{
  "id": 3235324,
  "name": "Charles Dillow and Cora A. Dillow, Appellees, v. Hallie L. Hileman et al., Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Dillow v. Hileman",
  "decision_date": "1939-03-13",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "509",
  "last_page": "511",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "300 Ill. App. 509"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "254 Ill. App. 595",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:43:51.784123+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Charles Dillow and Cora A. Dillow, Appellees, v. Hallie L. Hileman et al., Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Stone\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is a suit in forcible entry and detainer brought in the county court of Union county. The second amended complaint alleges that plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of the premises described therein and that defendants unlawfully withhold possession thereof from them.\nDefendants deny the right of possession in plaintiffs; deny that they are in possession by lease, but claim that they are in rightful possession of the premises by virtue of a bond for deed by plaintiffs and allege that they have performed all conditions precedent to entitle them to a bond for deed and in fact a deed. In support of this contention they bring into court their Exhibit \u201cB\u201d which is the same as plaintiffs\u2019 Exhibit \u201cA\u201d with the addition of the following written by plaintiff, Charles Dillow, thereon:\n\u201cBe it further agreed that parties of the first part agree to make parties of the second part a bond for deed, per verbal agreement, when the terms and conditions of the above contract are fully complied with.\u201d\nWhat was this verbal agreement? The trial court refused to hear evidence on it. This was error. While the general rule is that parole evidence may not be heard to modify or contradict the terms of a written agreement, yet, \u201cWhere there is a direct reference in writing to a verbal agreement, such agreement may be proved by parol evidence even though the effect be to add material terms and conditions to the writing.\u201d 9 Enc. of Evidence, p. 353, sec. D.\nThe oral agreement referred to in the writing under consideration might have had much to do with whether defendants were in possession of the premises by lease or as purchasers.\nWhile we are aware that title to real estate cannot be tried in forcible entry and detainer suits, the conditions under which defendants held possession could have much to do with whether plaintiff was entitled to possession of the premises.\nIn Moran v. Redder, 254 Ill. App. 595, the court said \u201cWe see no reason why a landlord and his tenant may not enter into a valid contract for the purchase and sale of the premises, and when this is done, the relation of landlord and tenant ceases even though the contract does not specifically authorize the tenant to enter into or withhold possession as purchaser of the premises, as this authority may be implied from the circumstances.\u201d Leary v. Pattison, 66 Ill. 203; Stanwood v. Kuhn, 132 Ill. App. 466; Mahannah v. Mahannah, 292 Ill. 133.\nIt was a question of fact for the jury whether defendants held as tenants or purchasers; or whether they held by virtue of some agreement contained in the verbal conversation which would render their possession lawful.\nDefendants insist that they had performed \u2022 every condition which would entitle them to a bond for deed. We think they were entitled to show that. This includes what constituted the different elements of the $185 paid by them.\nIt was error for the court to give the peremptory instruction.\nThe judgment of the county court is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to take further proceeding in accordance with the views here expressed.\nReversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Stone"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. Kelly Smith, of Mounds, for appellants.",
      "W. D. Lyerle and R. Wallace Karraker, both of Jonesboro, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Charles Dillow and Cora A. Dillow, Appellees, v. Hallie L. Hileman et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed March 13, 1939.\nRehearing denied July 1, 1939.\nJ. Kelly Smith, of Mounds, for appellants.\nW. D. Lyerle and R. Wallace Karraker, both of Jonesboro, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0509-01",
  "first_page_order": 531,
  "last_page_order": 533
}