{ "id": 4950014, "name": "Standard Discount Company, Inc., Appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Standard Discount Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance", "decision_date": "1945-03-26", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 43,107", "first_page": "506", "last_page": "519", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "325 Ill. App. 506" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "388 Ill. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2502019 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/388/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3166915 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/278/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5622598 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/297/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2424671 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/321/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 N. E. 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N. Y. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2251418 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/133/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 N. Y. Supp. 815", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.", "case_ids": [ 7791979 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nys/65/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 N. Y. App. Div. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.", "case_ids": [ 4756860 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad/53/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Pa. St. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 981843 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/148/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2992687 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/217/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ill. App. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3378487, 3379063 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/310/0266-01", "/ill-app/310/0266-02" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5213862 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/332/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4964003 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/324/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4970212 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/322/0643-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 813, "char_count": 25046, "ocr_confidence": 0.525, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.15452734889176936 }, "sha256": "5ac936acd5fc9328b50806087da7ac401c9270d326cc4ce7fa14778f34e2bd43", "simhash": "1:3233d99486afb698", "word_count": 4329 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:22.508325+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Standard Discount Company, Inc., Appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice O\u2019Connor\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nJune 20, 1932, defendant insurance company issued its policy on the life of Katie Smith for $90. The executor or administrator of the insured was designated as beneficiary, subject to the \u201cFacility of Payment\u201d clause. Afterward the beneficiary was changed, designating the daughter of the insured. The policy provided that \u201cAny assignment or pledge of this Policy or of any of the benefits hereunder shall be void and of no effect.\u201d Katie Smith died August 16, 1943, and her daughter, the beneficiary, made the funeral arrangements. Plaintiff was in the business of making loans to undertakers for funerals conducted by them. August 18, 1943, the beneficiary, the insured\u2019s daughter, executed a document assigning all her right, title and interest to the undertaker and the plaintiff; afterward the undertaker assigned all his right to plaintiff and on August 19, 1943, plaintiff wrote defendant enclosing a copy of the assignment stating it was entitled to the proceeds of the policy. No payment on the policy was ever made. February 4, 1944, summary judgment was entered in plaintiff\u2019s favor against defendant for the amount of the policy, interest and costs aggregating $94.54. Defendant appeals contending that under the provision of the policy above quoted, the assignment of the policy was void and of no effect. We delayed disposing of the appeal pending the decision by our Supreme court in Lam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 Ill. App. 643, where the same point was involved. Our Supreme court at the December term held that the assignment was valid. Lain v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Docket No. 28415.\nWe have today filed an opinion in No. 43053, Standard Discount Co., Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. [324 Ill. App. 586 (Abst.)], where the validity of a similar assignment was involved. We held' the assign- , ment good.\nAfter we handed down the foregoing opinion, defendant filed a petition for a rehearing on the ground that we had not passed on the last point made in its brief in which it contended that the \u201cFacility of Payment\u201d clause in the policy was effective' even though some persons made an assignment of their alleged interest, calling attention to the fact that we had not mentioned this point and that counsel had cited in support thereof McDaniels v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 332 Ill. 603, and Wickerath v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 310 Ill. App. 266. The policy provides \u201cAny assignment or pledge of this Policy or of any benefits hereunder shall be void and of no effect.\u201d We have had a number of cases in the last year or two where defendant contended that this provision of the policy made any assignment void. And as stated, we delayed deciding the case pending a decision of the Supreme court which involved the same provision and which case we have above cited. We allowed a rehearing for the reason that we did not pass on counsel\u2019s last point as above stated.\nThe policy, dated June 20, 1932, is known as an industrial policy, issued by defendant to Katie Smith. The amount of the policy is $90. Katie Smith died August 16, 1943, and, as stated by counsel for defendant: \u201cPlaintiff was in the business of making loans to undertakers for funerals conducted by them. On August 18, 1943, Nettie Johnson executed a document ,. . . which purported to assign all her right, title and interest in and to the above mentioned policy to Beverly W. Schweich (the undertaker) and the plaintiff. Thereafter the undertaker assigned all of his right, title and interest and claim in the assignment, executed by Nettie Johnson, to the plaintiff. . . .\n\u201cThe proceeds of the policy were not paid to Nettie Johnson or anyone else.\u201d\nIn its pleadings \u201cdefendant states that Nettie Johnson was designated as beneficiary in said policy to receive the death benefit only.\u201d And on November 29, 1939, the following was stamped on the policy: \u201cSubject to the provisions of the policy authorizing payment to the executor or administrator of the insured, or at the company\u2019s option to other persons.\u201d Following this there appears in longhand \u201cNettie Johnson \u2014 Daughter.\u201d \u201cHas been designated beneficiary to receive death benefit only. \u2019 \u2019\nBy the terms of the policy the company agreed, subject to certain conditions, \u201cto- pay as an endowment on the anniversary on this Policy next if the Insured shall have passed the age of seventy-nine years,\u201d etc. the amounts stipulated, and it further provided that if the insured died before reaching the age of 79 years, to pay the stipulated sum \u201cto the executor or administrator of the Insured, unless payment be made under the provisions of the next succeeding paragraph.\n\u201cThe Company may make any payment ... to the Insured, husband or wife, or any relative by blood or connection by marriage of the Insured, or to any other person appearing to said Company to be equitably entitled to the same by reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the Insured, or for his or her burial.\u201d\nIn McDaniels v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 332 Ill. 603, the insurance company issued an industrial policy on the life of Dora McDaniels, Sr., plaintiff\u2019s aunt, for $165. Plaintiff had judgment in the Circuit court of St. Clair county for the amount of her claim which the Appellate court affirmed but on certiorari the judgment was reversed. Plaintiff, the niece of the insured, \u201cpaid all insurance premiums from July 6, 1925, the date of issue, to August 31, 1925, the date of the death of the insured. On August 1, 1925, the following rider, on a form provided by the insurance company, was signed by the insured and attached to the policy: \u2018The undersigned, insured under policy No. 6,112,228 in the above company, hereby authorizes the said company to pay the amount of insurance due under said policy to Dora McDaniels, my niece. It is agreed that this authorization is not to vary in any way or alter the terms and conditions contained in said policy, especially the \u201cfacility of payment\u201d provision therein. \u2019 \u201d\nIt will be noted that the rider from which we have above quoted, signed by the insured, merely authorizes the company to pay the amount of insurance to the niece of the insured, while in the case at bar, Nettie Johnson, the daughter of the insured, is the \u201cdesignated beneficiary, to receive death benefit only.\u201d\nIn the Wickerath case, 310 Ill. App. 266 (abst.), the insurance company issued its policy on the life of John A. Unhoch for $500. Suit was brought by Elizabeth Wickerath, also known as Elizabeth Unhoch. The policy provided that upon proof of death of the insured, the company would pay \u201cto the executors or administrators of the Insured, unless payment be made under the next succeeding provision.\n\u201cFacility oe Payment\n\u201cThe company may make any payment or allow any benefit provided for in this policy to any relative by blood or connection by marriage.of the Insured, or to any person appearing to the Company to be equitably entitled thereto.\u201d Stamped on the back of the policy is the following: \u201cName of person to whom payment of death benefit is requested subject to all the terms and conditions of the policy. Name Elisabeth Unhoch. Relationship Wife.\u201d It will be noted that the endorsement does not name Elizabeth Unhoch as the beneficiary but only a person to whom payment may be made, while in the case at bar, Nettie Johnson is specifically named as the beneficiary.\nIn Bishop v. Prudential Ins. Co., 217 Ill. App. 112, in discussing a \u201cfacility of payment\u201d clause similar to the clause in the policy before us, the court said that the purpose of the clause was \u201cprompt payment of the benefit is usually provided for after the receipt of satisfactory proofs of the death by the insurer; and that the purpose of such a clause is the protection of the insurer in making a prompt payment without the expense of administrative proceedings. (Thomas v. Prudential Ins. Co., 148 Pa. St. 594, 598; Wokal v. Belsky, 53 N. Y. App. Div. 167, 65 N. Y. Supp. 815.\u201d And continuing the court quoted from the Thomas case: \u201cThe manifest object of the second' schedule of the policy . . . [facility of payment] was to enable the company, in case of the death of the assured, to pay the amount of the policy without the expense of an administration. The sum of $60 [the amount claimed under the policy], if it could be paid only by raising up a legal administration, would be of little use to any one, as nearly the whole of it would be absorbed in fees and expenses.\u201d\nThe Wokal case (65 N. Y. Supp. 815) above referred to, was an action brought by the administrator on two policies of insurance issued to John Wokal upon his life by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Defendant Belsky was alleged to be an adverse claimant. The policy there provided that in case of the death of the insured the defendant insurance company might pay the amount under the policy \u201cto any relative by blood or connection by marriage of said John Wokal or to any other person appearing to the defendant corporation to be equitably entitled to the same by reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the insured or for his burial.\u201d In considering this provision the court said: \u201cthe right granted is distinctly an option to be exercised under certain conditions, but not to be used to defeat the purposes of the insurance; it being a general rule that an obligation of an insurance company cannot fail for want of a particular payee. Walsh v. Insurance Co., 133 N. Y. 408, 31 N. E. 228. The defendant must, by the terms of the policy, pay the amount of it to such person as has become entitled to it by reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the insured, or for his burial. The plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of John Wokal, alleges in his complaint that he has actually paid the expenses of Wokal\u2019s burial; and therefore not only is he entitled to recover as administrator, if the corporation has not paid some one else, but he is also entitled to recover as a person equitably entitled under the terms of the policy. Apart, however, from authorities, it is evident from the wording of this clause in the policy that no particular beneficiary was designated, and therefore no one, upon the death of the insured, became entitled individually to enforce payment against the company, except to the extent that he might have paid debts or funeral expenses .....Such a clause in a policy is inserted for the protection of the company, to enable it, in industrial policies, where, as here, the amount payable is small, to discharge its obligation by payment to any one of the classes designated, without requiring administration ; but it is not intended to relieve the company from payment to some one.\u201d (Emphasis ours.) In that case the policy provided that the company might' pay the amount due to any person appearing to it to be equitably entitled to the money by reason of having incurred burial expenses of the insured, and in construing this provision the court said: \u201cThe defendant must, by the terms of the policy, pay the amount of it to such person as has become entitled to it by reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the insured, or for his burial. \u2019 \u2019 Plaintiff in that case alleged he had actually paid the expense of Wokal\u2019s burial and therefore he, as administrator, was not only entitled to recover but that he personally \u201cis also entitled to recover as a person equitably entitled under the terms of the policy.\u201d\nIn the instant case the policy in specifying those to whom payment may he made by the insurance company includes \u201cany other person appearing to said Company to be equitably entitled to the same by reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the Insured, pr for his or her burial.\u201d It is admitted that Nettie Johnson, the daughter of the insured, arranged with the undertaker for the burial of her mother, assigned her interest in the policy to the undertaker and to plaintiff. Defendant has paid no one any part of the money admittedly due, and it does not say in its pleading or otherwise that any other person is entitled or claims to be entitled to the $90. In these circumstances it is clear that plaintiff is equitably entitled to the $90. The law creates an obligation on defendant for reasons of justice to pay it. Restatement of the Law of Contracts, ch. 1, \u00a7 5, somewhat akin to the common-law action of assumpsit.\nIf defendant\u2019s position in this case is to be sustained, it is a misnomer .to refer to the provision in the policy as the \u201cFacility of Payment\u201d clause. It might be more appropriately designated as a provision to prevent payment. And we think what we have just said would be equally applicable if we refer to the transaction as industrial insurance for the reason that if no one could recover the $90 except the administrator, who might be appointed by the Probate court of Cook county, the cost of administration would eat up the $90. And as stated in 217 Ill. App. 112, the purpose of such insurance \u201cis the protection of the insurer in making a prompt payment without the expense of administrative proceedings.\u201d\nThe judgment of the Municipal court of Chicago is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMatchett, J., concurs.\nNiemeyer, P. J., dissents.\nThe court makes a new contract for the parties.\nThe policy provides that on death of the insured the company agrees to pay the amount due to the executor or administrator of the insured, unless payment be made under the provisions of the next succeeding paragraph, generally called a Facility of Payment Clause, and common to industrial policies, reciting that \u201cThe Company may make any payment I . . provided herein to the Insured, husband or wife, or any relative by blood or connection by marriage of the Insured, or to any other person appearing to said Company to be equitably entitled to the same by reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the Insured, or for his or her burial . . . .\u201d The courts of Illinois have uniformly held that this clause is for the benefit of the insurer; that its payment to, or selection in good faith of, a person within the provisions of the Facility of Payment Clause is conclusive, and that in the absence of such payment to or selection of a beneficiary, right of action on the policy is in the executor or administrator. McDaniels v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 332 Ill. 603; Morticians\u2019 Acceptance Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 277; Wickerath v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 310 Ill. App. 266 (abst.); Voris v. Rutledge, 297 Ill. App. 383; Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 278 Ill. App. 113; Bishop v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 217 Ill. App. 112. The right of the company to select the payee is not impaired by the endorsement on the policy that, \u201cSubject to the provisions of the Policy authorizing payment to the executor or administrator of the Insured, or at the Company\u2019s option to other persons, Nettie Johnson \u2014 Daughter, has been designated beneficiary, to receive death benefit only.\u201d The rights of Nettie Johnson, as beneficiary, are expressly made subordinate or subject to the rights of the company to make payment under the Facility of Payment Clause. By the endorsement she was named as one to whom the company might make payment, but she did not become the only person to whom payment could be made. A similar situation was before the court in the McDaniels case, supra. In that case an industrial policy with substantially the same Facility of Payment Clause as in the instant case, had a rider attached reciting that the insured \u20181 authorizes the said company to pay the amount of insurance due under said policy to Dora McDaniels, my niece. It is agreed that this authorization is not to vary in any way or alter the terms and conditions contained in said policy, especially the \u2018facility of payment\u2019 provision therein.\u201d The court said (607): \u201cThe authorization, as a part thereof, provided that it should not vary or in any way alter the terms and conditions contained in the facility of payment clause. If it did not vary the terms of that clause then the option to pay anyone coming within the provisions of such clause, other than the defendant in error, still remains in the contract. The defendant in error has no right to sue unless she is the beneficiary and entitled to the fund. The fact that she was by the rider included among those to whom the insurer might pay the fund does not give her that right in the absence of the exercise in her behalf of the option resting in the company.......she did not by the rider become the only person to whom the company could, under the contract, pay the fund. \u201d In Lain v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 388 Ill. 576, in speaking of the rider in the McDaniels case, the court said (579): \u201cIn the McDaniels case . . . the purported transfer was made subject to the right of the insurance company to exercise the options conferred in the \u2018Facility of Payment\u2019 clause,\u201d thereby giving the rider the same effect as the endorsement in the present case, which expressly made the designation of Nettie Johnson, as beneficiary, subject to the provisions of the policy authorizing payment to the executor or administrator of the insured, or, at the company\u2019s option, to other persons. In the McDaniels case, as in the present case, the right of the company to select, under the Facility of Payment Clause, the person to whom payment should be made, was expressly preserved, and the attempt in the opinion of the court to distinguish the two cases fails.\nThe Wickerath case, 310 Ill. App. 266, decided by this court, followed the McDaniels case. An attempt is now made to distinguish it from the present case, because the person named in the endorsement in the Wickerath case was not designated \u201cas the beneficiary but only a person to whom payment may be made.\u201d However, in that case the request for the payment to the wife was made subject \u201cto all terms and conditions of the .policy,\u201d which included a Facility of Payment Clause substantially identical with the one before us, and the rights of the respective persons, by whatever name they are called, to whom the insured in each policy sought to have payment made were subject to the same condition, namely, the right of the company to select a beneficiary. If anything the present case is stronger than the Wickerath case. In that case the preservation of the company\u2019s right to select the payee was general. Here the reservation of the company\u2019s option to pay other persons than Nettie Johnson is specific.\nIn discussing Bishop v. Prudential Ins. Co., 217 Ill. App. 112, the court refers to and quotes from Wokal v. Belsky, 65 N. Y. S. 815, cited in the Bishop case. In so far as that case holds that a person paying the funeral expenses may sue \u201cas a person equitably entitled under the terms of the policy,\u201d it is in direct conflict with the decisions of our courts, and it ignores the plain, unambiguous language of the Facility of Payment Clause, which makes the insurer, and not a third person or the courts, the judge of the person equitably entitled to receive payment under the terms of the policy. It is also in conflict with the leading case of Thomas v. Prudential Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 594, cited in the McDaniels case, and also cited and quoted from in the Bishop case, and by the court in this case. In the Thomas case the court, as quoted in the Bishop case (p. 119), said: \u201cIt is for the company to judge who is the person to he equitably entitled to the money. This discretion is vested in it by the contract between the parties. The contract itself does not offend against any rule of law or public policy, and we cannot hold that the administrator is entitled to recover without making a new contract for the parties.\u201d In that case the party to whom the company made payment had advanced only $8 for funeral expenses. In Voris v. Rutledge, 297 Ill. App. 383, the court cited the Bishop case as holding \u201c. . . that where an insurer fails to exercise the option as to the person to whom it will pay, given it by the facility of payment clause in an industrial insurance policy payable to the executor or administrator, recovery may be had at the suit of the executor or administrator,\u201d and said (387): \u201cThis is sound in law and in logic. A party who is in a position to receive the bounty if the insurer elects to pay it to him cannot compel the making of a new contract. Contracts are determined in pursuance of the positions and rights of the parties thereto. An outsider, in the absence of fraud, may not oust one party to a contract and place himself in that party\u2019s place.\u201d In the Bishop case it appears that the administrator who brought suit on the policy was appointed at the instance of creditors of the deceased, who had claims against his estate for medical and hospital services and for funeral expenses, and that the claim on the policy was the only asset of the estate. The judgment in the trial court for the administrator was reversed, it appearing that the company had exercised its option to pay another person whom it considered equitably entitled to the money.\nIn the instant case the court seeks to justify the selection of Nettie Johnson and her assignee as the person equitably entitled to the amount due by saying that \u201cDefendant has paid no one any part of the money admittedly due, and it does not say in its pleading or otherwise that any other person is entitled or claiming to be entitled to the $90. Plaintiff\u2019s right, if any, to recover depends upon its title, and the burden of establishing that title rests wholly upon the plaintiff. There is no obligation on the defendant to show that someone other than the plaintiff has a stronger claim in law or equity. When defendant denied the plaintiff\u2019s right to sue and asserted its (defendant\u2019s) right to select the beneficiary under the Facility of Payment Clause, it did all that the law required of it. Anything further would have been the pleading of immaterial matter and a needless confusion and extension of the issues in the case. Furthermore, upon the record before us, defendant is not in a position to make payment under the policy until this litigation is ended. The insured died August 18, 1943; on the same day Nettie Johnson delivered the policy, with an assignment of its proceeds, to plaintiff, who immediately made demand on defendant for payment; on September 1, 1943, plaintiff\u2019s claim was rejected, and suit was started' October 7th following. It would have been exceedingly poor business to have made payment to anyone after the suit was instituted, and a delay of five weeks to ascertain whether suit would be started is not unreasonable, particularly when, as in the present case, the number of prior actions against the defendant on similar assignments, as shown by the records of this court, was notice that this suit would in all likelihood be brought. Defendant should not be criticized for making its defense to plaintiff\u2019s action. For all we know, or, are at present entitled to know, it may be that an estate of the insured is now being administered in the courts, or, that other relatives or even friends of the insured have paid out greater sums than the $90 here involved, for medical and hospital expenses of the insured in her last illness under circumstances which, if disclosed, would lead this court, if vested with the power, to determine that they, rather than Nettie Johnson or her assignee, were equitably entitled to the amount due under the policy. It may also be the fact that\" the insurer has already determined the person to whom the money should be paid, and is only awaiting the termination of this litigation. The great number of similar policies written by the defendant require, in the interest of the policy holders as well as of itself, that the rights and liabilities under these policies be definitely fixed by the courts; for if, as held in the opinion of the court, third persons may by independent action make themselves beneficiaries against the will of the insurer, or the courts may substitute themselves for the insurer in determining the person equitably entitled thereto, the business of the defendant, in the chaos resulting, would become extremely hazardous, and the purpose of the clause, as stated in the McDaniels case (606), \u201cTo protect the insurance company, with the consent of the insured, against trifling but expensive litigation which might constantly occur over disputes as to parties entitled to the amount of the insurance,\u201d is defeated.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice O\u2019Connor" } ], "attorneys": [ "Hoyne, O\u2019Connor & Rubinkam and Eckert & Peterson, all of Chicago, for appellant; Nathaniel Rubinkam, Melvin L. Gibbard, Tom Leeming and Owen Rall, all of Chicago, of counsel.", "Victor H. Bloom, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Standard Discount Company, Inc., Appellee, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant.\nGen. No. 43,107.\nHeard in the first division of this court for the first district at the June term, 1944.\nOpinion filed March 26, 1945.\nReleased for publication April 11, 1945.\nHoyne, O\u2019Connor & Rubinkam and Eckert & Peterson, all of Chicago, for appellant; Nathaniel Rubinkam, Melvin L. Gibbard, Tom Leeming and Owen Rall, all of Chicago, of counsel.\nVictor H. Bloom, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0506-01", "first_page_order": 526, "last_page_order": 539 }