{
  "id": 5091359,
  "name": "Lina Wollf v. John H. Van Housen",
  "name_abbreviation": "Wollf v. Van Housen",
  "decision_date": "1894-11-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "295",
  "last_page": "297",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "55 Ill. App. 295"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "cites_to": [
    {
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    {
      "cite": "133 Ill. 300",
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    {
      "cite": "33 Ill. App. 113",
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:55:31.699098+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Lina Wollf v. John H. Van Housen."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Gary\ndelivered the opinion ob the Court.\nThe appellant sued the appellee in trespass, alleging an assault, and in one count charging a rape, and in a second an attempt at rape, and in a third a common assault.\nOn the merits of the case we express no opinion, but there are errors for which the judgment for the defendant below must be reversed.\nFirst. The co\u00fart admitted the wife of the appellee as a witness for him, to deny that she made an exclamation to which the appellant had testified. Ho question is before us as to the admissibility of such exclamation, but admitting the wife as a witness was error. Poppers v. Wagner, 33 Ill. App. 113; Craig v. Miller, 133 Ill. 300.\nSecond. The court, by one instruction, told the jury, \u201c before you can find the accused guilty you must be satisfied from a preponderance of the evidence, that he had carnal knowledge of said plaintiff forcibly and against her will,\u201d and by another, that \u201c there must be shown in this cause by a preponderance of the evidence, not only that the defendant committed an assault upon the plaintiff, but that he did so with intent to compel her by force, and against her will, to have intercourse with hitfi, notwithstanding any resistance she might make.\u201d These instructions precluded a recovery under the third count. Even under the other counts, a recovery for a common assault, if proved, might be had. Lewis v. Hoover, 3 Blackf. 407. The word \u201c satisfied,\u201d in the first instruction, is too strong. Connelly v. Sullivan, 50 Ill. App. 627.\nThird. On cross-examination the court refused to require the defendant to answer whether he had been convicted of forgery, and also refused to admit the record of such conviction, on the ground of the lapse of time since 1868. This was error. Sec. 1, Chap. 51. How the lapse of time should qualify the effect of the conviction upon the credibility of the Avitness should be left to the jury. Pennsylvania Co. v. Versten, 41 Ill. App. 345.\nThere is something in the case about an attempt to suborn witnesses. There is nothing for us to say about it, as the attention of the court was drawn to it only ex parte.\nThe judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Gary"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "T. H. Simmons, attorney for appellant.",
      "Wight & Williams, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Lina Wollf v. John H. Van Housen.\n1. Witnesses-\u2014Wife Not Competent for the Husband.\u2014A wife is not a competent witness for the husband in an action against him for a trespass.'\n2. Instructions\u2014Use of the Word \u201c Satisfied \u201d Instead of \u201c Believed.\u201d \u2014An instruction which tells the jury that before they can find the accused guilty they must be satisfied from a preponderance of the evidence, etc., is erroneous, the word, \u201c satisfied\u201d being too strong.\n3. Same\u2014 Not to Preclude a Recovery, When, etc.\u2014Where a suit was brought in trespass alleging an assault, and in one count charging a rape, in a second an attempt at rape, and in a third a common assault, it is error to instruct the jury that there must be shown, not only that the defendant committed an assault upon the plaintiff, but that he did so with intent to compel her by force and against her will to have intercourse with him notwithstanding any resistance she might make, because it precludes a recovery for an assault under the third count.\n4. Assault\u2014An Element of the Crime of Rapie.\u2014Under counts in trespass charging a rape and an attempt at rape, a recovery for a common assault,' if proved', may be had.\n5. Evidence\u2014Of Former Conviction, etc.\u2014It is error to refuse to admit the record of a party\u2019s conviction for forgery on the ground of lapse of time. The question as to how the lapse of time should qualify the effect of a conviction upon the credibility of a witness should be left to the jury.\nMemorandum.\u2014Trespass to the person. In the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Declaration in trespass; pleas, not guilty, etc; trial by jury; verdict and judgment for defendant; appeal by plaintiff. Heard in this court at the October term, 1894. Reversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed November 12, 1894.\nT. H. Simmons, attorney for appellant.\nWight & Williams, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0295-01",
  "first_page_order": 291,
  "last_page_order": 293
}