{ "id": 860000, "name": "Sarah E. Bromwell v. Frank D. Turner et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Bromwell v. Turner", "decision_date": "1891-01-16", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "561", "last_page": "564", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "37 Ill. App. 561" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "38 Ill. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 428255 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/38/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 How. 415", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "How.", "case_ids": [ 3481982 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/56/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Tenn. Rep. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 5777204 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/4/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 817853 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/56/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5301141 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/52/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4956077 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/27/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 890", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2608568 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/62/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2862334 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/112/0099-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 383, "char_count": 5192, "ocr_confidence": 0.559, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.114447668508056e-07, "percentile": 0.9101901307759641 }, "sha256": "6125ecea5ec9ff8b087068a28288a270f729f1a89543144c2c5904849742021b", "simhash": "1:b19f654789efaaec", "word_count": 955 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:53:41.478670+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Sarah E. Bromwell v. Frank D. Turner et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Gary, J.\nThe appellees, who were a firm of attorneys, under the name of Turner & Moore, filed a hill against the appellant to enforce the terms of the following instrument, which they alleged they delivered to her, and the terms of which she agreed to:\n\u201c Received of Mrs. Sarah E. Bromwell seventy-five dollars in full of all attorneys\u2019 fees as cash engagement in her equity suit, probate and civil cases; and she is to pay no more fee except that in case of success in the estate and damage cases, she agrees to pay one-fonrth of what she may recover in each, provided, that if such interest (J) equals \u00a71,000 a case, that she is not to pay any sum as a fee in the case in excess of \u00a71,000, but such sum shall be the full fee in such case, and her said attorneys are, in no event, to hold her for any liability for fees, in either case, except the contingent fee as above named, and that is to be paid to them out of the same as recovered, and neither she nor her said attorney shall have any right to compromise or settle any of these cases without the written consent of the other.\n\u201cAugust, 18, 1887.\n\u201cTurner & Moore,\u201d\nIt is unnecessary to consider the conflict of evidence as to her assent to the terms.\nThe instrument, even if it had been signed by her, is not an assignment of any portion of what she might recover, but only a promise to pay part of a certain fund, which gives no lien in equity upon the fund. The only remedy is at law for a breach of the promise. The cases are so fully collected in Pom. Eq., S. 1283, and Bish. Eq., p. 221, that it would be mere ostentation to repeat the citations. On page 103, in Wyman v. Snyder, 112 Ill. 99, the distinction between an assignment of part of, and a promise to pay part of, a fund, is clearly expressed.\nIn this case the appellant could not perform literally the promise, without first receiving the money recovered. In Smith v. Young, 62 Ill. 210, the report does not state the facts fully. It is probable there was a formal contract, containing an assignment. This question may have been in Hawk v. Ament, 28 Ill. App. 890, as the case reads, but the question was not alluded to by court or counsel, and the case is therefore no authority upon it.\nIn Sanders v. Seelye, 27 Ill. App. 288, the attorney\u2019s lien stood upon possession of the bonds in controversy.\nBut upon the fruits of litigation, not in the possession of the attorneys by whose skill and labor those fruits have been produced, those attorneys have, in this State, no lien. Forsythe v. Beveridge, 52 Ill. 268; La Framboise v. Grow, 56 Ill. 197.\nThis point being decisive of the case, the decree is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the Circuit Court to dismiss the bill with costs.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Gary, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mrs. S. E. Bromwell, pro se.", "Messrs. Smith, Helmer & Moulton, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Sarah E. Bromwell v. Frank D. Turner et al.\nAttorney and Client\u2014Contingent Fee\u2014Lien for.\n1. Upon the fruits of litigation, not in the possession of the attorney through whose efforts the same were secured, there can be no lien for services rendered. .\n2. A promise to pay an attorney a certain proportion of a given fund, if such fund be obtained through his exertions, gives no lien in equity thereon. The remedy is at law for a breach of the promise upon refusal to carry out the same.\n[Opinion filed January 16, 1891.]\nAppeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. O. H. Horton, Judge, presiding.\nMrs. S. E. Bromwell, pro se.\nMessrs. Smith, Helmer & Moulton, for appellees.\nWeeks on Attorneys at Law, says (Sec. 369): \u201cAttorneys are allowed two species of liens as security for the payment of their compensation and costs. The particular or \u2018charging lien\u2019 on the property of the client on account of labor bestowed or money expended in regard to that particular property, and secondly, a general lien for the balance due them on account of their professional services.\u201d\n\u201cThe particular lien also attaches to the fruits of a judgment or decree which the attorney\u2019s services have obtained.\u201d (See, also, Sec. 368.) Ex parte Price, 2 Ves. Sr. 407; Turwin v. Gibson, 3 Atk. 720; Mitchell v. Oldfield, 4 Tenn. Rep. 123; Skinner v. Sweet, 3 Madd. 244; Irving v. Viana, 2 Younge & J. 70.\nThis lien has been held to attach to money payable to the client by virtue of an award, and to money payable into court, if the proceeds of the labor and skill of an attorney. The reason is, the money is regarded as the fruit of the attorney\u2019s labor and skill, especially if he has taken up the cause of a poor person. Weeks on Attorneys at Law, Sec. 370.\nThe Hnited States Supreme Court has held to this doctrine, and that the \"court would enforce it by a bill in equity. Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How. 415.\nOur Supreme Court has held that a court of chancery has full jurisdiction of the question of an attorney\u2019s lien. Morgan v. Roberts, 38 Ill. 65.\nAn attorney may have a special lien upon a fund in court or in the hands of a receiver, recovered by him, and a court of equity, having such a fund in its possession, will protect the attorney in retaining .out of it a reasonable compensation for his services. Jones on Liens, Sec. 147.\nAn oral agreement is sufficient to create a general lien in equity in favor of an attorney. Jones on Liens, Sec. 154." }, "file_name": "0561-01", "first_page_order": 559, "last_page_order": 562 }