{
  "id": 4978066,
  "name": "W. G. Fortner, Plaintiff, v. W. Joe Hill, Circuit Judge, Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Fortner v. Hill",
  "decision_date": "1943-11-19",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "483",
  "last_page": "486",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "320 Ill. App. 483"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "319 Ill. App. 521",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        5651558,
        5649638
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/319/0521-02",
        "/ill-app/319/0521-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 5347,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.494,
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    "simhash": "1:afc6d67956262f51",
    "word_count": 910
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:35.834963+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "W. G. Fortner, Plaintiff, v. W. Joe Hill, Circuit Judge, Defendant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Stone\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is a petition for the writ of mandamus in aid of a certain appeal now pending in this court wherein W. G. Fortner is appellant, and George Hynds, trustee, is appellee. The petition is directed against respondent, Hon. W. Joe Hill, one of the circuit judges of the State of Illinois within and for the second judicial circuit thereof. It seeks to have this court direct and compel.by mandamus said respondent to sign a certain purported \u201cProceedings at the Trial\u201d in the appeal above referred to.\nThis case was before us oiice before (319 Ill. App. 521). The opinion in the former case recites all of the facts pertaining to this litigation and which we think are pertinent to the matter now before us.\nThe appeal was taken from a judgment rendered against appellant on January 31, 1941, and the record thereof was filed in this court on June 12, 1941. It will appear from said opinion that this court was most generous in extending the time of appellant in which to perfect his appeal; that it extended it from time to time, and finally without limit. It also shows not only that this court assisted appellant in this way, but that the trial court made available to appellant all proceedings which were necessary for the purpose of constructing and presenting a proper 'and legal \u201cProceedings at the Trial\u201d in said cause. Notwithstanding that, the so-called \u201cProceedings at the Trial\u201d were not presented to the trial court until October 13,1941. When it was presented to the trial court the trial court refused to sign it, stating different reasons therefor, one of which was that the so-called \u201cProceedings at the Trial \u2019 \u2019 contained the original exhibits used at the trial, and that it did not have the approval of the court, nor a stipulation of counsel that such original exhibits might he incorporated in the said proceedings. In said opinion we approved the trial court\u2019s actions in that behalf. Petitioner then waited until May 15,1942, and although he was well aware of the objection of the trial court to the said \u201cProceedings at the Trial\u201d he again presented to-the court not a corrected \u201cProceedings at the Trial, \u2019 \u2019 but the same one, which he had theretofore presented on October 13, 1941. A full hearing was had at that time and the court again refused to sign said \u201cProceedings at the Trial\u201d for the reasons stated on the first presentation. It was thereafter that petitioner presented his first petition for mandamus, which was disposed of in the opinion referred to. In said opinion we said: \u201cThe record in the case, we feel, well substantiates the claim urged by respondent that petitioner has been grossly dilatory and negligent in his methods of delay, which amount to laches. Without any plausible reason, he delayed action in the matter from October until May. It is not the duty of the trial court nor of the opposing counsel to make copies of exhibits and insert them in a transcript in place of the originals so that there may be constituted a legal and proper report of proceedings. After specific objections were made to petitioner\u2019s faulty transcript, he did nothing about it for seven months. This delay appears most unreasonable and inexcusable, especially when we consider that during this lapse of time, the judgment entered by the trial court against petitioner remains uncollected and the questions lodged against its validity undetermined.\u201d This opinion was filed June 1, 1943. On June 25, 1943, petitioner presented the present petition. It sets up most of the facts of the former petition, but shows that said \u201cProceedings at the Trial\u201d were corrected by placing copies of the exhibits in said proceedings instead of the originals. The petition was answered by respondent, setting up most if not all of the objections to the former petition, and in addition thereto alleging that the said petitioner has been guilty of laches and has used respondent and the Appellate Court as a means to circumvent the plain provisions of the statute in regard to appeals, his delay being grossly dilatory and negligent. A motion was made by petitioner to strike said answer. This motion is denied.\nPlaintiff knows as a matter of fact, and by his attempted correction of the said proceedings affirms that he knows, that it was not proper to incorporate the original exhibits in the \u201cProceedings at the Trial\u201d without an order of court or consent of counsel. What he knows now he is presumed to have known in the first instance. We have not changed our mind on our holding that the petitioner has been guilty of laches in the conduct of preparing said \u201cProceedings at the Trial.\u201d Courts cannot lend themselves to the prolongation of litigation of this character. It is against public policy. There is no good reason why a proper \u201cProceedings at the Trial\u201d should not have been presented in the first instance. The court ruled correctly when he refused to sign the so-called \u201cProceedings at the Trial\u201d in the first two instances, and we think he acted correctly in refusing to sign the one which is now before the court.\nThe petition for the writ of mandamus is denied.\nWrit denied.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Stone"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Julius Keznik, of Chicago, for plaintiff.",
      "Conger & Elliott, of Carmi, for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "W. G. Fortner, Plaintiff, v. W. Joe Hill, Circuit Judge, Defendant.\nOpinion filed November 19, 1943.\nJulius Keznik, of Chicago, for plaintiff.\nConger & Elliott, of Carmi, for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0483-01",
  "first_page_order": 521,
  "last_page_order": 524
}