{ "id": 5784017, "name": "Daniel Norton v. Catherine Brophy", "name_abbreviation": "Norton v. Brophy", "decision_date": "1895-02-11", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "661", "last_page": "664", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "56 Ill. App. 661" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "68 Ill. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2627023 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/68/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460757 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/61/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2930792 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/124/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5308461 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/64/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Brad. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Bradf.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5211942 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/33/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2627023 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/68/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460757 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/61/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5308461 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/64/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5211942 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/33/0424-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 347, "char_count": 5094, "ocr_confidence": 0.522, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3630144885149833e-07, "percentile": 0.6367033367582434 }, "sha256": "89d8050628bebfb99348007c48b5c75c437bb15b24e0fb61169fc7a799e6abe6", "simhash": "1:3b145823d45c062e", "word_count": 877 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:37.497383+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Daniel Norton v. Catherine Brophy." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mb. Justice Boggs\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThe action below was assumpsit by appellee against the appellant upon the following instrument, viz.:\nBloomington, Ills., March 17,1887.\nTo the bearer of Catherine Brophy \u00a7212 dollars of\nDaniel Norton.\nWhether the instrument was evidence of indebtedness in writing within the meaning of Sec. 16, Chap. 83, B. S., entitled \u201c Limitations,\u201d is the sole question. The appellant executed and delivered it to the appellee. It was designed to serve some purpose and was delivered and accepted as accomplishing that purpose. As it was written by the appellant, we-are at liberty to construe it most strongly against him (2 Parsons, Contracts, 506; Massac v. Belford, 68 Ill. 290), and if necessary to render it intelligible may supply a word necessarily implied by the context (Booth v. Wallace, 2 Roach Con. 247, cited with approval in Beardsley v. Hill, 61 Ill. 354), or may reject a word if its omission is likewise necessarily implied. Bailey on Bills, Chap. 1, Sec. 2, p. 6. The application of these rules of construction leaves no doubt as to the effect which ought to be given to it. It is readily seen to be a written statement of the appellant that the appellee or the bearer of the writing is to receive of or from him the sum of money mentioned therein. Such a written admission is evidence of indebtedness within the meaning of the statute in question. Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424; Jassoy v. Horn, 64 Ill. 379. The judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mb. Justice Boggs" } ], "attorneys": [ "Appellant\u2019s Brief, Frank B. Henderson and John E. Pollock, Attorneys.", "Appellee\u2019s Brief, Bowell, Neville & Bindley, Attorneys." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Daniel Norton v. Catherine Brophy.\n1. Written Instruments\u2014Gonstruetion of.\u2014A written instrument may be construed most strongly against the maker of it, and if necessary to render it intelligible, a word necessarily implied by the context may be supplied, or rejected, if its omission is likewise necessarily implied.\n2. Limitations\u2014What Instruments Are Within the Statute.\u2014The following instrument\u2014\n\u201cBloomington, Ill., March 17, \u201987.\nTo the bearer of Catherine Brophy, $212.00 dollars of\nDaniel Norton\u201d\u2014\nis such a written admission as is evidence of indebtedness within the meaning of the statute of limitations.\nMemorandum.\u2014Assumpsit. In the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Judge, presiding. Declaration, special and common counts; judgment for plaintiffs on demurrer to plea of the statute of limitations; appeal by defendant. Heard in this court at the November term, 1894,\nand affirmed.\nOpinion filed February 11, 1895.\nCopy of the plea of the statute of limitations:\nAnd for a further plea in this behalf the defendant says that the plaintiff ought not to have her aforesaid action against him, the defendant, because he says that the several supposed causes of action in said declaration mentioned did not, nor did any of them or either of them accrue to the plaintiff at any time within five years next before the commencement of this suit, in manner and form as the plaintiff has above complained against him, the defendant, and this the defendant is ready to verify, wherefore he prays judgment, if the plaintiff ought to have her aforesaid action against him, etc.\nAppellant\u2019s Brief, Frank B. Henderson and John E. Pollock, Attorneys.\nTo constitute a promissory note there are certain indispensable requisites:\nA promissory note is a written promise to pay to a certain person, or to the order of a certain person^ or to bearer, a sum certain of money absolutely.\nIt is generally laid down that a promise must be express. The mere fact that a debt is acknowledged is not enough, and the word promise, or its equivalent, must be used. Bigelow on Bills and Notes, 6,11,12; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 4th Ed., Yol. 1, p. 39, Par. 28, and p. 44, Par. 36.\nFor a writing to be a due bill it must contain an acknowledgment of the debt. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 4th Ed., Par. 36a to Par. 40, Yol. 1, p. 45.\nA writing to be by virtue of itself an obligation for the payment of money, must contain a promise to pay, or an acknowledgment of such indebtedness. S. & 0. Stat., Chap. 98, Par. 3.\nAppellee\u2019s Brief, Bowell, Neville & Bindley, Attorneys.\nThe following instrument has been held to be an evidence\nof indebtedness in writing under our statutes and negotiable :\n\u201c Good for 50 cents.\nH. 0. Myers, Sut.\u201d\nWhich was indorsed in the handwriting of Myers, ec H. G. M\u201e\u201d Charles W. Weston et al. v. Henry C. Myers, 33 Ill. 424.\nA certificate of deposit in a bank is a sufficient evidence in writing of the existence of a debt to save the cause of action until barred by the statute of limitations relating to written instruments. First National Bank v. Amanda F. Coleman, 11 Brad. 509; Jassoy & Co. v. Horn, 64 Ill. 379.\nEntries of a deposit by a bank in a depositor\u2019s bank book are evidence in writing of indebtedness and an action thereon is not barred by the five years\u2019 statute of limitation. Jassoy & Co. v. Horn, 64 Ill. 379; Schalucky v. Field, 124 Ill. 617.\nWords omitted in a note which are plainly inferable from the remaining language will be considered the same as if not omitted. Beardsley v. Hill, 61 Ill. 354; Massie v. Belford, 68 Ill. 290." }, "file_name": "0661-01", "first_page_order": 657, "last_page_order": 660 }