{
  "id": 5080331,
  "name": "William Harlev and Alfred Harlev v. David Weiner",
  "name_abbreviation": "Harlev v. Weiner",
  "decision_date": "1895-04-22",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "340",
  "last_page": "343",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "58 Ill. App. 340"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "41 Ill. 197",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5216981
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/41/0197-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 377,
    "char_count": 5820,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.478,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.3341757668126914e-08,
      "percentile": 0.2726805694077145
    },
    "sha256": "b88b994808ada4f99bbed5c16ddbb159b7c7bd5084ee33d497e7fa086b2ffcc4",
    "simhash": "1:756e5f169fa56050",
    "word_count": 1005
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:52:30.003237+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "William Harlev and Alfred Harlev v. David Weiner."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Shepard\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThis was an action of replevin brought by the appellee against the appellants to recover possession of 1,000 cords of wood and 100 logs.\nThe said property was taken under the replevin writ, and the judgment was that the appellee have and retain the same, and that he recover his damages of $84 and costs.\nIt may be assumed that the appellants had a contract with the Sanitary District trustees to perform certain work on the main drainage canal, which necessitated the \u00a1 removal by them from a certain portion of the right of\nwav for said canal, of all timber, stumps, brush, etc., thereon growing or standing.\nOn January 18, 1893, they made a contract with one Helson Bleau to do that work, whereby Bleau was to pay appellants $2,500.10 from time to time as demanded, and was to have all the timber, brush and materials taken from the land, the appellants reserving for themselves a lien upon such timber, etc., until said $2,500 should be fully paid to them.\nBy a writing, dated March 10, 1893, the appellee made a proposition, not addressed to any one by name, to cut and remove all logs, trees and brush remaining on said land, in consideration of having \u201c all remaining wood left on said section,\u201d and to pay $100 \u201c for. all wood cut up to this date.\u201d By the proposition'appellee agreed to do the work \u201cin a manner best suited to Harlev & Son (the appellants), contractors for said section.\u201d x\nBleau indorsed on the back of the written proposition, as follows: \u201cWe accept .the within proposition of David Weiner.\nHelsoh Bleau.\nAuthorized by Harlev & Son to make the agreement.\u201d\nFor the $100 so specified, the appellee executed and de- ' livered his promissory note, payable to the order of Bleau, thirty days after date, and paid the note on April 24, 1893.\nTrouble arose between appellants and appellee because the latter refused after having cut the wood, to pull the stumps, claiming that such was not his duty under his contract, and appellants stopped the appellee from removing the wood that remained on the ground, and which was the subject of the replevin. Notwithstanding the appellants reserved a lien upon the wood, etc., by the terms of the contract with Bleau, dated January 18th, it was competent for them by subsequent arrangement with Bleau to authorize the contract of March 10th with the appellee, or to ratify it after it was made. There was much evidence heard on both sides, touching both the authority of Bleau by the appellants to make the contract of March 10th with the appellee, and the inducement to appellee under such authority to enter into said contract, and touching appellant\u2019s subsequent knowledge and ratification of it, and such evidence was most conflicting in its character.\nThe questions arising upon the evidence were of a kind peculiarly within the province of a jury, and the evidence being conflicting, the verdict of the jury would be final, and treated as conclusive in an appellate tribunal, if the cause had been submitted to the jury upon proper instructions. It is hardly necessary to say that facts are for the jury and not for the court, and therefore, when the trial judge refused each and all of the instructions asked by the defendants, and of his own motion prepared and gave, as his own, to the jury, a substitute for the defendant\u2019s instructions, it was highly necessary that such an instruction should be reasonably free from error, and should not tell the jury what the fact was upon a vital issue in the case.\nAs already said, it was a controlling issue in the case whether the contract of March 10th, that Bleau made with the appellee, was authorized by the appellants. Recognizing the importance of that issue, the judge in his instruction says: \u201c It is therefore important for you to consider the effect of this contract of March 10,1893. upon the rights of the defendants, Harlev & Son, and authorized by them,\u201d etc. The italics are ours. The whole context is obscure (see Haskin v. Haskin, 41 Ill. 197), but need not be quoted, for read as the average jury would read, or understand if read to them, this was equivalent to telling them that the contract referred to was authorized by appellants\u2014a most important and determinative fact in the case.\nWe not infrequently have some reason to guess that records brought to this court do not speak the verity .that the law clothes them with, and being familiar, as we are, with the legal acumen of the learned trial judge we may guess so in this instance, but doing so does not avail.\nHotice of the defect in the instruction has been prominently urged upon us by appellant\u2019s counsel in their brief, and no attempt has been made to cure the record by amendment if it were susceptible of cure, and we must reverse the judgment for that error, if for no other. Other errors have been urged, which are not likely to occur on another trial, even though they exist here now, and we consequently omit discussion of them.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court will be reversed and the cause remanded.\nReversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Shepard"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John J. Coburn and Lawrence M. Ennis, attorneys for appellants; Henry M. Coburn, of counsel.",
      "Jambs B\u201e Muir and Egbert H. Vickers, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "William Harlev and Alfred Harlev v. David Weiner.\n1. Instructions \u2014 Where the Evidence is Conflicting.\u2014Where the evidence upon the tidal of an issue of fact is conflicting, it is highly necessary that the instructions should be reasonably free from error.\n2. Same\u2014Error to Assume the Existence of Fact.\u2014An instruction which assumes the existence of a controverted fact, is erroneous.\nReplevin.\u2014Appeal from, the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Frank Baker, Judge, presiding. Submitted at the March term, 1895, of this court.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed April 22, 1895.\nJohn J. Coburn and Lawrence M. Ennis, attorneys for appellants; Henry M. Coburn, of counsel.\nJambs B\u201e Muir and Egbert H. Vickers, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0340-01",
  "first_page_order": 336,
  "last_page_order": 339
}