{ "id": 5172343, "name": "West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. Martin Dougherty", "name_abbreviation": "West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. Dougherty", "decision_date": "1896-06-11", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "599", "last_page": "600", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "64 Ill. App. 599" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "118 Ill. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5381252 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/118/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ill. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5806388 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/140/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5113039 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/51/0488-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 264, "char_count": 3862, "ocr_confidence": 0.541, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7508509183353933 }, "sha256": "84e5ef47a7a2256481c1a6c9f6cab6269b845329f81c6f81011fe7ade2b25f03", "simhash": "1:ce8b90362294d384", "word_count": 697 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:36.948645+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. Martin Dougherty." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Gary\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThe appellee recovered a judgment for personal injury sustained by him by a collision between a wagon in which he was riding and a grip car at a street crossing.\nOn the questions of fact\u2014negligence and the amount of damages\u2014the evidence was such as to make the verdict of the jury conclusive.\n\u25a0 \u25a0\u25a0 One O\u2019Brien was driving the horse drawing the wagon, and with reference to O\u2019Brien\u2019s driving at the crossing, the appellant asked the appellee on cross-examination as a witness, \u201c Ton approved of what he did?\u201d to which question the court sustained an objection, and the appellant excepted. Bo offer or attempt was made to show that the appellee in any manner interfered in the driving, and of what significance can it be what he thought about it ?\nThe question to the gripman 'whether he could have done anything more than he did to stop the car called for no fact, and was rightly rejected. Only the opinion of the witness appeared by the answer he did give, and which is not fairly shown to have been struck out, and the striking out excepted to.\n. At the instance of the appellee the court instructed the jury:\n\u201c The court instructs the jury that the testimony of James O\u2019Brien which was taken in the shape of his deposition and has been read to you, is to be considered by you with all the other evidence in the case, and you are to give it such weight as you may think it entitled to in connection with all the circumstances appearing in the case from the evidence and in connection with all the other evidence in the case.\u201d\nIn this class of cases prudence on the part of counsel for plaintiff is quite as important as skill. Verdicts sure to come, are often lost by too much zeal. The plaintiff has more reason to fear what the court may do for him at the request of his counsel, than he has need of the aid of the court.\nThis instruction is subject to criticism only in that it calls attention to a witness by name. Brown v. Monson, 51 Ill. App. 488; Penna. Co. v. Versten, 140 Ill. 637.\nBut as is said in Phenix Ins. Co. v. La Pointe, 118 Ill. 384, \u201c it often happens that the giving of an instruction would not constitute reversible error, where the refusal of such instruction would not be improper.\u201d This instruction, unlike the one in Brown v. Monson, does not refer the jury to the version by the witness of the transaction under investigation and it is hardly possible to believe that it affected the result.\nWhat has been said and cited justifies the refusal of an instruction asked by the appellant as follows :\n\u201c The law of this State allows a party to a suit to testify in his own behalf as a witness, but it provides that the interest of such party in the result of the suit may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility; and in this case in passing upon the weight to be given to the testimony of the plaintiff the jury may consider his interest in the result of the suit.\u201d\nThe judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Gary" } ], "attorneys": [ "Egbert Jamieson and John A. Rose, attorneys for appellant.", "McCracken & Cross, attorneys for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. Martin Dougherty.\n1. Practice\u2014Pertinent Suggestions.\u2014In cases against corporations for personal injuries, prudence on the part of counsel for plaintiff is quite as important as skill. Verdicts sure to come are often lost by too much zeal. The plaintiff has more reason to fear what the court may do for him at the request of his counsel, than he has need of the aid of the court.\n2. Instructions\u2014Calling Attention to a Witness by Name.\u2014An instruction which calls attention to a witness by name is subject to criticism.\nTrespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the March term, 1896.\nAffirmed,\nOpinion filed June 11, 1896.\nEgbert Jamieson and John A. Rose, attorneys for appellant.\nMcCracken & Cross, attorneys for appellee." }, "file_name": "0599-01", "first_page_order": 597, "last_page_order": 598 }