimony of Dr. Harry E. Mock, called as an expert witness. Having heard the testimony given in court by Dr. Trowbridge, and having read the transcript of the testimony given by Dr. Piette, Dr. Mock expressed the opinion, in answer to a hypothetical question, that, assuming a, healthy man with a healthy spleen, \u201chis rising from the chair suddenly could not cause a rupture of the spleen.\u201d He then was told to assume the fact that the same individual had fallen from a scaffold about 90 days prior to his rising from this chair, and asked if, in his opinion, \u201cthe fall from the scaffold had anything to do with the condition, in causing the death ? \u2019 \u2019 He replied \u201cI can answer that question only in the light of previous testimony that there were chang\u00e9s in the spleen indicating an old condition. . . . There is not enough of the question there for me to answer yes or no. I don\u2019t know whether a fall from the scaffold had anything to do with it without assuming certain knowledge that I have.\u201d He also expressed the opinion that \u201cthe immediate cause of death was undoubtedly surgical shock, plus hemorrhage from a ruptured spleen,\u201d and that the \u201cruptured spleen could more probably occur from such movements as moving him to the X-ray room and to the operating room and back.\u201d\nIn urging a reversal of the judgment defendant\u2019s counsel contend that Prehn\u2019s death did not result from violent and accidental means independently of all other causes, and that the court erred in refusing defendant\u2019s motions, made at the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence and at the close of all the evidence, to enter a finding and judgment for defendant. We cannot agree with the contentions. We are of the opinion that the evidence sufficiently showed that Prehn\u2019s death did result from such violent and accidental means and independent of other causes as rendered defendant liable under the certificate or policy sued upon, and that the court\u2019s finding and judgment are sufficiently sustained by the law. (See United States Mutual Accident Ass\u2019n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 121; Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 224 N. Y. 18, 20, 21; Higgins v. Midland Casualty Co., 281 Ill. 431, 435, 437; Christ v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 312 Ill. 525, 530, 531; Vollrath v. Central Life Ins. Co., 243 Ill. App. 181, 184, 187; Hibbs v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 262 Ill. App. 279, 286, 287.) In the Higgins case, supra (p. 437) our Supreme Court, quoting from another case, said: \u201cThe proper and true test, in all instances of voluntary action, is that defined in the Barry case (131 U. S. 121). If in the act which precedes the injury, though an intentional act, something unforeseen, unexpected and unusual occurs which produces the injury, it is accidentally, caused.\u201d\nThe judgment of the municipal court should be and is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nKeener, P. J., and Scanlan, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Gridley"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hoyne, O\u2019Connor & Bubinkam, for appellant.",
      "Ward & Kreitzer, for appellee; Gilbert O. Volice and Harry K. Ward, of counsel."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Amanda L. Prehn, Appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant.\nGen. No. 35,786.\nOpinion filed June 28, 1932.\nRehearing denied July 11, 1932.\nHoyne, O\u2019Connor & Bubinkam, for appellant.\nWard & Kreitzer, for appellee; Gilbert O. Volice and Harry K. Ward, of counsel."
  },
  "file_name": "0190-01",
  "first_page_order": 238,
  "last_page_order": 247
}
