{
  "id": 5107048,
  "name": "W. E. Haines v. H. H. Nance et al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Haines v. Nance",
  "decision_date": "1893-10-28",
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  "first_page": "406",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "W. E. Haines v. H. H. Nance et al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nHowever strong the defense sought to be made may appear to be in merit or in point of equity, it can not prevail under the rules of law applicable to the instrument in suit and the act of the appellees in connection therewith. The instrument has all the qualities of a bill of exchange (3 Kent\u2019s Com., 74; Daniel\u2019s negotiable Instruments, 493-495; Randolph\u2019s Commercial Paper, Vol. 1, page 2), except it does not contain Avords at one time deemed necessary to give it the quality of negotiability.\nBy the force and effect of Sec. 3, Chap. 98, R. S., the use of such words are no longer necessary to accomplish that purpose in this State. Its indorsement by the appellees, though in blank, was in legal effect an acceptance of it by each one and all of them. Lawson\u2019s Rights and Remedies, Vol. 4, 1495; Randolph on Commercial Paper, Vol. 1, page 4. The acceptance being on its face absolute can not be shown by parol to have been conditional. Lawson\u2019s Rights and Remedies, Vol. 4, page 1498; Byles on Bills, page 196; Johnson v. Glover, 121 Ill. 283. Parol evidence tending to show that the appellees intended a different contract than that implied by the law from their acts was not admissible. Johnson v. Glover, supra; Courtney v. Hogan, 93 Ill. 101, and cases there cited. The liability created by the indorsement made by the appellees was their individual liability. No apt words were used by them to bind the church, or the building committee as an organization separate from the church, without which it has been held in many cases not distinguishable in principle from this, that the undertaking is an individual one. Powers v. Briggs, 19 Ill. 93; Burlingame v. Brewster, Id. 515; Hypes v. Griffin, 89 Ill. 134; Scanlan v. Keith, 102 Ill. 634. Cases supposed to support a view contrary to that which we have expressed will be found to differ from the cases we have cited only in the facts\u2014not in the rule of law announced. Because of the error of the Circuit Court in admitting parol evidence to vary the contract implied by the law from the writing, and in rendering the judgment against the appellant, the judgment must be and is reversed and the cause remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Boggs"
      }
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    "attorneys": [
      "Appellant\u2019s Brief, T. J. Sparks and Baily & Holly, Attorneys.",
      "D. Chambers, attorney for appellees."
    ],
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    "head_matter": "W. E. Haines v. H. H. Nance et al.\n1. Bills of Exchange\u2014 What Is.\u2014The following instrument is a bill of exchange under Sec. 3, Ch. 98, R. S.\nBushnell, Ill., October 26, 1891.\nTo the Building Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Parsonage, Bushnell, Illinois.\nGentlemen: Please pay W. E. Haines, $159.48, and charge to the account of John Livingstone.\n2. Bills of Exchange\u2014 What is a Personal Acceptance.\u2014The following indorsement on the back of a bill of exchange:\nBuilding Committee for M. E. Church Parsonage,\nis the personal acceptance of the parties signing it and not that of the building committee.\n3. Bill of Exchange\u2014Indorsements in Blank\u2014Acceptances.\u2014An indorsement by a person in blank upon a bill of exchange is in legal effect an acceptance of it.\n4. Bill of Exchange\u2014Acceptances\u2014Parol Proof.\u2014An acceptance of a bill of exchange on its face absolute, can not be shown by parol to have been conditional.\nMemorandum.\u2014Assumpsit. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McDonough County; the Hon. Charles J. Scofield, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the May term, 1893.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed October 28, 1893.\nThe opinion states the case.\nAppellant\u2019s Brief, T. J. Sparks and Baily & Holly, Attorneys.\nThe \" order \u201d spoken of in this case was nothing more nor less than a bill of exchange. Rapalje & Lawrence, Law Dictionary, 129; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 2.\nThe signing of the order by the defendants constituted an acceptance of it. Rapalje & Lawrence, Law Dictionary, 8; Bandolph on Commercial Paper, 4; Norton v. Knapp, 64 Iowa, 112.\nAnd if an acceptance is absolute on its face a contemporaneous condition can not be shown by parol. Byles on Bills, 196; Goodwin v. McCoy, 13 Ala. 271. As to drawee acceptor is liable as principal. Byers v. Franklin Coal Co., 106 Mass. 131; First National Bank v. Morris, 1 Hun, 680.\nThe acceptor of a bill of exchange is primarily liable for its payment even though he have no funds of the drawer in his hands. Crounse v. Kellogg, 20 Ill. 11; Diversy v. Moore, 22 Ill. 331; Novak v. Excelsior Stone Co., 78 Ill. 307.\nThe order in this case is a bill of exchange. In this State the words \u201c or order,\u201d or \u201c for value received,\u201d are not necessary to make an instrument negotiable. Revised Statutes (Starr & Curtis), Chap. 98, Sec. 3; Archer v. Claflin, 31 Ill. 306.\nD. Chambers, attorney for appellees.\nStatement of the Case.\nThis was an action of assumpsit brought by the appellant against Nance, Cole and Spicer, appellees, as acceptors of the following instrument:\nBushnell, Ill., Oct. 26, 1891.\nTo the Building Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Parsonage, Bushnell, Illinois.\nGentlemen : Please pay W. E. Haines $159.48, and charge to the account of John Livingstone.\nIndorsed on its back:\nH. H. Nance, Jas. Cole, J. B. Spicer, Building Committee for M. E. Church Parsonage.\nThe appellees together with Rev. R. E. Buckley and Cicero Hamilton, were appointed the Building Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church Parsonage, of Bushnell, Illinois.\nJohn Livingstone, the drawer of the instrument, entered into a contract with this building committee to build the parsonage, and executed and delivered to the appellant the instrument sued upon. The appellant presented it to the appellees, who indorsed it as shown by the copy here set out. The defense presented in the Circuit Court ivas that the appellees indorsed the order as members of the building committee with the intention of binding that body or the church corporation, and not themselves as individuals; that the money directed to be paid by the order to the appellant was for the purpose of discharging an indebtedness due from Livingstone, incurred long before the latter contracted to build the parsonage, and was in no wise connected with the erection of the building; and that Livingstone abandoned his contract and had no claim against or money due him from the building committee or the church. Against the objection of the appellant the appellees were permitted to introduce parol testimony in support of such defense. The appellees prevailed and the plaintiff appealed to this court."
  },
  "file_name": "0406-01",
  "first_page_order": 402,
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