{ "id": 5156163, "name": "The People, etc., ex rel. The Ferris Wheel Company v. George B. Swift, Mayor of the City of Chicago, J. R. B. Van Cleave, City Clerk, and Philip Mass, City Collector", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Ferris Wheel Co. v. Swift", "decision_date": "1895-10-31", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "395", "last_page": "398", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "60 Ill. App. 395" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5082054 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/58/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ill. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 12123366 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/130/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4988846 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/33/0078-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 376, "char_count": 6091, "ocr_confidence": 0.493, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.0011153170616546e-08, "percentile": 0.31490059845187884 }, "sha256": "d52db24d878ba2240e66159de0ceaf074ca3e6cb0a7bc724aa3145bf43c5f6d3", "simhash": "1:82d7e7106379d166", "word_count": 1047 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:22:36.351146+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People, etc., ex rel. The Ferris Wheel Company v. George B. Swift, Mayor of the City of Chicago, J. R. B. Van Cleave, City Clerk, and Philip Mass, City Collector." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Gart\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nA general ordinance of the city of Chicago\u2014of which the appellee Swift is mayor, and the other appellees city clerk and city collector\u2014provides for the issuing of dramshop licenses upon certain terms.\nThe relator, complying with those terms, applied for a license. It was refused, and the relator sued out this mandamus to compel the issuing of such license, and being denied that relief in the Circuit Court, has appealed to this.\nThe question for us is the validity of another ordinance which the appellant attacks upon two grounds: First, that the text of the ordinance makes it void. Second, that it was not properly passed by the common council. We shall only need to consider the first ground. That ordinance provides that in a certain limited district embracing the premises of the relator, no dramshop license shall be granted unless the applicant shall present to the mayor, with the application, \u201ca petition signed by a majority.of the legal voters of that portion of the city \u201d embraced within that district.\nIt is conceded by the appellant that the city may prohibit the sale of liquor within defined districts of the city\u2014create prohibition districts. It is not denied by the appellees that a mandamus may issue to compel the issue of a license wrongly refused.\nUnder the general ordinance any applicant\u2014complying with the terms\u2014is entitled to a license. Under the ordinance attacked, the success of his application depends upon the favor or good will of his neighbors.\nIn a cosmopolitan city, in which the voting population of considerable districts are of like blood, descent, race, religion, politics, or any other distinguishing trait, they might\u2014if such districts were separated from the city at large by ordinances like the one in question\u2014prevent all competition with those like themselves by signing petitions for those only who were so like.\nClans could monopolize the traffic.\nWhile happily in modern times prejudices and antipathies growing out of religious, political, or other differences, are much mollified, they are not eradicated, and no encouragement by law should create a field for their exercise. Why, \u25a0if the option of license or no license is made dependent upon the favor of a majority of the legal voters, may it not be made dependent upon the favor of a majority of the married women\u2014which probably, in the abstract, has much more to commend it ? The good will of the women might be, in a measure, dependent upon the degree of personal pulchritude of the applicant; of the voters, by their expectation of the liberality with which he would \u201c chalk it up.\u201d Voters, as such only, have no interest in property within the defined district. Then why should they, more than others, be consulted ? The operation of such ordinances is to make discriminations, and create monopolies; and ordinances of that character are invalid. City of Lake View v. Tate, 33 Ill. App. 78; 130 Ill. 217; City of Chicago v. Stratton, 58 Ill. App. 539.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the Circuit Court to award a mandamus, as in the petition therefor is prayed.\nMb. Justice Shepard.\nI should dissent from the above decision-if it were not that the case of City v. Stratton, supra, wherein I dissented, binds the court, and it is therefore becoming in me to remain silent in subsequent cases where the same doctrine is involved.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Gart Mb. Justice Shepard." } ], "attorneys": [ "Green, Bobbins & Honors, attorneys for appellant; William A. Vincent, of counsel.", "Wm. G. Beale, corporation counsel, and George A. Du-put, attorneys for appellees; Bubens & Mott and Wilson, Moore & McIlvaine, of counsel." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People, etc., ex rel. The Ferris Wheel Company v. George B. Swift, Mayor of the City of Chicago, J. R. B. Van Cleave, City Clerk, and Philip Mass, City Collector.\n1. Mandatos\u2014When it Lies to Gompel the Issue of Dramshop License.\u2014A writ of mandamus will lie to compel the issue of a dramshop license, wrongly refused, under a general ordinance.\n2. Ordinances\u2014Dramshop License, upon Petition of the Legal Voters.\u2014An ordinance which provides, that in a certain district named, no dramshop license shall be granted unless the applicant therefor shall present with his application a petition signed by a majority of 'the legal voters of the district in question, is void as tending to make discriminations and create monopolies.\nPetition for Mandamus.\u2014Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Frang\u00eds Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1895.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed October 31, 1895.\nCopy of the ordinance in question:\nBe it Ordained by the City Council of the City of Chicago: Section 1. That the mayor of the city of Chicago shall not grant a license for the keeping of a dramshop within that portion of the city of Chicago which is bounded on the west by the center line of Clark street, on the east, by the center line of Lake View avenue, on the north by the center line of Diversey avenue, and on the south by the center line of Fullerton avenue, unless the person applying for the same shall apply to the mayor in writing, furnish sufficient evidence to satisfy the mayor that he or she is a person of good character, and execute to the city of Chicago a bond with at least two sureties, to be approved by the mayor, in the sum of \u00a7500, conditioned that the licensed party shall faithfully observe and keep all ordinances now in force or hereafter to be passed during the period of such license, and that he will keep closed on Sunday all doors upon any street from the bar or room where such dramshop is kept; and that all windows opening upon any street from such bar or room shall, Sundays, be provided with blinds, shutters or curtains, so as to obstruct the view from such street into such room; and unless such person so applying shall present to the mayor, with his application, a petition signed by a majority of the legal voters of that portion of the city of Chicago hereinbefore defined, and asking for the granting of such license.\nGreen, Bobbins & Honors, attorneys for appellant; William A. Vincent, of counsel.\nWm. G. Beale, corporation counsel, and George A. Du-put, attorneys for appellees; Bubens & Mott and Wilson, Moore & McIlvaine, of counsel." }, "file_name": "0395-01", "first_page_order": 393, "last_page_order": 396 }