{ "id": 3326341, "name": "Northern Trust Company, Appellee, v. Central Life Insurance Company of Illinois, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Northern Trust Co. v. Central Life Insurance", "decision_date": "1934-04-30", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 37,341", "first_page": "551", "last_page": "560", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "274 Ill. App. 551" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "112 N. Y. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2219647 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/112/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N. Y. S. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.", "case_ids": [ 3116546 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nys/95/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Kan. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 280305 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/99/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Neb. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 4535817 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/109/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Tex. Civ. App. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tex. Civ. App.", "case_ids": [ 4370566 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tex-civ-app/31/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Iowa 1124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2253765 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/184/1124-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3355827 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/217/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3125150 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/161/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3124566 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/161/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3130420 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/160/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5426641 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/133/0556-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 638, "char_count": 15960, "ocr_confidence": 0.526, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.671277647141776e-08, "percentile": 0.5289090213367652 }, "sha256": "4849d67086c5d4b787424e4a0978320d0fc2c0df5af5705c0d8410e34f17f741", "simhash": "1:136778125170c413", "word_count": 2654 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:53:58.051062+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Northern Trust Company, Appellee, v. Central Life Insurance Company of Illinois, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice O\u2019Connor\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nPlaintiff, the beneficiary in a life insurance policy issued by defendant on the life of Joseph Friedman, brought an action to recover $20,000 claimed to be due it under the terms of the policy. The policy was for $10,000 and there was a rider attached which provided for double indemnity payment of $20,000 under certain circumstances. There seems to have been no contention but that defendant was liable for the face amount of the policy, $10,000, and this phase is out of the case. The only question before the court was whether the defendant was liable for the double indemnity provided for in the rider attached to the policy. The case was tried before the court without a jury on a stipulation' of facts. There was a finding and judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor for $11,250, and defendant appeals.\nIt is stipulated that Joseph Friedman, the insured, came to his death accidentally as a result of breathing, while sane, \u201catmosphere which was full of carbon monoxide gas, which is a deadly poison, emanating from a certain automobile,\u201d and that the sole question for decision is whether or not, as a matter of law, the beneficiary of the policy is entitled to recover upon the double indemnity provision of the policy. The double indemnity rider, after providing that the company would pay $20,000 in lieu of the face amount of the policy upon receipt of due proof of the death of the insured under certain conditions not involved here, contains the following: \u201cThis Double Indemnity Benefit shall not be payable if the insured\u2019s death resulted from self-destruction, whether sane or insane; from the taking of poison or inhaling of gas, whether voluntary or otherwise.\u201d The construction of this provision is the one question in controversy.\nDefendant\u2019s contention is that since the insured, Joseph Friedman, came to his death by accidentally breathing gas from an automobile, no recovery can be had because the double indemnity provision above quoted expressly states that the double indemnity shall not be payable if the insured\u2019s death results from the \u201cinhaling of gas, whether voluntary or otherwise.\u201d\nOn the other hand, plaintiff\u2019s position is that the words \u201cthe taking of poison or inhaling of gas, whether voluntary or otherwise,\u201d mean \u201cthe intentional inhaling of gas, whether sane or insane,\u201d and do not include \u201cthe accidental and unknowing breathing of carbon monoxide gas while sane.\u201d A further contention of plaintiff is that regardless of the meaning of the wording of the double indemnity rider, the defendant is liable because at the bottom of the first page of the policy and on the back of it, which is called the' fourth page, the following words were stamped: \u201cwith double indemnity benefit from accidental death. \u2019 \u2019\nWe will dispose of plaintiff\u2019s second contention first. A photostatic copy of the policy is in the record. It is a document about 17 inches in length and 11 inches wide. At the bottom of page one the words in question seem to have been placed there by a rubber stamp. And again, the same rubber stamp seems to have been used on what would be the outside or face of the policy when folded. The words are not very conspicuous. Plaintiff\u2019s argument is that these words stamped on the policy as stated, \u201care controlling and decisive, and defeat defendant\u2019s contention\u201d; that when the policy was presented to the insured he undoubtedly must have understood that he was being insured for double indemnity for accidental death, and therefore these words \u201cshould be held virtually to estop it (defendant) from now taking a position inconsistent therewith\u201d; that in case of ambiguity or uncertainty in a policy, the rule of law is to construe it most strongly against the insurance company. While there is some merit in the contention, we think it cannot be sustained. We think an insurance company ought not be permitted to display prominently in a policy the statement that the insured is obtaining certain insurance, and then later on in the policy in small print cut down or explain away such insurance. And while we do not wish to be understood as placing our approval on the use of the rubber stamp on the policy in question in the manner indicated, yet we are of opinion we would not be warranted in eliminating from the double indemnity rider all of the provisions which specifically state that under the conditions named the double indemnity was not payable. The provision of the rider in question expressly states that the double indemnity is not payable if the insured\u2019s death resulted from self-destruction, whether sane or insane, from committing an assault or felony, from war or police duty, from the insured\u2019s engaging in riot or insurrection, or from riding as a passenger in an aeroplane, etc.\nIf plaintiff\u2019s contention were sustained, the double indemnity would be payable without any exception. We think the policy cannot be given this construction.\nThe question then is, What is the meaning to be given to the wording of the rider which provides that the double indemnity benefit \u201cshall not be payable if the insured\u2019s death resulted from . . . inhaling of gas, whether voluntary or otherwise\u201d?\nAs stated, plaintiff\u2019s contention is that recovery can be had since the insured unintentionally inhaled gas. Defendant\u2019s position is that the inhaling of gas \u201cvoluntarily or otherwise\u201d means the same as thoug\u2019h the policy read that the double liability would not arise if gas was inhaled by the insured whether voluntarily or involuntarily, \u2014 that there was no liability under this policy in case the insured died as the result pf inhaling gas.\nCounsel for plaintiff chiefly rely on the cases of Healey v. Mutual Accident Ass\u2019n, 133 Ill. 556; Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 160 Ill. 642; Metropolitan Accident Ass\u2019n v. Froiland, 161 Ill. 30; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Waterman, 161 Ill. 632; Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 217 Ill. 390; while counsel for defendant cites Porter v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 95 N. Y. S. (App. Div.) 682; Riley v. Inter-State Business Men\u2019s Accident Ass\u2019n, 184 Iowa 1124; Kennedy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 31 Tex. Civ. App. 509; Birss v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 109 Neb. 226; Minner v. Great Western Accident Ass\u2019n, 99 Kan. 575, and other cases.\nThe wording of the policies in none of the cases cited is the same as the provision in the rider under consideration, and we can come to a better interpretation of the words in question by a reading of them than by analyzing and distinguishing cases, or in any other way. The rider says that the double indemnity benefit shall not be payable if the insured\u2019s death resulted from the \u201cinhaling of gas, whether voluntary or otherwise.\u201d We think this means that if the insured died as a result of inhaling gas, no recovery can be had under the rider. It was intended that there would be no double indemnity if the insured died as a result of inhaling gas, whether inhaled voluntarily or involuntarily. To give to the words the meaning contended for by counsel for plaintiff, the words \u201cor otherwise\u201d would have to be eliminated, and we think we are not warranted in eliminating those two words, but must construe the contract as made by the parties, giving effect to all of it.\nObviously the parties had the right to so contract if they desired. The rider provided that the double indemnity was not payable if the death of the insured resulted from self-destruction, whether sane or insane. The company had a right to insert this provision. It had equally such right to provide that the double indemnity should not be payable in case the insured died from inhaling gas.\nIn Porter v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. (supra), 95 N. Y. S. 682, 683, where an accident policy, by express terms, relieved the company from liability from injury caused by the \u201cvoluntary or involuntary inhalation of any gas\u201d by the insured, it was held that no recovery could be had where the insured died from the effects of gas accidentally inhaled by him while in a hotel room. The court there said (p. 683): \u201cIt must be conceded that an accident insurance company has the right to limit its liability in any reasonable manner; has the right to provide that in no case will it be liable if the death of the insured results from the effects of gas, inhaled voluntarily or involuntarily. We think that was the intention of the parties as indicated by the express language used in the policy in question. The meaning is no different than if the policy provided that the defendant would not be liable if the death of the insured resulted from the effects of dynamite, a railroad accident, or from yellow fever. The words employed in the exemption from liability clause quoted clearly indicate an intention to avoid liability where death is caused by the inhalation of gas. Concededly gas was inhaled by the deceased and such inhalation caused his death. It was not voluntary, but non-liability for the death of the insured by the involuntary as well as by the voluntary inhalation of gas was provided for. The words . . . must mean that, if the death of the insured resulted from the voluntary or involuntary inhalation of gas, no recovery could be had. \u2019 \u2019\nIn the Birss case, supra (109 Neb. 226), the insured in examining the flow of an oil well in attempting to measure the amount of oil in several tanks, became suffocated from inhaling poisonous gas, as a result of which he died. The policy provided that \u201cBenefits . . . shall not cover . . . any death ... resulting from . . . inhaling of gas . . . (voluntary or involuntary, conscious or unconscious) \u201d and it was held that no recovery could be had.\nIn the Minner case, supra (99 Kan. 575) an insurance policy provided for two kinds of indemnity, accident and sickness; disability occasioned by gas was classified as sickness. The policy provided, \u201cDisability or loss, fatal or otherwise, caused by or resulting wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, from . . . gas, ... in any manner taken or administered, voluntarily or involuntarily, . . . shall be classified as sickness,\u201d subject to the provisions and conditions contained in the policies. And it was held that no recovery could be had for the death of the insured caused by accidentally and unintentionally breathing illuminating gas.\nHealey v. Mutual Accident Ass\u2019n, supra (133Ill.556), cited by plaintiff, was an action on an accident insurance certificate. It was alleged in the declaration that the assured\u2019s death was caused \u201cthrough external, violent and accidental means, within the intent and meaning of the certificate,\u201d by accidentally taking and drinking poison. The certificate was set out in the declaration. It provided that in case of the insured\u2019s death certain payments would be made to his wife, the beneficiary, if the insured \u201cshall have sustained bodily injuries, received by or through external, violent and accidental means . . . and such injuries alone shall have occasioned death.\u201d A demurrer was sustained to the declaration. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment, but on appeal to the Supreme Court it was reversed; the court held that the insured came to his death from extreme and violent means as provided in the policy. Obviously this case is not in point.\nTravelers\u2019 Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, supra (160 Ill. 642), was an action on an accident policy. The insured came to his death as a result of taking, through mistake, carbolic acid instead of medicine. The policy provided that the company would not be liable where death occurred as a result of taking poison, and it was held that this provision was applicable only where the poison was intentionally taken, and since the evidence showed that the insured unintentionally and accidentally took the poison, recovery was allowed.\nTo the same effect was the holding in Metropolitan Accident Ass\u2019n v. Froiland, supra (161 Ill. 30).\nIn Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Waterman, 161 Ill. 632, suit was brought on an accident insurance policy which insured against death \u201cthrough external, violent and accidental means.\u201d The policy also contained a provision for a weekly indemnity in case of bodily injury not causing death. The insured was asphyxiated by accidentally inhaling illuminating gas in his hotel room in Aurora. The policy provided: \u201cThis insurance does not cover disappearances; nor war risk; nor voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger; nor injuries, fatal or otherwise, resulting from poison or anything accidentally or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed or inhaled; nor injuries, fatal or otherwise, received while or in consequence of having been under the influence of or affected by, nor resulting directly or indirectly from, intoxicants, anesthetics, narcotics, sunstroke, freezing, vertigo, sleep-walking, 'fits, hernia, or any disease or bodily infirmity.\u201d The court, after quoting the foregoing provision, analyzed a number of authorities, including Paul v. Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, and in construing the provision above quoted, said (p. 636): \u201cBead in the lig'ht of the decisions, the words now in question do not mean otherwise than if they explicitly read, \u2018poison or anything accidentally or otherwise, consciously and by an act of volition, drawn into the system by inspiration,\u2019 \u201d and the judgment was affirmed.\nIn Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co. v. Ayers, supra (217 Ill. 390), it was held that a provision of an insurance policy that the insurance should cover death resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly \u201cfrom any gas or vapor\u201d did not exempt the company from liability for death by asphyxiation caused by the accidental escape of gas into the room and the unconscious inhaling of the gas by the insured while asleep. '\nWe think none of the cases cited by plaintiff, above referred to, is in point. The provisions of the policies of insurance involved in those cases are not the same as the provision in the policy before us in the instant case. We hold that no recovery can be had under the double indemnity provision of the policy because the insured came to his death as the result of \u201caccidentally inhaling gas,\u201d and in such case liability is expressly exempted.\nThe judgment of the superior court of Cook county is reversed, but the cause will not be remanded for the reasons stated.\nJudgment reversed.\nMatchett, P. J., and McSurely, J., concur.\nSupplemental Opinion on Petition por Rehearing.\nPlaintiff in its petition for a rehearing again argues that the words stamped on the face and back of the policy, viz., \u201cWith double indemnity benefit from accidental death,\u201d ought to estop the defendant from.contending that double indemnity was not payable under the. policy.\nWe are entirely satisfied with what we have said in the opinion in disposing of this contention, except that it may be that the defendant insurance company, in stamping these words on the face and back of the policy, was endeavoring to comply with paragraph 12 of section 1 of the Act regulating the conditions and provisions of life insurance policies. Cahill\u2019s 1933 Statutes, pp. 1650, 1652.\nThat Act provides that after January 1, 1908, \u201cno policy of life insurance shall be issued or delivered in this State or be issued by a life insurance company organized under the laws of this State, unless the same shall provide the following:\u201d Then follow a number of paragraphs as to what such policy shall contain, and paragraph 12 of that section is as follows: \u201c (12) Title on the face and on the back of the policy, correctly describing the same.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice O\u2019Connor" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stebbins, McKinley & Price and John M. Allen, for appellant; Lewis A. Stebbins, of counsel.", "Hirsch E. Soble, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Northern Trust Company, Appellee, v. Central Life Insurance Company of Illinois, Appellant.\nGen. No. 37,341.\nOpinion filed April 30, 1934.\nHeard in the first division of this court for the first district at the February term, 1934.\nRehearing denied and supplemental opinion filed May 14, 1934.\nStebbins, McKinley & Price and John M. Allen, for appellant; Lewis A. Stebbins, of counsel.\nHirsch E. Soble, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0551-01", "first_page_order": 609, "last_page_order": 618 }