{
  "id": 5569467,
  "name": "Highway Mutual Casualty Company, Assignee, Appellee, v. Roscoe Stern, Trading as Invader Decorating Service, Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Highway Mutual Casualty Co. v. Stern",
  "decision_date": "1940-10-01",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 41,056",
  "first_page": "506",
  "last_page": "509",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "306 Ill. App. 506"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "364 Ill. 234",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2585987
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/364/0234-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 325,
    "char_count": 5407,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.527,
    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:967dae1f8e08886f",
    "word_count": 885
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:16.574450+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Highway Mutual Casualty Company, Assignee, Appellee, v. Roscoe Stern, Trading as Invader Decorating Service, Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice O\u2019Connor\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nPlaintiff brought an action against defendant to recover a balance claimed for workmen\u2019s compensation insurance. Defendant denied liability on the ground that the contracts which were the basis of plaintiff\u2019s claim were not executed by him, had not been delivered to him and were ultra vires the corporation which purported to issue the contracts. There was a trial before the court without a jury, a finding and judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor for $1,292.65 and defendant appeals.\nThe record discloses that March 2, 1936, the United Employers Corporation \u201cA Workmen\u2019s Compensation Safety and Service Company\u201d issued \u201cA Workmen\u2019s Compensation Contract\u201d to defendant Boscoe Stern, the employer named in the contract, whereby it agreed to pay the employer \u201cfor personal injuries sustained by his employees arising out of and in the course of the employment\u201d for a period of one year. At the termination of this contract a similar one was executed for another year. In the first contract defendant\u2019s business was located at 3141 W. Roosevelt road, Chicago, and the second contract that defendant was in business at 2223 S. Millard avenue, Chicago. February 15,1938, the United Employers Corporation assigned all its right, title and interest arising under the contracts to plaintiff, Highway Mutual Casualty Company of Chicago. The amount defendant was to pay for the insurance was based upon a percentage of his payroll and from time to time defendant\u2019s payroll was examined, bills sent to him and he made payments on account, and the corporation made a number of payments for injuries sustained by defendant\u2019s employees. The evidence shows that March 12, 1936, and again on March 27, 1937, the Industrial Commission issued its certificates to defendant Stern certifying that he had complied with all terms and provisions of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. March 4,1937, the Industrial Commission wrote Stern advising him that the Commission had been informed that his contract with the United Employers Corporation had expired March 2, 1937, and to advise the Commission immediately whether he intended to comply with the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Stern wrote on the bottom of this letter, \u201cHave renewed my policy with same company.\u201d\nThe defense interposed is that the United Employers Corporation was organized under the Illinois Business Corporation Act and that act does not apply to insurance companies and therefore the two contracts are \u201cillegal and ultra vires the corporation. \u2019 \u2019\nWe do not stop to consider whether United Employers Corporation complied with all the terms of the law in obtaining its charter or in issuing the two contracts involved in the suit. We might say, however, the evidence above referred to shows that what was done by the United company in its dealings with defendant Stern was approved by the Industrial Commission and we think it is far from clear that what was done was not authorized by law. No one connected with the- Industrial Commission, nor anyone else who seems to have been familiar with the organization of companies issuing workmen\u2019s compensation insurance and entering into contracts with employers, was called to testify and explain what was done and how the contracts involved were approved by the Commission. We are of opinion that defendant has no defense. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Richmond, 364 Ill. 234. In that case it was held that one who had received the full benefit of his contract \u2014 an insurance contract \u2014 cannot defend on the ground of ultra vires unless the enforcement of the contract is directly prohibited by some positive rule of law, good morals or established public policy. The court there, in passing on the validity of an insurance policy said: \u201cIt will be found that one who has received the full benefit of his contract with a company cannot defend upon the ground of ultra vires unless the enforcement of the contract is directly prohibited by some positive rule of law or runs counter to good morals or established public policy. In the case at bar we are of the opinion that the constitutiopal question sought to be raised is immaterial; that no matter which way it might be decided \u2014 even if we should assume the power to pass upon it \u2014 the result must be the same so far as the defendants are concerned.\u201d\nIn the instant case no law has been pointed out which directly prohibits the issuance of the two contracts in question. The fact that the Business Corporation Act, under which the United Employers Corporation received its charter from the Secretary of State, may not be applicable to insurance companies does not directly prohibit the making of the two contracts of insurance. Defendant has received the full benefit of the two contracts; nothing remains but to pay the balance due. The evidence shows he acknowledged his liability a number of times and made payments from time to time as bills were presented to him. There is no merit in his defense and the judgment of the municipal court of Chicago is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMatchett, J., and McSurely, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice O\u2019Connor"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Nathan E. De Vault, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "B. M. Steiner and Irwin I. Blumberg, both of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Highway Mutual Casualty Company, Assignee, Appellee, v. Roscoe Stern, Trading as Invader Decorating Service, Appellant.\nGen. No. 41,056.\nOpinion filed October 1, 1940.\nNathan E. De Vault, of Chicago, for appellant.\nB. M. Steiner and Irwin I. Blumberg, both of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0506-01",
  "first_page_order": 554,
  "last_page_order": 557
}