{ "id": 5111544, "name": "People of State of Illinois ex rel. Lyle G. Walker, Appellee, v. Timothy J. O'Connor, Commissioner of Police of City of Chicago et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Walker v. O'Connor", "decision_date": "1953-10-07", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 45,957", "first_page": "545", "last_page": "549", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "351 Ill. App. 545" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "311 Ill. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5114761 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/311/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5016520, 5012300 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/337/0661-01", "/ill-app/337/0661-02" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 365, "char_count": 5676, "ocr_confidence": 0.57, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.1045036156068077e-07, "percentile": 0.9098294919896874 }, "sha256": "6384208b8826e3e402cfc396400c0de6318608357719e8c454ec9fb2b4ad244f", "simhash": "1:10e6171318e892b9", "word_count": 948 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:13.542784+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "People of State of Illinois ex rel. Lyle G. Walker, Appellee, v. Timothy J. O\u2019Connor, Commissioner of Police of City of Chicago et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Kiley\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is a mandamus suit to compel the reinstatement of the relator Walker to the Chicago Police Department from which he had been discharged. Defendants answered. The court found the issues for Walker and entered judgment that the writ be issued. Defendants have appealed.\nWalker is married and has two children. He served in the United States Armed Forces for eighteen months in the South Pacific. Prior to his appointment to the police force he was a conductor for the Chicago Surface Lines and Chicago Transit Authority. He completed the Civil Service examination for patrolman in March, 1947. His name was placed on the list of successful candidates in September, 1947. He was certified by the Civil Service Commission for appointment October 8, 1951 and performed the duties assigned him until December 2 when he was suspended. The Police Commissioner on December 3, 1951 wrote the Commission for authority to discharge Walker. The Commission returned the letter asking that the Police Commissioner state the reason. December 4th the Police Commissioner wrote: \u201cThe reason for this request is he submitted a false official report relative to his indictment for the charge of rape.\u201d December 7, 1951 the Commission \u201cgranted authority\u201d and Walker was discharged December 12th.\nIt is the City\u2019s position that Walker was discharged because he had answered \u201cno\u201d a question in the application to take the patrolman\u2019s examination \u201cHave you ever been arrested or indicted?\u201d\nHe was indicted for rape in 1929. In 1930 the case was heard and the complaining witness not appearing Walker was told the case was dismissed. When he made the answer in the application in 1946 he \u201cdid not think that I had a record.\u201d When he was suspended from the police force in 1951 he learned that the rape charge had not been dismissed but was still pending. He then had a hearing and was found \u201cnot guilty\u201d of the charges in the 1929 indictment.\nThe Director of Personnel of the Police Department made, an investigation of Walker and submitted to the Police Commissioner a written report of the facts preceding and following the indictment. This report was signed by Walker. The Director of Personnel recommended that Walker be retained on the police force.\nIf the reason for discharging Walker was the giving of the false answer in the application for the patrolman\u2019s examination, the written reason assigned by the Police Commissioner is ambiguous. The application is not an \u201cofficial report.\u201d The only evidence of an official report made by Walker relating to the indictment was the one signed by him in November, 1951. There is no claim that that was false.\nWalker was a probationer when discharged. The Police Commissioner proceeded under sec. 10 of the City Civil Service Act. (Chap. 24\u00bd, Ill. Rev. Stat. [1951, \u00a7 48; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 23.049].) He could discharge Walker only \u201cby and with the consent\u201d of the Civil Service Commission. When the Commission itself takes the \u201cfinal action,\u201d its own Rule II, sec. 6 requires that a probationer, \u201cappointee,\u201d be given an opportunity to be heard. People ex rel. Bergquist v. Gregory, 337 Ill. App. 661.\nWe think the term \u201cconsent\u201d in sec. 10 of the City Civil Service Act, implies an understanding of the thing consented to. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind judging which is preferable. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, p. 377, citing 1 Story, E. Jur. \u00a7 222 (4th ed., 1951). The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Wabash Ry. Co., 311 Ill. 579, 583 said, \u201cA consent is an official act representing the judgment and consideration of. . . .\u201d It is clear from the definition of consent in Webster\u2019s New International Dictionary (2d ed., 1949) that the term includes at least a meeting of the minds. How could the minds of the Commission and the Police Commissioner meet on the reason for Walker\u2019s discharge? The reason which the City contends the Police Commissioner had in mind as the basis for the discharge was not that stated in writing. Presumably the Commission gave its \u201cconsent\u201d to the reason stated in writing. In this case that was not a protection to the patrolman against arbitrary action of a department head. We think that the requirement of \u201cconsent\u201d implies the legislative intent of giving that protection. We do not hold that Walker was entitled to the kind of hearing contemplated in sec. 12 [Ill. Rev. Stats. 1951, ch. 24\u00bd, \u00a7 51; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 23.052] of the Act before discharge after probation. We hold that there was not compliance with the requirement of consent in sec. 10 of the City Civil Service Act.\nThe question whether the relator was required to appeal under the Administrative Review Act (chap. 110, Ill. Rev. Stat. [1951, \u00a7\u00a7 264-279; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 104.094(1)-104.094(16)]) rather than bring this mandamus suit was not raised or passed upon at the trial. That question is not properly before us.\nWe need consider no other point presented.\nThe judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nFeinberg, P. J. and Lewe, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Kiley" } ], "attorneys": [ "John J. Mortimer, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago, for appellants; L. Louis Karton, Head of Appeals and Review Division, and Earl A. Deutsch, Assistant Corporation Counsel, both of Chicago, of counsel.", "Michael F. Ryan, of Chicago, for appellee; Richard F. McPartlin, Jr., of Chicago, of counsel." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of State of Illinois ex rel. Lyle G. Walker, Appellee, v. Timothy J. O\u2019Connor, Commissioner of Police of City of Chicago et al., Appellants.\nGen. No. 45,957.\nOpinion filed July 2, 1953.\nRehearing allowed July 28, 1953.\nNew opinion filed October 7, 1953.\nReleased for publication December 14, 1953.\nJohn J. Mortimer, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago, for appellants; L. Louis Karton, Head of Appeals and Review Division, and Earl A. Deutsch, Assistant Corporation Counsel, both of Chicago, of counsel.\nMichael F. Ryan, of Chicago, for appellee; Richard F. McPartlin, Jr., of Chicago, of counsel." }, "file_name": "0545-01", "first_page_order": 571, "last_page_order": 575 }