{ "id": 3254045, "name": "Lena Rogers, Administratrix of the Estate of Leonard Ingstrom, Appellee, v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Rogers v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America", "decision_date": "1933-05-23", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 36,270", "first_page": "515", "last_page": "526", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "270 Ill. App. 515" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "68 Fed. 825", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 6730832 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826, 827" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/68/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ind. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind. App.", "case_ids": [ 4948559 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639, 640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind-app/42/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Cal. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "case_ids": [ 287080 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175, 176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal/89/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Mo. App. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo. App.", "case_ids": [ 1454764 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256, 257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo-app/63/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Mo. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 469878 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116, 117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/126/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ky. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "case_ids": [ 4402178 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ky/87/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S. E. 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1073" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ga. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 395339 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589, 590" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/107/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Miss. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Miss.", "case_ids": [ 8835404 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336, 337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/miss/72/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3371050 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/245/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 Ill. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3423647 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/240/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 U. S. 661", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3532431 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/127/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5426641 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/133/0556-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 914, "char_count": 19667, "ocr_confidence": 0.501, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.357640866281845e-07, "percentile": 0.6348528427719144 }, "sha256": "a8fbb88bccf7a0b3b7599d8047864874570edce592b043eb77fcb98fa9bfb3bb", "simhash": "1:35df15e87c4dacda", "word_count": 3351 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:56:38.536321+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Lena Rogers, Administratrix of the Estate of Leonard Ingstrom, Appellee, v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Gridley\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nOn February 4, 1932, Lena Rogers commenced a first class action in assumpsit against defendant, based upon its insurance policy insuring the life of Leonard Ingstrom and providing for a double indemnity in case of his accidental death. She commenced the action in her own name on the theory that Ingstrom, having during his lifetime delivered a certain writing to defendant, had made her the beneficiary of the policy subject to its terms and conditions. On June 30, 1932, however, the court gave her \u201cleave to amend by changing plaintiff from Lena Rogers to Lena Rogers, administratrix of the estate of Leonard Ingstrom,\u201d and by further leave she, on July 8, 1932, filed an amended statement of claim, to which defendant filed an affidavit of merits. On July 18, 1932, after a trial without a jury, at which oral and documentary evidence was introduced by each party, the court found the issues against defendant, assessed plaintiff\u2019s damages at $2,856, and entered judgment in that sum against defendant. The present appeal followed.\nIn plaintiff\u2019s amended statement of claim (to which is attached and made a part a copy of the policy) she alleged that on July 20, 1931, defendant, in consideration of the payment of a weekly premium of 85 cents by the insured, issued to Leonard Ingstrom its policy of insurance No. 87074961, dated July 20, 1931, insuring the life of Ingstrom in the amount of $1,428; that by one of the provisions of the policy as to \u201cAccidental Death Benefit\u201d it is provided (italics ours):\n\u201cUpon receipt of due proof that the Insured after 1 attainment of age 15 and prior to the attainment of age 70, has sustained bodily injury, solely through external, violent and accidental mea/i'is, occurring after the date of this Policy and resulting in the death of the insured within ninety days from the date of such bodily injury while this Policy is in force, and while there is no default in the payment of premiums, the Company will pay in addition to any other sums due under this Policy and subject to the provisions of this Policy an Accidental Death Benefit equal to the face amount of insurance stated in this Policy less the amount of any disability benefit which has become payable under this Policy on account of the same bodily injury, except as provided below.\u201d\nThat subsequent to the issuance of the policy and while it was in full force and effect \u2014 all premiums having been paid \u2014 to wit, \u201csometime subsequent to August 22, 1931, and prior to September 2, 1931,\u201d Ingstrom came to his death, \u201cas a result of bodily injury solely through external, violent and accidental means\u201d within 90 days from the date of the bodily injury; that at the time of such violent and accidental death Ingstrom was approximately 27 years of age; that plaintiff has been appointed administratrix of his estate and all moneys due under the policy are payable to her as such administratrix; that the total amount due is $2,856; and that defendant, although often requested, has refused to pay such amount to her or any part thereof, wherefore she brings suit, etc.\nOn the first page of the policy, in addition to the date and number as above mentioned, are the following paragraphs among others (italics ours):\n\u201cThe Prudential Insurance Company of America, in consideration of the payment of the weekly premium herein specified, on or before each and every Monday during the continuance of this Policy or until the anniversary date of the Policy immediately preceding the seventieth anniversary of the birth of the Insured, will pay at its Home Office, Newark, New Jersey, immediately upon receipt of due proof of the death of the Insured during the continuance of this policy, the amount of insurance herein specified, to the executors or administrators of the Insured,, unless payment be made under the provisions of the next succeeding paragraph; subject to the \u2018General Provisions\u2019 on the second page hereof,_ which are hereby made part of this contract.\n\u201cSchedule\n\u201cName of Insured Age next Amount of Weekly Birthday Insurance Premium\n\u201cLeonard Ingstrom 27 $1428 85 cts.\u201d\nAmong the \u201cGeneral Provisions\u201d on the second page of the policy are provisions as to \u201cAccidental Death Benefit\u201d (as above quoted in plaintiff\u2019s declaration), but immediately under the quoted provisions are mentioned \u201cExceptions,\u201d as follows:\n\u201cExceptions. (1) If the bodily injuries referred to above shall be sustained by the Insured while engaged in employment in or on the premises of any open pit or underground mine, or shall be sustained by the Insured while on or about the premises or rig\u2019ht of way of any railroad company while the Insured is following the occupation of gang, track or roadway laborer; track walker; yard, freight or mixed train brakeman or flagman, the additional Accidental Death Benefit referred to in the first paragraph hereof shall be one-half of the face amount of insurance stated in this Policy, less the amount of any disability benefit which has become payable under this Policy on account of the same bodily injury. (2) No Accidental Death Benefit will be paid if the death of the Insured resulted from suicide or from having been engaged in submarine or diving operations, or in aviation as a passenger or otherwise, or from military or naval service in time of war.\u201d\nIn defendant\u2019s affidavit of merits to plaintiff\u2019s amended statement of claim its defenses are stated to be (a) that \u201cthe insurance sued upon in this suit was a speculative adventure by the parties in interest in said litigation, and, therefore, said insurance is void and of no force and effect, and defendant hereby tenders the return of the premiums paid in full satisfaction of all claims against defendant\u201d; (b) that \u201cthe alleged insured\u2019s death was not the result of external, violent and accidental means as alleged\u201d; (c) that defendant \u201chas no knowledge as to when, where and how the alleged insured met his death and of this it demands strict proof\u201d; and (d) \u201cno proofs of death have been supplied to the Company as required by the policy.\u201d As to defense \u201c (a),\u201d no evidence was introduced by defendant to substantiate it and it may be disregarded.\nDefendant\u2019s main contention here is, in substance, that the judgment should be reversed because plaintiff\u2019s evidence did not sufficiently disclose that Ingstrom\u2019s death was caused \u201csolely through external, violent and accidental means.\u201d To maintain her case plaintiff testified.in her own behalf and she called as witnesses Doctor Paul A. Isherwood (coroner of Du-Page county, Illinois, and a physician and surgeon); Theodore Schwer (a partner in business with Ingstrom prior to August 22,1931); Allen A. Myers (an investigator employed in the office of the State\u2019s attorney and the coroner of DuPage county); Jerry C. Miller (a friend of Ingstrom for several years); and Francis K. Wilton and William McDonald, agents of defendant in Chicago or vicinity. From the testimony of these witnesses the following facts appeared: On and prior to August 22,1931, Ingstrom, a bachelor about 27 years of age, was a partner of Schwer in a small business. He was then and had been for several years a roomer in a rooming house, managed by Lena Bogers, at 219 South Throop street, Chicago. On Saturday evening, August 22, 1931, in apparent good health, he left his residence but did not return that evening or on Sunday. On Monday morning Lena Bogers, becoming alarmed over his continued absence, notified the Chicago police an'd the State\u2019s attorney\u2019s office and a search for him was made. On September 2, 1931, the body of a deceased man was found lying in an open field alongside a graveled road or street, just inside the fence, in DuPage county, and Lena Bogers and Schwer were notified.\nDoctor Isherwood, the coroner, testified on direct examination that on that day he with other persons went to the place; that they found \u201cthe body fully clothed \u2014 both hands being tied behind the back with a necktie\u201d; that \u201cthe wrists were crossed and tied together with a double knot at his back\u201d; that the deceased \u201ccould not have tied his own hands behind his back\u201d; that the body was \u201cremoved to the undertaking establishment of Ruchty Brothers in Hinsdale, Illinois\u201d; that the deceased was \u201cabout 5 feet, 6 or 7 inches, in height, and would weigh about 130 or 140 pounds\u201d; that \u201cI searched his clothing and found numerous papers and cards, and he wore a leather belt with a white metal buckle with the initials \u2018L. I.\u2019 on it\u201d; that later in the day Theodore Schwer came to Hinsdale and \u201cexamined the clothing- and effects on the body, and the belt, buckle and other things, which were shown to Schwer, were all found on the body of the man\u201d; that based upon the witness\u2019 experience as coroner for about seven years and as a physician for about 20 years, he had' an opinion as to how the man came to his death, and as to how long he had been dead, and that in the witness\u2019 opinion he came to his death \u201cpresumably by violence,\u201d and that he had been dead \u201cabout a week or more.\u201d On cross-examination Dr. Isherwood testified that he found the body \u201cin an extreme state of putrefaction\u201d; that the man\u2019s clothes \u201cwere quite odoriferous,\u201d and \u201ceverything was soaked into the clothes\u201d; that it was quite hot in August and September, 1931.\nTheodore Schwer testified that on September 2, 1931, after receiving notice, he went to Hinsdale, met the coroner (Isherwood), and the State\u2019s attorney\u2019s investigator (Myers), visited the undertaker\u2019s (Ruchty) place and saw the body \u201cin a box\u201d; that he also saw \u201ca suit of clothes\u201d of the man; that he recognized the suit as the one that \u201cIngstrom had been wearing for the last year or so\u201d; that he also saw a straw hat and a leather belt, with the initials \u201cL. I.\u201d on it, both of which he recognized as being Ingstrom\u2019s; that he also saw certain papers, including some of their partnership \u201cliterature\u201d; that he also found a \u2018\u2018pocketbook or leather fold\u201d which belonged to Ing\u2019strom, and also a \u201cbank book on the Mid-City Bank,\u201d which he did not recognize but which had the name \u201cLeonard Ingstrom\u201d on it; and that Ingstrom was \u201cabout 5 feet, 7 inches, tall,\u201d and in August, 1931, weighed about 135 pounds.\nAllen A. Myers testified in substance that on September 2, 1931, in company with the coroner and State\u2019s attorney, and also a deputy sheriff, of DuPage county, he saw the body of the man lying alongside 79th street in DuPage county; that he was about 5 feet and seven and one-half to eight inches in height; was rather slight, and weighed, probably, 135 to 140 pounds; that he could not tell his age \u201cas the body was in such shape\u201d; that the man was fully clothed and was \u201clying on his face with his hands tied, in hack of him with a necktie\u201d; that from cards in the man\u2019s clothing he learned about his business connection with Schwer and caused Schwer to be notified; that after the body had been taken to the undertaker\u2019s, Schwer came and he there was shown the body, the clothing, the cards and papers, and the belt buckle with the initials \u201cL. I.\u201d on it; that these cards and papers were found in an inside coat pocket; that the body at the undertaker\u2019s was \u201cin very bad condition, maggots, in terrible shape\u201d; and that \u201cthe features and face were badly decomposed and could not be recognized.\u201d\n. jerry C. Miller, a friend of Ingstrom for several years, and who saw him frequently, testified that Ing\u2019strom was not over 5 feet, seven and one-half inches, tall, and was not \u201cfive foot ten\u201d as claimed by defendant.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence as above outlined was not contradicted by any of defendant\u2019s evidence, except as to the height and weight of Ingstrom. It appeared from the written application (introduced by defendant and dated July 16,1931) for the insurance in question, that the answer as to \u201cheight and weight\u201d is filled in as \u201c5 ft. 10 in. 152 lbs.\u201d; but it also appears from the testimony of defendant\u2019s agent, McDonald, that he (McDonald) wrote in the particular answers from what he understood Ingstrom to say in reply to the questions, and that he (McDonald), while he noticed Ingstrom was shorter than he was, \u201cdidn\u2019t make any particular point of his height.\u201d We are of the opinion that it clearly appears from all the evidence that the body which was found in said field on September 2, 1931, and which before burial was taken to said undertaker\u2019s place in Hinsdale, was that of the insured, Ingstrom. And considering the evidence, as well as the authorities hereinafter mentioned, we are further of the opinion that it sufficiently appears that Ingstrom\u2019s death was caused \u201csolely through external, violent and accidental means.\u201d\nThe word \u201caccidental\u201d is defined in the Century Dictionary as \u201chappening by chance or accident or unexpectedly; taking place not according to the usual course of things; casual, fortuitous; unintentional.\u201d In 1 Bouvier\u2019s Law Dictionary (Bawle\u2019s 3rd Bevision) p. 101, the word \u201caccident\u201d is defined as \u201can event which, under the circumstances, is unusual or unexpected; an event the real cause of which cannot be traced, or is at least not apparent.\u201d In 1 C. J., sec. 72, pp. 425, 426, in the article on \u201cAccident Insurance\u201d it is said:\n\u201cThe terms \u2018accident\u2019 and \u2018accidental,\u2019 as used in insurance policies covering accidental death . . . , are presumed to be employed in their ordinary and popular sense, as meaning happening by chance; . . . not according to the usual course of things; ... an event which takes place -without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected by the event; ... if happening through human agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual and not expected to the person to whom it happens; . . . \u201d\nIn 2 Bouvier\u2019s Law Dictionary, p. 1625, it is said:\n\u201cAccident insurance is intended to furnish indemnity against accidents and death caused by accidental-means, and the language of the policy must be construed with reference to that proposition. In case of doubt the construction should be liberal in favor of the insured.\u201d' (Citing Healey v. Mutual Accident Ass\u2019n, 133 Ill. 556, 561.)\nIn 1 C. J., sec. 77, p. 431, under the heading \u201cIntentional Injuries Inflicted by Third Persons,\u201d it is said: \u201cInjuries inflicted by a third person without fault of insured have been held within accident policies. \u2019 \u2019 (Citing numerous cases in a note.)\nIn 1 C. J., sec. 78, pp. 432, 433, under the heading \u201cExternal, Violent and Accidental Means,\u201d it is said: \u201cIt is a very usual provision of an accident policy that it shall apply only to death or injury through \u2018external, violent, and accidental means,\u2019 in which case the policy embraces only cases where the elements of force and accident concur in effecting an injury. But if the cause of the injury or death can be shown to be due to accidental or unnatural means this imports that such injury or death is due to external and violent means, and the nature and character of the injury may also be sufficient to establish that it was inflicted by external and violent means. . . . The word \u2018external\u2019 in such a clause refers' to the means which cause the injury, and not to the injury itself, . . . \u201d\nIn 1 C. J., sec. 278, p. 495, under the heading \u201cPresumptions as to Cause of Death or Injury,\u201d it is said: \u201cWhere, however, it is apparent that the injury to or death of the insured was the result of external and violent means, and the issue is as to whether it was due to an accident, within the meaning of the policy, or to some cause excepted by the policy, the presumption is in favor of accident and against the existence of facts bringing the case within any of the exceptions of the policy, such as insanity of the insured, intentional injury inflicted by a third person, lack of due care and diligence, self-inflicted injuries, and suicide. These presumptions may, however, be overcome by facts and circumstances establishing the contrary.\u201d\nIn the policy sued upon in-the present case, the \u201cexceptions\u201d are above set out in full. While it there appears that death by suicide prevents the payment of any \u201cAccidental Death Benefit,\u201d there is no exception if the death be caused by injuries intentionally inflicted by some person other than the insured, as was the case in Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, and numerous similar cases. Nor does it appear from the evidence in the present case that any of the \u201cexceptions\u201d in the policy were relied upon as a defense. And there was no evidence even tending to show that Ingstrom had committed suicide. Indeed, there was strong evidence to the contrary. While the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show that Ingstrom\u2019s injuries were accidental and not self-inflicted, it was not necessary for plaintiff to show by an eyewitness that the injuries which caused the death were accidental. That fact could be and was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence. (See Wilkinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 240 Ill. 205, 211.) And where a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of death of the insured from external, violent and accidental means, the burden is then upon the defendant to show that said death resulted from a cause excepted in the policy. (Nalty v. Federal Casualty Co., 245 Ill. App. 180, 185; 14 R. C. L. p. 1437, sec. 599.)\nThe following adjudicated cases in other jurisdictions may be cited as supporting plaintiff\u2019s contention that Ingstrom\u2019s death was caused \u201csolely through external, violent and accidental means \u2019 \u2019 and as also supporting the finding and judgment of the trial court for the full amount of plaintiff\u2019s claim: Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 72 Miss. 333, 336, 337; Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co. v. Wyness, 107 Ga. 584, 589, 590; Gaynor v. Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co. (Ga. App.), 77 S. E. 1072, 1073; Hutchcraft\u2019s Ex\u2019r v. Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co., 87 Ky. 300, 303; Lovelace v. Travelers\u2019 Protective Ass\u2019n, 126 Mo. 104, 116, 117; Collins v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 63 Mo. App. 253, 256, 257; Richards v. Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170, 175, 176; Phoenix Accident & Sick Benefit Ass\u2019n v. Stiver, 42 Ind. App. 636, 639, 640; Robinson v. United States Mut. Acc. Ass\u2019n, 68 Fed. 825, 826, 827.\nDefendant\u2019s counsel also contend that the judgment should be reversed because no \u201cproper\u201d proofs of Ingstrom\u2019s death were made to defendant. It is not urged that the proofs were not promptly made, but it is argued (1) that such proofs should have been made in plaintiff\u2019s name as administratrix instead of in her individual name at a time when she believed she was the beneficiary, and (2) that the proofs did not sufficiently show a claim for the \u201caccidental death benefit.\u201d We do not think there is any substantial merit in the contention or argument, especially as the evidence discloses that about two days after Ingstrom\u2019s body was found, agents of defendant were advised of the facts and the \u201cclaimant\u2019s certificate,\u201d on a form furnished by defendant and dated September 4, 1931, was filled out by one of its agents and signed by plaintiff as directed, and that in the certificate, in answer to certain questions, it is stated that the insured met an \u201caccidental death,\u201d and that he did not die at home or in a hospital but \u201cwas found in a ditch.\u201d\n' Our conclusion is that the judgment of the municipal court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.\nAffirmed.\nScanlan, P. J., and Sullivan, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Gridley" } ], "attorneys": [ "Hoyne, O\u2019Connor & Rubinkam, for appellant.", "David S. Chesrow and Samuel L. Golan, for appellee ; Samuel L. Golan, of counsel." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Lena Rogers, Administratrix of the Estate of Leonard Ingstrom, Appellee, v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, Appellant.\nGen. No. 36,270.\nOpinion filed May 23, 1933.\nHoyne, O\u2019Connor & Rubinkam, for appellant.\nDavid S. Chesrow and Samuel L. Golan, for appellee ; Samuel L. Golan, of counsel." }, "file_name": "0515-01", "first_page_order": 541, "last_page_order": 552 }