{ "id": 4977019, "name": "The American Insurance Company, for use, etc., v. Samuel Arbuckle", "name_abbreviation": "American Insurance v. Arbuckle", "decision_date": "1890-02-14", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "369", "last_page": "372", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "32 Ill. App. 369" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 863729 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/23/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4916568 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/22/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2416408 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/21/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2735240 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/93/0230-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 406, "char_count": 6815, "ocr_confidence": 0.55, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.306719294217812e-08, "percentile": 0.4343067877702522 }, "sha256": "4fe8730da32ffc61bc60b75a9083ca36366e6379f6952fa4ec29c862ab60cc86", "simhash": "1:9a8215255b46e679", "word_count": 1171 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:59:20.043421+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The American Insurance Company, for use, etc., v. Samuel Arbuckle." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wall, J.\nThe question presented by this record is whether an action on a judgment of a justice of the peace is barred by the statute of limitations in five years.\nIt is provided by Sec. 15, Chap. 83, R. S., that \u201c actions on unwritten contracts expressed or implied, or on awards of arbitration, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within five years next after the cause of action accrued.\u201d See. 16 provides, \u201c actions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts or other evidences of indebtedness in writing shall be commenced within ten years next after the cause of action accrued.\u201d By Sec. 26 the period of limitation in actions on j udgments of courts of record in this State is twenty years.\nA judgment of a justice of the peace not being a judgment of a court of record, does it fall within Sec. 15, which includes \u201call civil actions not otherwise provided for,\u201d or within Sec. 16 under the clause, \u201c other evidences of indebtedness in wilting \u201d ?\nUnder the English statute of 21 James I, and similar statutes in this country limiting actions of debt founded upon \u201c any contract, without specialty,\u201d it has generally, if not always, been held that the statute of limitations does not bar an action upon a judgment, and so where the liability of defendant arises, not by the act of the parties but by virtue of some requirement of a statute, there is no such bar. The distinction is drawn between actions upon contracts in fact and contracts in law.\nIt has been held in New York, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania that the judgment of a justice of the peace was not within such a statute, which barred only actions founded upon any contract, without specialty, thus distinguishing such judgment from a mere contract. Angell on Limitations, Ch. 10; Wait\u2019s Ac. & Def., Vol. 7, 253. In Bemis v. Stanley, 93 Ill. 230, it was held that a judgment of a court of record of another State was within the clause of Sec. 15 above quoted.\nThe court did not refer to Sec. 16. It was then said \u201c our view is that Sec. 15 is broad enough to embrace the judgment sued on in this case; that the suit on a judgment is a civil action not otherwise specially provided for and hence barred in five years by the terms and conditions of our statute.\u201d In Aarvig v. Kellogg, 21 Ill. App. 530, it was held by the Appellate Court of the Second District that such a judgment as here involved is to be classed under the head of \u201c other evidences of indebtedness in writing\u201d and therefore controlled by Sec. 16, it being considered that Bemis v. Stanley was not conclusive because involving merely the judgment of a court in another State and because the decision there might have been sustained on the ground that more than ten years had elapsed, and further the attention of the court had not been called to Sec. 16. The same court so held in O\u2019Donnell v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 22 Ill. App. 233.\nIn Stelle v. Lovejoy, 23 Ill. App. 575, it was held by the Appellate Court of the First District that the action was barred in five years, citing Bemis v. Stanley. We are inclined to the same view.\nThe sixteenth section enumerates bonds, notes, bills, written leases, written contracts, and then adds \u201c other evidences of indebtedness in writing.\u201d\n\u201c It is said to be a good rule of construction that where an act of Parliament begins with words which describe things or persons of an, inferior degree and concludes with general words, the general words shall not be extended to any thing or person of a higher degree; that is to say, where a particular class is spoken of and general words follow, the class first mentioned is to be taken as the most comprehensive and the general words treated as referring to matters ejusdem generis, with such class, the effect of general words, when they follow particular words, being thus restricted.\u201d Broom\u2019s Legal Maxims, 651; Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, 360-1.\nHere the statute having specially enumerated several particular kinds of voluntary obligations, including the more general expression \u201cwritten contracts,\u201d uses the language under consideration, obviously intending to include every other form of voluntary written acknowledgment, admission or undertaking, which might give evidence of indebtedness.\nA judgment does evidence indebtedness, but it does more; for it is an adjudication even though rendered by a court of inferior jurisdiction, if acting within its proper limits as to person and s\u00fabject-matter. It may rest upon contract or upon tort, or upon a provision of statute or of a municipal ordinance. It does not necessarily depend upon any voluntary act of the defendant. Indeed, it may be and often is based upon considerations wholly independent thereof. Moreover it is conclusive, and its merits, while it remains in force, can not be collaterally examined or inquired into.\nIt would be a misuse of terms to describe it as a mere evidence of indebtedness. It is not to be supposed that the legislature, familiar with \u2018the legal effect and qualities of a judgment, would refer to it in terms which more aptly describe something less conclusive and less potential, and which inaptly and imperfectly characterize it by a designation of its minor quality only.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court will be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wall, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Messrs. F. W. Dundas and J. C. Ficklin, for appellant.", "Mr. H. Van Sellar, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The American Insurance Company, for use, etc., v. Samuel Arbuckle.\nLimitations\u2014Statute, Sec. 15\u2014Justice of Peace\u2014Judgment of.\nAn action on a judgment of a justice of the peace falls within the provisions of Sec. 15 of the statute of limitations and is barred in five years.\n[Opinion filed February 14, 1890.]\nAppeal from the Circuit Court of Edgar County; the Hon. C. B. Smith, Judge, presiding.\nThis was a suit commenced by appellants before George M. Jeter, a justice of the peace of Edgar county, on January 7, 1889, to recover a judgment upon a former judgment rendered January 22, 1879, by M. H. Ewers, a former justice of the peace of Edgar county, against Samuel Arbuckle and in favor of the American Insurance Company. Judgment was rendered by Jeter, January 21, 1889, against appellants, and an appeal was taken to the September term of the Edgar Circuit Court. The cause was then tried before a jury, and after hearing all the evidence, the court instructed the jury to render a verdict for the defendant, upon the ground that appellants had not commenced this action before Justice Geo. M. Jeter within five years from date of former judgment obtained before Justice M. H. Ewers, and in accordance with such instructions the jury so rendered a verdict.\nMotion for new trial having been entered, overruled and judgment entered in accordance with the verdict, this appeal was taken.\nMessrs. F. W. Dundas and J. C. Ficklin, for appellant.\nMr. H. Van Sellar, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0369-01", "first_page_order": 363, "last_page_order": 366 }