{ "id": 5010090, "name": "Rock Finance Company, Appellant, v. Central National Bank of Sterling, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Rock Finance Co. v. Central National Bank", "decision_date": "1950-01-10", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 10,389", "first_page": "319", "last_page": "328", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "339 Ill. App. 319" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2423145, 2423534 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/336/0155-01", "/ill-app/336/0155-02" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2495863 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/122/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5789998 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/335/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 Ill. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2556787 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/381/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3397541 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "p. 78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/247/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5403603 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/205/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5438380 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/219/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 Ill. App. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5618825 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "p. 289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/280/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3102951 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/165/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 La. 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "La.", "case_ids": [ 2626880 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/la/118/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5281875 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/357/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5259339 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/344/0579-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 682, "char_count": 13911, "ocr_confidence": 0.534, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.183870829384653e-07, "percentile": 0.5893104192561034 }, "sha256": "08737887f0216a872040bdaa05ca0b8e6d4b9a3141b19b51423b0c66d4950c99", "simhash": "1:55ab3e23480a047a", "word_count": 2325 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:59:04.256225+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Rock Finance Company, Appellant, v. Central National Bank of Sterling, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Bristow\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn a proceeding instituted by plaintiff, Rock Finance Company, to recover the proceeds of two checks, payable to plaintiff, in the amounts of $12,550 and $4,010, respectively, and drawn on the defendant, Central National Bank of Sterling, the circuit court of Whiteside county entered a summary judgment in favor of defendant, from which plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal.\nIn determining the propriety of this summary judgment, relieving defendant of liability, the sole query herein is whether defendant evidenced its decision not to pay the checks by the end of the next business day, within the meaning of the terms and provisions of the Illinois Negotiable Instruments Statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 98, par. 207a [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 89.207(1)].)\nThe facts are uncontroverted. On Februry 10, 1940, plaintiff deposited to its account with the Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Bockford two checks, payable to plaintiff, in the amounts of $12,550 and $4,010, respectively, drawn by the Auto Mart, Inc., on the defendant bank.\nThe checks were regularly forwarded through the Federal Beserve Bank of Chicago to the defendant bank on February 13, 1940. The defendant bank held the checks, and apparently did not decide whether it would pay them until some time between 4:30 p. m. and 5:12 p. m. on February 14, 1940, when it telegraphed the Federal Beserve Bank, advising of the nonpayment of the checks. The Federal Beserve Bank thereupon accepted the checks back for credit.\nIt appears further that, on- February 14, 1940, the defendant bank transacted business with the public between the hours of 9:00 a. m. and 3:00 p. m.\nPlaintiff instituted this proceeding on December 27, 1949, to secure payment of the checks from defendant on the theory that defendant\u2019s failure to decide whether or not to pay the checks before 3:00 p. m. on February 14, 1940, constituted an implied acceptance of the liability thereon.\nDefendant maintained that under the statute allowing it until the end of the next business day to decide whether or not to pay the checks, it had until midnight of February 14 to decide, and that by forwarding the telegram to the Federal Beserve Bank at 5:12 p. m. on February 14, it bad complied with the statute, and was thereby relieved from all liability on the checks. Inasmuch as this constituted an absolute defense, defendant contends there was no triable issue of fact, and hence, the summary judgment of the circuit court was proper.\nIt is evident, however, that if the \u201cbusiness day\u201d ended at 3:00 p. m., as plaintiff insists, defendant would not have complied with the statute, and the issue of defendant\u2019s liability would depend upon other affirmative defenses involving certain questions of fact. Under those circumstances, the summary judgment would be in error.\nIt is incumbent upon this court, therefore, in reviewing the judgment of the circuit court, to ascertain the proper meaning of the phrase \u201cbusiness day,\u201d as provided in par. 207a of the Negotiable Instruments Law. (Ch. 98, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 89.207(1)].)\nThis section provides:\n\u201cThe drawee bank named in a check presented to it by mail or through a clearing house association, or through a settlement with another bank or banks, or for deposit in an account in the drawee\u2019s bank is allowed until the end of the next business day following the day of presentation to decide whether or not it will pay the check.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues that the term \u201cbusiness\u201d qualifies the word \u2018 \u2018 day, \u2019 \u2019 and limits the number of hours therein to those during which the bank is open for the transaction of business with the public.\nDefendant insists that the words \u201cbusiness day\u201d are a unit with an established meaning in the parlance of negotiable instruments, whereby the phrase denotes a twenty-four hour day on which business is conducted, as distinguished from a Sunday or holiday.\nThe phrase \u201cbusiness day\u201d in par. 207a has not been statutorily or judicially defined, and, therefore, according to canons of statutory construction, its proper connotation must be determined first, from an analysis of the entire negotiable instruments statute, to deduce the probable legislative intent (ch. 131, par. 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 27.13]; Landry v. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., 344 Ill. 579; People v. Lieber, 357 Ill. 423) and thereafter by resort to the recognized channels of legal research and analogy.\nThe expression \u201cnext business day\u201d does not appear in those precise terms elsewhere in the statute, however, par. 216 [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 98; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 89.216] contains the phrase \u201cnext succeeding secular or business day.\u201d This section provides :\n\u201cWhere the day, or the last day, for doing an act herein required or permitted to be done falls on Sunday or on a holiday, the act may be done the next succeeding secular or business day.\u201d\nThis provision is patterned after the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (5 Uniform Laws Anno., \u00a7 194), which also has been adopted by the State of New York (art. 2, book 37, McKinney\u2019s Consol. Laws of N. Y.); and the phrase \u201csecular or business day,\u201d appearing therein, is used in contradistinction to Sundays and holidays. (Beutel\u2019s, Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law, p. 1347.) There is no decision in the annotation of this section hmiting the secular or business day to those hours during which a bank may be open to the public.\nThe comparable provision of the Bills of Exchange Act of England (\u00a7 92 B.E.A. 1414) uses the term \u201cnon business days,\u201d and after enumerating such days, states that any other day is a business day, thereby evidencing a practice of referring to business and non business days to designate days on which business is conducted or prohibited.\nWh.eth.er the Illinois legislature used the phrase \u201cnext business day\u201d to mean the same as the established expression of \u201cnext secular or business day,\u201d must depend upon the natural import of the words, their use in cases and texts, as well as their practical implication.\nLegal dictionaries and encyclopedias do not define \u201cbusiness day\u201d as a distinct legal concept. In Words and Phrases (5 W. & P. 1026) and Bailan tine\u2019s Law Dictionary (p. 1178), the phrase \u201cbusiness day\u201d is merely followed by a cross reference to \u201csecular or business day,\u201d thereby indicating that the terms are treated synonymously. The phrase \u201csecular or business day\u201d is defined therein as a day other than a Sunday or holiday, and in opposition to days of public rest and legal holidays.\nIn Corpus Juris there is no reference to \u201cbusiness day,\u201d but only to \u201csecular or business day,\u201d which is similarly defined, and supported by a Louisiana case. (State v. Duncan, 118 La. 702, 43 So. 283; 56 C.J. 1275.)\nIn the legal literature it appears that the phrase \u201cbusiness day\u201d is used by courts and text writers to denote a day upon which business is conducted, as contracted with holidays or Sundays. Thus, in 52 American Jurisprudence 347, the author states, \u201cWhere the last day of a period falls on a Sunday or holiday, it is generally sufficient if the act required is performed on the next business day.\u201d The phrase is used with a similar connotation by the courts in Industrial Bank of Chicago v. Bowes, 165 Ill. 70, 77; Village of Lombard v. Anderson, 280 Ill. App. 283; Hixenbaugh v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 219 Ill. App. 534, 538.\nMoreover, in Breslauer v. S. Franklin & Co., 205 Ill. App. 372, the court apparently distinguishes between the phrases \u201cbusiness day\u201d and \u201cbusiness hours,\u201d with the implication that business day includes the full day and nighttime, whereas business hours includes only that period within which transactions are normally conducted. The court stated at p. 374':\n\u201cThe order provides that the examination be conducted during business hours. This does not mean that such examination be carried on throughout the entire business day, but it was intended that the examination be not conducted in the nighttime, but only during business hours.\u201d\nThe Federal Reserve Bank, furthermore, has given a similar construction to the phrase \u201cbusiness day,\u201d for it is provided in the regulations of the board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, with reference to check clearing and collections, that a check may be returned for credit or refund at any time prior to midnight of the drawee\u2019s next business day. (Sec. 5, par. 4, Reg. J.) The term \u201cbusiness day\u201d therein clearly refers to a non-holiday, and consists of a twenty-four hour period up to midnight.\nAlthough the Regulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System do not modify the law of Illinois, they do reveal the interpretation of the law evolved by the board, and the banking practices predicated thereon, of which this court can take judicial notice.\nThis construction, furthermore, is consistent with the prevailing legal concept of a \u201cday,\u201d as an indivisible unit consisting of a twenty-four hour period from midnight to midnight. (People v. Keating, 247 Ill. 76; Kuznitsky v. Murphy, 381 Ill. 182.) Courts do not ordinarily take cognizance of fractions of a day, and an act to be done therein is not referable to any particular portion thereof. (Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 335 Ill. 11.) Thus, the designation, \u201celection day\u201d referred to the twenty-four hour period of the day on which the election is held, rather than to the hours during which the polls are open. (Aimo v. People, 122 Ill. App. 398.)\nIt is, however, within the power of the legislature to declare what shall constitute a day for a particular purpose. The legislature has unequivocally provided that eight hours of labor, between the rising and setting of the sun, in all mechanical trades, arts and employments, shall constitute a legal day\u2019s work, unless there is a specific contract to the contrary. (People v. Keating, supra, at p. 78.)\nIn par. 207a of the Illinois Negotiable Instruments Law, there is no such clear statutory limitation on the length of a day. The word \u201cbusiness,\u201d if it were to be construed as qualifying the word day, is vague and ambiguous, for banks vary, even within a single community, in the hours that they are open for business transactions with the public. There is an even greater variance in the number of hours during which the employees and officials attend to business matters after the doors are closed. Therefore, it would be tantamount to judicial legislation to construe the word \u201cbusiness\u201d as limiting the \u201cday\u201d to the hours between 9:00 a. m. and 3:00 p. m., or to the particular number of hours on the specific day that the individual bank may be open to the public.\nSuch a construction, urged by plaintiff, is not .only unwarranted from the use of the phrase \u201cbusiness day\u201d in judicial parlance, as hereinbefore noted, but would defeat one of the avowed purposes of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which both parties agree was designed to set forth a uniform procedure for the conduct and handling of negotiable paper. For, unless the phrase \u201cbusiness day\u201d were construed to mean the full twenty-four hour period from midnight to midnight of a day on which business may be conducted, it would be a question .of fact in each case as to when the business of the bank ended. Furthermore, the interpretation urged by plaintiff would be inconsistent with established banking practices, of which courts may properly take cognizance. In Village of Lombard v. Anderson, supra, at p. 289, the court stated:\n\u201cThe depositing of checks in banks to the credit of the holder thereof, and the clearing of same through the usual commercial methods, are transactions peculiar to the banking business and should be recognized and dealt with according to the established usage of that business.\u201d\nIt is evident that deposits are frequently made up until the doors of the bank are closed to the public, and until then it is not always ascertainable whether or not a check held for insufficient funds may be covered by a deposit made just before closing hours. If plaintiff\u2019s contention that the bank must decide whether it will accept the check during the hours that it is open to the public were sustained, it would mean that banks would have to modify established practices, and return doubtful checks immediately, or make some other onerous arrangement respecting deposits and clearance of checks.\nIn the absence of a clear statutory mandate, no such requirement should be construed. Paragraph 207a, on the contrary, does not require the performance of an act which can be done only while the bank is open to the public. Unlike the presentment of a check to the bank by the payee, which, of necessity, must be made during banking hours, the act of deciding whether or not to pay the check can be performed by the bank at any hour, and according to practice, is generally done after the bank closes its doors to the public.\nInasmuch as defendant, Central National Bank of Sterling, telegraphed the Federal Reserve Bank, of its intention not to accept the checks, prior to midnight on February 14, 1940, the next business day after receipt thereof, it had fully complied with the statute, and there is no basis for imposing liability under an implied acceptance. Therefore, since defendant interposed an absolute defense, involving no triable issue of fact, the circuit court properly entered the summary judgment in its favor. (Ch. 110, par. 181, subpar. (2), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 104.057, subpar. (2)]; Hall v. Shinadle, 336 Ill. App. 155) and this judgment must be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Bristow" } ], "attorneys": [ "C. A. Pedderson, of Rockford, and Jacob Cantlin, of Rock Falls, for appellant.", "Ward & Ward, of Sterling, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Rock Finance Company, Appellant, v. Central National Bank of Sterling, Appellee.\nGen. No. 10,389.\nOpinion filed January 10, 1950.\nReleased for publication February 9, 1950.\nC. A. Pedderson, of Rockford, and Jacob Cantlin, of Rock Falls, for appellant.\nWard & Ward, of Sterling, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0319-01", "first_page_order": 341, "last_page_order": 350 }