{ "id": 858493, "name": "Bloomington Mutual Life Benefit Association v. Mollie Cummins", "name_abbreviation": "Bloomington Mutual Life Benefit Ass'n v. Cummins", "decision_date": "1894-06-23", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "530", "last_page": "540", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "53 Ill. App. 530" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "117 U. S. 519", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8300062 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/117/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Mass. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 2150903 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/133/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Fed. Rep. 672", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 6737456 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/f/6/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Phila. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Phila.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "98 Pa. St. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 496913 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/pa/98/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ore. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 2295319 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/or/5/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 How. Pr. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "How. Pr.", "case_ids": [ 4472911 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/how-pr/50/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Hun, 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Hun,", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "8 Mo. App. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo. App.", "case_ids": [ 553459 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mo-app/8/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 N. Y. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 527206 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/63/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N. Y. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2164961 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/67/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5232023 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/59/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Mass. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 710670 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/98/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Cush. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cush.", "case_ids": [ 1972350 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/66/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4978865 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/32/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2417893 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/21/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Pa. St. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 444792 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/pa/97/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2751419 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/91/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2902397 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/119/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 U. S. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3506658 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/111/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ala. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 3385653 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/80/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ky. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N. Y. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Iowa, 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Mass. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Conn. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 12121401 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/21/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 U. S. 183", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3468129 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/120/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 831443 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/108/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2776749 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/85/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 852719 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/10/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2617641 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/65/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4978865 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/32/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2751419 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/91/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2902397 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/119/0474-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 800, "char_count": 21770, "ocr_confidence": 0.483, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8901512351802878e-07, "percentile": 0.7288886340477765 }, "sha256": "ffdf4af5e9c6c080899f94d8c05941506c49d303519f0d666babc32f09faedfe", "simhash": "1:1c3b774797519606", "word_count": 3782 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:03:00.879097+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Bloomington Mutual Life Benefit Association v. Mollie Cummins." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Sample\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThis suit, as shown by the foregoing statement of facts, was brought to recover assessable value of a certificate of membership in a Mutual Life Benefit Association. The defense interposed was, that the statements of the insured in the application in reference to matters of fact material to the risk were untrue, false and fraudulent; and that such statements were, under the terms of the contract of insurance, warranties.\nThe court instructed the jury for the plaintiff, that such statements were in law representations and not warranties, and although untrue in fact, yet unless they were falsely made for the fraudulent purpose of procuring membership in the defendant association, such false statements would not of themselves vitiate the policy issued to the plaintiff in this case. The jury found for the plaintiff the full amount due under the policy or certificate, upon which the court rendered judgment, after overruling motion for new trial, and the giving of the above instruction together with the refusal to give other instructions on behalf of the defendant, holding such statements were in law, under the contract, warranties, are assigned on this record as error.\nThat many of the answers in the application were material to the risk, is incontrovertible.\nThat they were made a part of the contract of insurance, as warranted statements on the faith of which this certificate was issued,\u201d is evidenced by the terms of the certificate itself, which is the basis of this action. It is therein further provided that if such statements \u201c are not in all respects true^ or in case of any fact relating to health, habits or circumstances being suppressed, then in either case this certificate shall be null and void and of no effect.\u201d\nThe application being made a part of the policy, the policy with all its terms and conditions constitutes the contract between the parties. Rockford Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 65 Ill. 415.\nThe application alone is not the contract. Mutual Benefit Association v. Conway, 10 Ill. App. 348. It is true, the application in this case is made the basis of the contract, and provides, \u201c If any misrepresentations or fraudulent or untrue answers have been made, or any facts which should have been stated, have been suppressed, then in either event this agreement shall be null and void.\u201d The answers in the application are made warranties by the express terms of the completed contract. Herein this case is to be distinguished in this respect from Winthrop\u2019s case, 85 Ill. 537, for it is there said the insurance society did not intend that the statements should operate as a warranty. Many peculiar and unusual questions were required to be answered in the application in that case, and as is said, \" If a warranty was required of the answers of some of the questions, it would be useless for persons to become members of the society.\u201d In that case there is nothing to indicate the policy provided in terms, the answers should be warranties.\nIn the Rogers case, 119 Ill. 474, the real question was whether it was incumbent on the plaintiff in a suit on an insurance policy to aver and prove the truth of the statements in the application, for the defendant did not attempt to prove they were untrue, and therefore, as the court held, they were not in issue. It is true the court considered to a certain extent the question of what statements were warranties, and said, \" It is generally true that where the application is expressly declared to be a part of the policy, and the statements therein contained are warranted to be true, such statements will be deemed material whether they are so or not, and if shown to be false there can be no recovery on the policy, however innocently made, and notwithstanding their falsity may have had no agency in causing the loss or producing the death of the assured.\u201d This doctrine seemed too harsh and therefore the court further say, \u201c If the answers, however, are simply representations, as contradistinguished from warranties, in the technical sense of these terms, then such of the answers not material to the risk, as were honestly made, in the belief they were true, would not be binding upon the assured, or present any obstacle to a recovery.\u201d It is further indicated that the provisions of a policy relating to fraudulent statements, concealment and misrepresentations, to be made effective, must be held to apply to representations and not warranties. There is no provision in this policy as to fraudulent representation avoiding the same, other than may be said to be contained in certain language of the application, viz.: \u201c If any misrepresentations, fraudulent or untrue answers have been made * * * then this agreement shall be null and void.\u201d\nThis language indicates that as to certain answers there may be misrepresentations, as to others they may be fraudulent, and still as to others they may be simply untrue.\nIt does not follow from the decision in 119 Ill. supra, that all the answers, which by the policy were made warranties, should, notwithstanding, be treated as representations in order to give effect to the provision in the application in regard to misrepresentations. The law not favoring forfeitures, the courts have seized on the term \u201c representation \u201d in policies of insurance or in applications, which are made a part of the policy, to construe answers as not being warranties, which relate to immaterial facts or to latent 'diseases of the applicant, of which he was not aware.\nTo that extent certain answers in this case may be held to be representations, although by the terms of the policy made warranties. But as to those matters material to the risk, about which direct inquiry was made, and which by the application and the policy it is provided that if they are \u201c untrue \u201d the policy will be avoided, the answers may be held to be warranties; for it may be well assumed, in view of the language used, it was to such matters the warranty was to apply. The answers in such an application as this were held to be warranties in the case of Morgan v. this association, 32 Ill. App. 79. There is, however, not very much difference in the legal effect of material representations and warranties. A misrepresentation of a material fact, about which a specific inquiry has been made, has been held to exonerate the insurer.\nThis rule is said to be peculiarly applicable when the application is by the policies made a part of the contract, and a warranty on the part of the assured. Thomas v. Fame Ins. Co., 108 Ill. 91-102.\nThis is the law whether the answers are representations or are made warranties. Phenix M. L. Ins. Co. v. Raddier, 120 U. S. 183. The policy in the case in hand, as has been stated, makes the answers warranties, at least where material.\nA representation, strictly speaking, is said to be no part of the contract of insurance, but as inducement to it: Glendale Woolen Co. v. Protective Ins. Co., 21 Conn. 19; while a warranty enters into and forms a part of the contract itself. Campbell v. N. E. M. L. Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 389. The difference in their legal effect on the contract being, that the former is required to be only substantially true, while the latter must be literally true. Campbell case, supra. Whether a material representation has been substantially complied with or is substantially true, is a question of fact for the jurw Miller v. M. B. L. Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 232. But it is not so as to a warranty.\nThe warranty must be exactly fulfilled and literally true or the contract is avoided. 21 Conn. 19, supra.\nIn neither case, however, is it for the jury to say the statement or representation, which is in writing and made a part of the contract of insurance, is immaterial, if it affects the risk. 31 Iowa, 232, supra. Nor that such representation was accidentally, honestly or dishonestly made. Armour v. T. Fire Ins. Co., 90 N. Y. 455. The same rule of law applies to the suppression of a material fact in an answer to a direct question, when such answer purports to be complete. 120 U. S. 183, supra.\nThe rule of law is believed to be in regard to representations, as distinguished from warranties, that motive, or knowledge of material facts about which direct inquiry is made, is not issuable, but is as to immaterial facts. Germania Ins. Co. v. Rudwig, 80 Ky. 235; Ala. G. L. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 80 Ala. 467. There may be some exceptions to this general rule, as in the case of lurking or constitutional tendency to certain diseases of the insured, which may even be manifest to the careful observer, and yet not be consciously recognized by the insured himself. It is natural for a man to desire to disbelieve that his body is afflicted with a constitutional taint, and therefore he does not readily give credence to manifestations that to others are apparent. Therefore, as to such matters, it is insisted in many well considered cases that the honesty and good faith of his answers, even to direct inquiry, is an issuable fact. Mouler v. American Life Ins. Co., 111 U. S. 335. If such tendencies are manifest at the time of the insurance, there seems to be no good reason why the insurance company shoud not protect itself by the physical examination of its medical examiner. If in such case, the examiner reports the insured as a fit subject for insurance, this is some evidence that the insured himself was not at the time aware of the character of his affliction, and the legal effect of his answers should be determined by the test of honesty and good faith.\nIf, however, such constitutional taint is not determinable from an examination, but is by family history, the knowledge of which the company has a right to assume rests with the insured, then his answers to direct inquiry in relation to such matters as are material to the risk must be true. If untrue, without regard to actual knowledge or good faith, the policy will be avoided.\nThe disease with which parents, brothers and sisters of the applicant died are clearly material to the risk, as affecting the prospects of life of the applicant. If he assumes to know he must answer the truth. If he does not know he can so state. But when- he does answer such direct inquiries in an unequivocable manner, the insurance company has a legal right to rely on them as being true.\nIn this case the insured was asked:\n\u201c If parents are living, give age and condition of health; if dead, state diseases and age at death.\u201d\nAnswer. \u201c Father dead, age 60, cause of death, fever.\u201d\n\u201c Mother dead, age 45, cause of death, fever.\u201d\n\u201c Brothers, one dead, age 19, cause of death, inflammation of bowels.\u201d\n\u201c Sisters, three dead, one, age 25, cause of death, slow fever; one, age 20, cause of death, bowel inflammation; one, age 19, cause of death, inflammation of bowels.\u201d\n\u201c Do you believe yourself to be free from all diseases, hereditary or otherwise, tending to shorten life ? \u201d Answer, \u201c Yes.\u201d\n\" Give the name and address of your family physician.\u201d Answer, \u201c Dr. Boyd Hurrican, * * * Ky.\u201d\nThe evidence of the family physician above named, of another family physician, and of the neighbors, show conclusively that the applicant\u2019s family above named all died of consumption, at which time he was living in the family and must have known the cause of death, several of them having died within a few years of the time of making the application. It is proven by two witnesses, that he stated his family had died of consumption, and he would go the same way.\nThe facts in the case of H. L. & A. Ins. Co. v. Gray et al., 91 Ill. 159, are very similar to those in this case. There the applicant stated his father and mother had died of fever, while, in fact, they had died of consumption, more than twenty years before the application. He stated further, that none of his family had been afflicted with such a disease. In that case, the court say: \u201c His answers assume that he had such knowledge and, therefore, precludes the right of appellees to allege his want of knowledge as an excuse for his answer.\u201d The court further say, \u201c It is not reasonable to assume that the assured was ignorant of this fact, of the cause of his parents\u2019 death, for he seems to have been living with or near his parents during the time they were afflicted. It is impossible to escape the conviction that the truth, here, was withheld, because its communication would have defeated the application for the policy, or materially increased the premiums for the risk.\nThe instructions of the court below, and the theory upon Avhich appellee\u2019s case rests, that false statements as to matters material to the risk would not vitiate the policy unless made for the fraudulent purpose of procuring the insurance, are erroneous, from either the point of view that the statements Avere warranties or material representations. The evidence does not warrant a recovery under the law, and therefore the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Sample" } ], "attorneys": [ "Brief of Plaintiff in Error, F. Y. Hamilton, Attorney.", "Parish & Parish and Boyer & Choisser, attorneys for defendant in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Bloomington Mutual Life Benefit Association v. Mollie Cummins.\ni. Insurance\u2014 The Application Made a Part of the Policy\u2014Contracts. \u2014Where the application is made a part of the policy, the policy with all its terms and conditions constitutes the contract between the parties. The application alone is not the contract.\n3. Same\u2014Statements in the Application\u2014Warranties.\u2014The answers in the application may be made warranties by the express terms of the completed contract, and when so made they are to be construed as such.\n3. Same\u2014Statement of Facts Not Material to the Risk.\u2014If the answers, however, are simply representations as contradistinguished from warranties, in the technical sense of these terms, then such of the answers not material to the risk, as were honestly made in the belief they were true, would not present an obstacle to a recovery.\n4. Same\u2014Provisions of the Policy\u2014Must Apply to Representation, Not Warranties.\u2014The provisions of a policy relating to fraudulent statements, concealment and misrepresentation, to be made effective must be held to apply to representations and not warranties.\n5. Same\u2014Misrepresentation \u25a0 Exonerates the Insurer.\u2014Where the application is by the policy made a part of the contract and a warranty on the part of the assured, a misrepresentation of a material fact, about which a specific inquiry has been made, exonerates the insurer.\n6. Same\u2014Representations and Warranties.\u2014A representation, strictly speaking, is said to be no part of the contract of insurance but as inducement to it, while a warranty enters into and forms a part of the contract itself. The difference in their legal effect on the contract being, that the former is required to be only substantially true, while the latter must be literally so.\n7. Same\u2014Compliance with Material Representations a Question of Fact;' Otherwise with Warranties.\u2014Whether a material representation has been substantially complied with or is substantially true, is a question of fact for the jury, but it is not so as to a warranty. The warranty must be exactly fulfilled and literally true or the contract is avoided.\n8. Same\u2014Materiality of the Statements a Question of Law.\u2014In neither case, however, is it for the jury to say the statement or representation, which is in writing and made a part of the contract of insurance, is immaterial, if it affects the risk, nor that such representation was accidently, honestly or dishonestly made.\n9. Same\u2014Representations Distinguished from Warranties.\u2014In regard to representations, as distinguished from warranties, the motive or knowledge of material facts, about which direct inquiry is made, is not issuable, but is issuable as to immaterial facts.\n10. Same\u2014Statement of Tendencies to Particular Diseases.\u2014Where a constitutional taint is not determinable from an examination, but is by family history, the knowledge of which the company has a right to assume rests with the insured, then his answers to a direct inquiry in relation to such matters as are material to the risk must be true. If untrue, without regard to actual knowledge or good faith, the policy will be avoided.\nMemorandum.\u2014Action on an insurance policy. Error to the Circuit Court of Saline County; the Hon. Alonzo K. Vickers, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1894.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed June 23, 1894.\nStatement of the Case.\nOn December 26, 1888, James E. Stone applied to plaintiff in error for insurance, and signed an application stating his father and mother had died of fever; a brother had died of inflammation of the bowels, two sisters of the same disease, one sister of slow fever, and one brother was living whose health was good. His brother and sister had died between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five. He stated further in the application that he believed himself to be free from all diseases, hereditary or otherwise, tending to shorten life and that his general health had been uniformly good for the past ten years. His family physician was stated to be Dr. Boyd, of Kentucky, and that he desired the insurance to be made payable on his death to Mollie Cummins, his aunt, a resident of Eldorado, Illinois, to whom he was then paying a visit, his residence being in Kentucky.\nThe application further stated : \u201c It is expressly agreed and stipulated that the foregoing application shall be the basis of the contract, * * * and that if any misrepresentations or fraudulent or untrue answers have been made, or any facts which should have been stated have been suppressed * * * then, and in either event this agreement shall be null and void, and all moneys which have been paid shall be forfeited to the association.\u201d\nThe policy or certificate of membership recited: \u201c In consideration of ten dollars membership fee having been paid, * * * and in consideration of the warranted representations, covenants and agreements made in his application * * * which is hereby made a part hereof, and the basis of this membership, * * * this certificate of membership is issued to J ames E. Stone. * * * the beneficiary fund * * * to the amount of $4,800, which sum, or such part as may be collected * * * in sixty days after the assessment is made, to be paid to his aunt, Mollie Cummins. * * *\n\u201c It is also understood, covenanted and agreed * * * that in case the statements made in the application for this certificate on file in the office of said association, and made a part of this certificate as Avarranted statements, on the faith of which this certificate is issued, are not, in all respects, true, or in case of any fact relating to health, habit or circumstances, being suppressed, then and in either case, this certificate shall be null and void and of no effect.\u201d\nJames E. Stone proposed this insurance to his aunt and told her that she could take out a policy on his life, which she did not do; but he went out and hunted up an insurance agent and had his life insured for her benefit, as the aunt testified, and the certificate in this case is that insurance. He died in June, 1890, and the association refusing to pay the insurance on account, as alleged, of untrue, false and fraudulent statements, this suit was brought, resulting on trial in a verdict and judgment for the appellee, from which this appeal is prosecuted.\nThe evidence shows his three sisters died of consumption, one in 1881, another in 1889. A brother died of consumption in 1887, his father died of same disease in 1885, and his mother of same trouble shortly thereafter, and that the insured also died of consumption. The family physicians testify that this family were afflicted with this disease. It is also, proven that the insured lived in the family at the time of the death of his father, mother, brother and sisters. The evidence is conclusive of the cause of death of the members of his family. It is also shown that he stated on several occasions that they had died of consumption and that he expected to go the same way.\nBrief of Plaintiff in Error, F. Y. Hamilton, Attorney.\nThe application was made a part of the contract of insurance and .a warranty on the part of the insured. Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 11, pp, 290-1; May on Ins., Chap. VI, Sec. 158-9 and cases cited; Cooke on Life Ins., Sec. 15 and notes, and cases cited; Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 119 Ill. 474; Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Gray, 91 Ill. 159; Lyc. Fire Ins. Co. v. Storrs, 97 Pa. St. 354; N. W. B. & M. A. A. v. Bloom, 21 Ill. App. 159, and cases therein cited; Morgan v. B. M. L. B. Ass\u2019n, 32 Ill. App. 79.\nA warranty is an agreement on the part of the assured in the nature of a condition precedent, and like that, must be strictly complied with. May on Ins., Ch. VI, pp. 179-80; Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 11, p. 291, Sec. 3, and notes; Daniels et al. v. H. R. Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 416; Campbell v. N. E. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381; H. Life and Annuity Ins. Co. v. Gray, 91 Ill. 159; Mutual B. L. Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 59 Ill. 123; Barteau v. Ph\u0153nix Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 595.\nAccording to the terms of the contract the answers made by the insured in his application were warranties, and if not fully and truly made, the contract was, by its own terms, void. Cooke on Life Ins., Secs. 17, 18, 19, and notes; Cushman v. U. S. Life Ins. Co.. 63 N. Y. 404; Ling v. Mass. Ins. Co., 8 Mo. App. 363; Mayer v. Eq. R. F. Life Ass\u2019n, 49 Hun, 336; Wright v. Eq. L. A. Soc., 50 How. Pr. 367; Buford v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 5 Ore. 334; C. M. F. Ins. Co. v. Huntzinger, 98 Pa. St. 41; Archer v. M. L. Ins. Co., 13 Phila. 139; Schultz v. M. L. Ins. Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 672; McCoy v. M. L. Ins. Co., 133 Mass. 82, and cases cited; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519.\nParish & Parish and Boyer & Choisser, attorneys for defendant in error." }, "file_name": "0530-01", "first_page_order": 526, "last_page_order": 536 }