{ "id": 5097352, "name": "World's Columbian Exposition v. Louis Scala", "name_abbreviation": "World's Columbian Exposition v. Scala", "decision_date": "1894-10-15", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "207", "last_page": "210", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "55 Ill. App. 207" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5146213 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/46/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5277315 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/53/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5342553 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/87/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313449 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/82/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5241566 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/57/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5263789 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/43/0260-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 355, "char_count": 7179, "ocr_confidence": 0.476, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.279034880960449e-07, "percentile": 0.7848195010597143 }, "sha256": "830bc917c57d3bacb512c32e40b859929ae6f707e7f412e42912475490df0d41", "simhash": "1:f677acf1ddb9a44f", "word_count": 1227 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:55:31.699098+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "World\u2019s Columbian Exposition v. Louis Scala." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Gary\ndelivered the opinion oe the Court.\nAt the August term, 1893, of the Superior Court, the defendant in error obtained a judgment by default against the plaintiff in error. The return of the sheriff upon the summons was that it was served \u201c by delivering a copy thereof to George E. Davis, Director General of said Exposition \u201d etc., at the September term, 1894. On notice to the plaintiff in error the sheriff made a new return upon the summons which was the same as the first return, with the words \u201cand an agent of said World\u2019s Columbian Exposition \u201d added to what is first herein copied.\nWhen that amendment was made, this writ of error, which had been made a supersedeas, was pending in this court.\nIn obtaining leave to amfend the return, the defendant in error presented an affidavit that Davis was an agent \u201d of the plaintiff in error, and the court refused to receive any testimony or affidavit to the contrary, but granted leave \u201c to the sheriff to amend his return on the writ of summons in this case, so as to conform to the facts.\u201d\nThat the amended return is good is not questioned, but it is insisted that the court should have heard testimony or . received affidavits that Davis was not an \u201c agent,\u201d and also that the amendment should not have been permitted after a supersedeas from this court.\nAs to the first point the affidavit presented by the defendant in error was not the ground of the amendment.\nThat affidavit only served the purpose of showing that the leave to amend was applied for in good faith. The court could not dictate what the amendment should be. The sheriff acts at his peril as to the truth of the amendment he makes. Dunn v. Rogers, 43 Ill. 260.\nThe elaborate case of O\u2019Connor v. Wilson, 57 Ill. 226, does not touch the questions here. Barlow v. Standford, 82 Ill. 298.\nThen as the court could not dictate the terms of the amendment, it should make no previous inquiry as to the truth of the proposed amendment, at least in the absence of any circumstances exciting suspicion of the good faith of the sheriff.\nThe fact that this writ was pending and was made a supersedeas was no obstacle to any proper amendment below. Dunham v. South Park, 87 Ill. 185.\nThe statute provides for service upon a \u201c principal director \u201d as well as upon an \u201c agent.\u201d It is unnecessary to decide whether \u201c director general \u201d is synonymous with \u201c principal director.\u201d\nIt would seem that the plaintiff in error should recover costs, but authority is the other way. Toledo, P. & W. Ry. Co. v. Butler, 53 Ill. 323. Affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Gary" } ], "attorneys": [ "Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Walker & Eddy, Attorneys.", "Brief for Defendant in Error, Mann, Hayes & Miller, Attorneys." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "World\u2019s Columbian Exposition v. Louis Scala.\n1. Service of Process\u2014Amendment of Sheriff's Return.\u2014Courts as' a matter of course grant leave to the sheriff to amend his return, but can not dictate what the. amendment shall be. The sheriff acts at his peril as to the truth of the amendment he makes.\n2. Same\u2014Motion for Leave to Amend Return.\u2014As a court can not dictate the terms of an amendment to a sheriff\u2019s return, it can make no previous inquiry as to the truth of the proposed amendment, at least in the absence of any circumstances exciting suspicion of the good faith of the sheriff,\n3. Service of Process\u2014 Upon Corporations.\u2014The statute provides for service of process upon a principal director as well as upon an agent. Is not a return showing service upon the World\u2019s Columbian Exposition by delivering a copy thereof to George R. Davis, Director General of the Exposition, good?\n4. Amendment of Sheriff\u2019s Return\u2014After Appeal is Taken.\u2014The fact that a case has been removed from the trial court to the Appellate Court by a writ of error and that the writ has been made a supersedeas is no obstacle to any proper amendment in the court below.\nMemorandum.\u2014Assumpsit. In the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. George F. Blanks, Judge, presiding; motion to amend sheriff\u2019s return; allowed; error by defendant. Heard in this court at the October term, 1894, and affirmed.\nOpinion filed October 15, 1894.\nBrief for Plaintiff in Error, Walker & Eddy, Attorneys.\nIn this case, judgment by default was taken against the World\u2019s Columbian Exposition, a corporation, upon the following return of service of summons :\n\u201c Served this ivrit on the within named defendants, the World\u2019s Columbian Exposition, by delivering a copy thereof to George JR. Davis, Director General of said Exposition, this 19th day of July, 1893. The president of said Exposition not found in my county.\nJames H. Gilbert, Sheriff,\nBy C. J. Jones, Deputy.\u201d\nThis shows a service upon one \u201c George B. Davis, Director General of said Exposition.\u201d No such officer or agent is known to the law, nor is there anything in the sheriff\u2019s return which avers that the dignitary known as \u201c Director General \u201d is, as a matter of fact, an agent of the Exposition. It is left to the court to assume judicially that a director general is, as a matter of fact, an agent of a corporation.\nIn Imperial Building Company v. Cook, 46 Ill. App. 279, this court held that return of service upon \u201c F. S. Fames, vice-president of said company,\u201d was insufficient, as the court could not assume judicially that the vice-president was, as a matter of fact, an agent of the company. [Since revised by the Supreme Court.]\nOur statute (Sec. 5, Practice Act) provides:\n\u201c An incorporated company may be served with process by leaving a copy thereof with its president, if he can be found in the county in which suit is brought; if he shall not be found in the county, then by leaving a copy of the process with any clerk, secretary, superintendent, general agent, cashier, principal director, engineer, conductor, station agent, or any agent of said company found in the county.\u201d\nBrief for Defendant in Error, Mann, Hayes & Miller, Attorneys.\nGeorge B. Davis is described in the original return as \u201c Director General,\u201d and the contention is that no such officer is named in section 5 of the Practice Act, and although the section covers \u201c principal director,\u201d the terms are not synonymous. Webster says of the word \u201cgeneral\u201d : \u201cThe word \u2018 general \u2019 annexed to a name of office usually denotes chief or superior.\u201d \u201c The chief or superior officer in an administration\u2014one who is head of a department, and superintends the other officers in it.\u201d The word \u201c chief \u201d the same author defines as \u201c the principal or ' most important person or thing.\u201d And gives as synonyms, \u201c principal,\u201d \u201cleading,\u201d \u201cmain,\u201d \u201cmaster,\u201d etc.\nIn the light of the above, we submit that the terms \u201c director general,\u201d \u201c director chief,\u201d \u201c director principal,\u201d and \u201c principal director,\u201d are but different terms for the same thing, and are synonymous, and that although the words \u201c director general \u201d be not specifically mentioned in the statute covering this question, yet the term and the duties which it implies are such as to bring it within the statute, and make the original return sufficient. The term \u201c general superintendent,\u201d although common, is not used in the statute, and yet, if the sheriff, on serving a superintendent, should insert the word \u201c general \u201d in his return, it would hardly be held to invalidate it.\nWe therefore respectfully submit that the original return on said summons was sufficient." }, "file_name": "0207-01", "first_page_order": 203, "last_page_order": 206 }