{
  "id": 5161056,
  "name": "Paul Cornell v. Central Electric Co.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cornell v. Central Electric Co.",
  "decision_date": "1895-12-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "325",
  "last_page": "328",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "61 Ill. App. 325"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "17 Ill. App. 399",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        867363
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/17/0399-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "58 Ill. 232",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5237049
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/58/0232-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "100 Ill. 82",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2823517
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/100/0082-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "69 Ill. 401",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2637237
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/69/0401-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "50 Ill. 226",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2605436
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/50/0226-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "92 Ill. 501",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2741201
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/92/0501-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "79 Ill. 318",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2687380
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/79/0318-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "11 Met. 170",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Met.",
      "case_ids": [
        1975713
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/mass/52/0170-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "58 Ill. App. 222",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        5079734
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/58/0222-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 308,
    "char_count": 5353,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.518,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 9.914635265628048e-08,
      "percentile": 0.5358750645307893
    },
    "sha256": "ccc14c164a5ab91af7d0adb64c08cc253b54ef18acc99b5dff58f3eeb5c6b51b",
    "simhash": "1:1f1ecb0b2c18ba8c",
    "word_count": 910
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:50:02.966731+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Paul Cornell v. Central Electric Co."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Shepard\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThe appellee, a corporation, sued the appellant for $737.42, claimed for electric supplies furnished by it to one Hand, who had contracted with appellant to place electric wires, fixtures and devices in a hotel building then in process of construction by the appellant, and, upon the verdict of a jury, a judgment for the full amount claimed was recovered by appellee.\n\u25a0 The appellant contends that the alleged promise by him or his agent to pay the debt of Hand to appellee was not sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence upon that question was conflicting. It is the very essence of the functions of a jury to settle controverted facts, and unless their finding is manifestly wrong it will not be disturbed upon appeal. Having considered the evidence attentively, we are unable to say that their finding was not in this case warranted by the evidence.\nThe next point urged by appellant is that, even though there was such a promise proved, there was no consideration for it; that the promise was not in writing, and was, therefore, within the statute of frauds.\nThe consideration that was proved was an agreement to forbear, followed by actual forbearance by the appellee, to, for a reasonable time, refrain from filing a petition to enforce a mechanic\u2019s lien against appellant\u2019s hotel property. An agreement to forbear to sue for a time certain, or for a reasonable time, is a good consideration to support a promise to pay the debt of another, and need not be in writing. Webbe v. Romona O. Stone Co., 58 Ill. App. 222. The slightest damage to the plaintiff, or benefit to the defendant, affords a sufficient consideration to support the promise to pay. Walker v. Sherman, 11 Met. 170, cited in the last case, supra.\n'Bor is it material that the certain right to recover in the suit forborne should exist. If the right were honestly asserted, though a doubtful one, the agreement to forbear its prosecution is based upon a sufficient consideration. Honeyman v. Jarvis, 79 Ill. 318; Pool v. Docker, 92 Ill. 501; Knotts v. Preble, 50 Ill. 226.\nBut it is insisted by appellant that the claim of appellee, at the time the promise Avas made, was wholly unsustainable at law or in equity as against the appellant or his property, in the improvement of which the goods and materials Avere furnished, and urges that his insistence in that regard is supported by the fact that appellee\u2019s subsequent petition for a mechanic\u2019s lien was dismissed as hot being sustainable.\nHnder the principle already stated, it Avas not necessary that a certain right to sustain the forborne action should exist. It Avas enough that a reasonably probable cause of action, although a debatable one, existed.\nAn examination of the record shows that at the time the promise was made, the appellee was honestly asserting its right to maintain a mechanic\u2019s lien against appellant\u2019s property, and threatening to commence suit therefor, and it is by no means certain that had appellee not been lulled into inactivity in the performance of its statutory rights in that regard, by the promise of appellant, its right to sustain the lien would have become lost.\nWe consider that the promise was supported by a sufficient consideration, and amounted to an original undertaking by appellant, based upon that consideration, to pay the debt, and was, therefore, not within the statute of frauds. Clifford v. Luhring, 69 Ill. 401; Borchenius v. Canutson, 100 Ill. 82; Wilson v. Bevans, 58 Ill. 232; Graham v. Mason, 17 Ill. App. 399.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Shepard"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Frank B. Dyohe and J. E. Cornell, attorneys for appellant.",
      "Walter W. Boss and Morton Denison Hull, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Paul Cornell v. Central Electric Co.\n1. Jury\u2014Settlement of Controverted Facts.\u2014It is the very essence of the functions of a jury to settle controverted facts, and unless their finding is manifestly wrong it will not be disturbed on appeal.\n2. Consideration\u2014Agreement to Forbear.\u2014An agreement to forbear to sue for a time certain, or for a reasonable time, is a good consideration to support a promise to pay the debt of another, and need not be in writing.\n3. Same\u2014For a Promise to Pay.\u2014The slightest damage to the plaintiff, or benefit to the defendant, affords a sufficient consideration to support a promise to pay.\n4. Same\u2014Honest Assertion of a Right\u2014Probable Cause of Action.-\u2014\u25a0 It is not material that the right to recover in the suit forborne should exist. If the right, though a doubtful one, is honestly asserted, the agreement to forbear its prosecution is based upon a sufficient consideration. It is enough if a reasonably probable cause of action, although a debatable one, existed.\n5. Statute of Frauds\u2014A Promise Not Within.\u2014A promise by the owner of a building to pay the debt of another for material used therein, in consideration of an agreement to forbear for a reasonable time from filing a petition for a mechanic\u2019s lien, followed by actual forbearance, is supported by a sufficient consideration and amounts to an original undertaking, and is not within the statute of frauds.\nAssumpsit, upon a promise to pay.' Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1895.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed December 12, 1895.\nFrank B. Dyohe and J. E. Cornell, attorneys for appellant.\nWalter W. Boss and Morton Denison Hull, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0325-01",
  "first_page_order": 323,
  "last_page_order": 326
}