{
  "id": 5177359,
  "name": "Ricardi Apartment House Co. et al. v. George E. Beaudet",
  "name_abbreviation": "Ricardi Apartment House Co. v. Beaudet",
  "decision_date": "1896-05-14",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "261",
  "last_page": "263",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "64 Ill. App. 261"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "89 Ill. 412",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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    {
      "cite": "58 Ill. App. 581",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        5085261
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      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "59 Ill. App. 376",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
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      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/59/0376-01"
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    {
      "cite": "54 Ill. App. 650",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
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        5099014
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      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/54/0650-01"
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    {
      "cite": "55 Ill. App. 347",
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      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        5097991
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      "case_paths": [
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    },
    {
      "cite": "73 Ill. 305",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:36.948645+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Ricardi Apartment House Co. et al. v. George E. Beaudet."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Gary\ndelivered the opinion op the Court.\nThis is a petition for a mechanic\u2019s lien by a sub-contractor against the owner of the building, if there be one, the original contractor, and three other appellants, on the allegation that these three had or claimed some interest in the premises.\nThe petition does not show that any building was ever erected, much less that the original contractor ever had anything due to it (a corporation) from the House company.\nThe master reported that the appellee did some excavation and built some walls, and did no more, and then was \u201c unable to proceed with his contract; \u201d and the context shows that such inability resulted from want of means to pay his workmen. Also that the architect and original contractor \u201c were justified in reletting the contract.\u201d The appellee excepted to this last conclusion of the master, but not to the first, and the court sustained that exception. The case stands, then, upon the master\u2019s report and the decree, thus: The fact, as the master reports it, is, that the appellee could not perform his contract, and, as a legal consequence, that the original contractor was justified in reletting the work. The appellee did not object to the master\u2019s conclusion of fact, but to that of law, and the court concurred with him.\nIt is true that the master also concluded that the appellee was \u201c entitled upon an accounting to recover the amount fairly due for the work done by him in said contract,\u201d which must have been in his mind, not a conclusion of fact, but of some sort of fireside equity.\nHow, a conclusion of fact, not objected to before the master (Pennell v. Lamar Ins. Co., 73 Ill. 305), followed by exceptions in the Circuit Court (Owen v. Occidental B. & L. Ass\u2019n, 55 Ill. App. 347), is the end of controversy on that fact, and, if made upon conflicting testimony, is as conclusive as a verdict, even if it be objected and excepted to. Whitcomb v. Duell, 54 Ill. App. 650; Friedman v. Schoengen, 59 Ill. App. 376; Foster v. Swaback, 58 Ill. App. 581.\nThe decree directs a \u201csale of the said building and leasehold interest.\u201d\nThe petition had not mentioned any building, nor was there in the petition anything from which an inference or even a conjecture could be made that there was any leasehold interest. The first mention of it is in the master\u2019s report, as \u201c a leasehold interest * * * for a term of years.\u201d The decree directs that if there should be a deficiency of proceeds, the appellee shall have an execution for it against all the appellants, three of whom had no concern with the business, being made parties only on the allegation that they had or claimed some interest.\nIt is quite safe to say that this decree never underwent the scrutiny of the chancellor himself, having been entered, as the record shows, with this suffix: \u201c O. H as to form. -Sol\u2019r for def\u2019ts.\u201d\nThis O. K. does not waive substantial rights. It doubtless was intended as an acknowledgment that if the appellee was entitled to the relief that the decree gave, then the form was not objectionable.\nNow with the fact, as shown by this record, that the appellee had, according to his own account, done less than a twelfth part of his contract, and in materials and pay to his workmen, had been compensated for nearly two-thirds of that, and then with the master\u2019s finding standing as a fact that the appellee \u201c was unable to proceed with his contract,\u201d how is he entitled to anything ?\nHis inability is no legal excuse for not performing his contract. Leopold v. Salkey, 89 Ill. 412.\nThe language of the decree, that all exceptions inconsistent with the findings of the decree are overruled, has no application to a finding of fact by the master which was not excepted to, whether such finding was consistent with the decree or not. On this record the petition should have been dismissed.\nThe decree is reversed and the petition dismissed at appellee\u2019s cost, without prejudice to any remedy the appellee may have at law.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Gary"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Josiah Burnham and James L. Clark, attorneys for appellants.",
      "Ela, Grover & Graves, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ricardi Apartment House Co. et al. v. George E. Beaudet.\n1. Equity Practice\u2014Finding of Facts.\u2014A conclusion of fact, not objected to before the master or followed by exceptions, is the end of the controversy upon such facts, and if made upon conflicting testimony, is as conclusive as a verdict, even if objected and excepted to.\n%. Contracts\u2014Inability to Perform.\u2014The inability of a contractor to perform, is no legal excuse for not performing his contract.\nPetition for a Mechanic\u2019s Lien.\u2014Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the March term, 1896.\nReversed and the petition dismissed.\nOpinion filed May 14, 1896.\nJosiah Burnham and James L. Clark, attorneys for appellants.\nEla, Grover & Graves, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0261-01",
  "first_page_order": 259,
  "last_page_order": 261
}