{
  "id": 3151650,
  "name": "Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Appellant, v. Kenneth J. Stanford, Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Stanford",
  "decision_date": "1938-06-13",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 40,044",
  "first_page": "1",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:49:50.507998+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Appellant, v. Kenneth J. Stanford, Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice O\u2019Connor\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nPlaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover on a judgment for $1,285.42, entered by a New York court, which judgment plus interest and costs amounted to $1,812.44 at the time of the filing of the suit. Defendant was served with summons but failed to appear or answer, and was defaulted. Afterward, on June 3, 1937, judgment was entered against him for the amount of the claim. November 17, 1937, defendant filed his petition in which he alleged that the municipal court of Chicago was without jurisdiction to entertain the action because the suit was on a foreign judgment exceeding $1,000, and reference was made to section 2 of the Municipal Court Act (par. 357, ch. 37, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 108.028]). The next day plaintiff filed an answer to the petition and on the same day an order was entered which recites that the defendant\u2019s motion to vacate the judgment came on to be heard and the matter was continued until November 22; an order was entered on that day sustaining defendant\u2019s motion and dismissing plaintiff\u2019s suit at its costs, and it prosecutes this appeal.\nThe defendant has not appeared in this court. The question for decision, as presented by counsel for plaintiff in their brief, is, Has the municipal court of Chicago jurisdiction in an action based on a foreign judgment exceeding $1,000?\nSection 2 of the Municipal Court Act provides: \u201cThat said municipal court shall have jurisdiction in the following cases:\n\u201cFirst. Cases to be designated and hereinafter referred to as cases of the first class, which shall include (a) all actions on contracts, express or implied, whether implied in law or implied in fact, when the amount claimed by the plaintiff, exclusive of costs, exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000).\u201d\nIn Brown v. Gerson, 182 Ill. App. 177, it was held that section 2 of the Municipal Court Act, which at that time (1912) provided that the municipal court of Chicago should have jurisdiction of \u201call actions on contracts, express or implied,\u201d did not confer jurisdiction to maintain an action based on a judgment entered by the circuit court of Cook county.\nIn People v. Dummer, 274 Ill. 637, two suits in debt, as cases of the first class, were brought in the municipal court of Chicago against the defendant for taxes alleged to be due on defendant\u2019s personal property. There was a trial and judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor for more than $19,000, and the defendant appealed. One of the points urged for reversal was that the municipal court had no jurisdiction of the action. The contention was upheld and the judgment reversed. That case was decided in 1916, at which time the provision of section 2 of the Municipal Court Act was the same as it was when the Appellate Court decided Brown v. Gerson. Section 2 of the Municipal Court Act, which was in effect at the time of the decisions in the two cases mentioned, was amended by an act of the legislature in. 1931, which was adopted by the voters in 1932. That section, so far as pertinent here, as amended is: \u201c Cases to be designated and hereinafter referred to as cases of the first class, which shall include (a) all actions on contracts, express or implied, whether implied in law or implied in fact, when the amount claimed by the plaintiff, exclusive of costs, exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000).\u201d The words we have italicized were added by the amendment. The amendment to section 2 which changed the words \u201cactions on contracts, express or implied,\u201d to \u201cactions on contracts, express or implied, whether implied in law or implied in fact,\u201d must be given some effect. We must assume that when the amendment was passed by the legislature it knew the existing law and that its purpose in enacting the amendment was to make some change in the former law. Sylvester v. Buda Co., 281 Ill. App. 139.\nBy sec. 1, ch. 28, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 27.12], the common law of England was, with certain exceptions, declared the law of this State, and is the law at the present time except in so far as it has been repealed by legislative authority or changed or modified by custom as found in decisions of our courts. Sylvester v. Buda Co., 281 Ill. App. 139. Blackstone in his Commentaries says (vol. 3, pp. 159-60): \u201cFrom these express contracts the transition is easy to those that are only implied by law. Which are such as reason and justice dictate, and which, therefore, the law presumes that every man has contracted to perform, and upon this presumption makes him answerable to such persons as suffer by his non-performance.\n\u201cOf this nature are, first, such as are necessarily implied by the fundamental constitution of government, to which every man is a contracting party. And thus it is that every person is bound, and hath virtually agreed to pay such particular sums of money as are charged on him by the sentence, or assessed by the interpretation of the law. . . . Whatever, therefore, the laws order any one to pay, that becomes instantly a debt which he hath beforehand contracted to discharge. And this implied agreement it is that gives the plaintiff a right to institute a second action, founded merely on the general contract, in order to recover such damages, or sum of money, as are assessed by the jury and adjudged by the court to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff in any former action. So that if he hath once obtained a judgment against another for a certain sum, and neglects to take out execution thereupon, he may afterward bring an action of debt upon this judgment, and shall not be put upon the proof of. the original cause of action; but upon showing the judgment once obtained, still in full force, and yet unsatisfied, the law immediately implies that, by the original contract of society, the defendant hath contracted a debt, and is bound to pay it.\u201d We think adding the words, \u201cwhether implied in law\u201d to section 2 of the.Municipal Court Act (that court prior to the amendment having had jurisdiction of 1\u2018 actions on contracts, express or implied\u201d) invested the municipal court with jurisdiction to maintain an action based on a foreign judgment, because, as Blackstone says, where a judgment has been obtained and not satisfied, \u201cthe law immediately implies that, by the original contract of society the defendant hath contracted a debt, and is bound to pay it.\u201d\nWe hold that the municipal court had jurisdiction of the action, and the judgment of that court dismissing the suit is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nMcSurely and Matchett, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice O\u2019Connor"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Kjggins & Jones, of Chicago, for appellant; Hiram T. Gilbert, J. T. Kiggins and R. D. J ones, of Chicago, of counsel.",
      "No appearance for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Appellant, v. Kenneth J. Stanford, Appellee.\nGen. No. 40,044.\nOpinion filed June 13, 1938.\nKjggins & Jones, of Chicago, for appellant; Hiram T. Gilbert, J. T. Kiggins and R. D. J ones, of Chicago, of counsel.\nNo appearance for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0001-01",
  "first_page_order": 51,
  "last_page_order": 55
}
