{
  "id": 5195943,
  "name": "Henry Harms v. Caroline Steir",
  "name_abbreviation": "Harms v. Steir",
  "decision_date": "1896-12-14",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "634",
  "last_page": "637",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "67 Ill. App. 634"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 433,
    "char_count": 6662,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.507,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08,
      "percentile": 0.35602191479117123
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    "sha256": "4bfb23126b8f2e6b6b8c2306f8fa72f4462242c3ef7d0ba99dba85500b0c0c2f",
    "simhash": "1:2f6a32866e1db93f",
    "word_count": 1150
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:34.097112+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Henry Harms v. Caroline Steir."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Shepard\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThis appeal is from a judgment of $2,000 recovered in an action of trespass brought by appellee against appellant.\nThe appellant urges three grounds for a reversal of the judgment.\nFirst. That the verdict is not sustained by the evidence.\nSecond. Improper remarks by appellee\u2019s counsel.\nThird. Excessiveness of the verdict and judgment.\nConcerning the first ground: There were eight witnesses on each side who testified, and it may be truly said that there is no possibility of reconciling much of the evidence, fro and con.\nIn such cases an appellate tribunal can not, with safety, substitute its judgment of the truthfulness of the testimony of one set of witnesses and the untruthfulness of another, for that of the jury and trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses as they testified. The law is, that in cases of irreconcilable conflict of testimony the verdict must stand.\nUpon the second ground: That of improper remarks by appellee\u2019s counsel made to the jury, and to the court in the presence of the jury.\nThere was no objection made, and consequently no ruling to which an exception could have been taken, to the first remark that is complained of, made in the opening speech to the j ury, about one Brenzel and his wife having \u201c either ran away, or had gone away before the policeman came, so they wrere not on the scene when the arrest was made.\u201d For the presumable purpose of ascertaining whether Brenzel was a party to the suit, the court interposed, at this point, with the remark, \u201c Harms is the only party.\u201d To that remark of the court, counsel for appellant replied, \u201c Suit has been dismissed as to the other defendants.\u201d And then the court remarked, \u201c This case appears to have been tried once before.\u201d Whereupon counsel for appellee stated to the court the fact that the cause had been formerly tried before a different judge, and taken from the jury, which was followed by an appeal to this court, where the cause was remanded for another trial, which was the occasion of the cause being here for trial again.\nTo nothing that so occurred was any objection made or exception taken, and we are at a loss to understand why counsel should have incorporated into his brief the statement of such occurrence as constituting error.\nTo other subsequent remarks made while examining witnesses, and in the closing argument, objections were made, and ruled upon by the court, sometimes sustaining and other times overruling them, but we are unable to see any error in any ruling that was unfavorable to appellant.\nIn the written reasons filed for a new trial, it was specifically urged that such remarks of counsel were improper, and we must assume that the trial court gave due consideration to the subject in deciding upon that motion.\nAlthough with due deference to the exalted system of ethics which graces the profession of the law, we may regret that counsel did not omit most of the matters complained of, still we, sitting as a court of review, may not seize upon. such things as a ground for reversing a judgment where it is not plain that justice has been in some way subverted or defeated by the practice. We must in most instances, like the present, rely confidently upon the trial judge to protect against any injurious consequences from the indiscretion and over-zeal of counsel in such respects.\nCommenting upon this subject, our Supreme Court has, in the very recent case (opinion filed November 9, 1896) of W. C. St. E. E. Co. v. Annis, spoken most felicitously :\n\u201cNo more delicate question for decision can arise than the propriety of the conduct of counsel in the trial of cases, and it is gratifying to know that the sense of professional propriety is generally such that courts are seldom called upon to do so. When, however, the necessity arises, trial courts should not hesitate to use their authority to restrain all efforts of attorneys to obtain verdicts by using unfair means, and making remarks outside of the evidence calculated only to arouse the prejudice and passions of the jury; and whenever such restraining influences do not effect the purpose, the fruits of such unprofessional conduct ought to be taken away by granting a new trial. It is, however, as held in the Cotton case, supra, a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial judge to say, under all the circumstances of the case, and in view of the counter remarks which may be made, and the temper and character of the jury, whether a new trial should be granted or not; and unless it satisfactorily appears from the record that the trial court had abused its discretion in this regard, courts of review can not interfere.\u201d\nAs to the excessiveness of the recovery, but a few words need be said.\nThe law permits punitive damages to be awarded in cases of aggravated trespass, in order that the guilty party may be punished, and others deterred from similar acts.\nWe do not find in the record, evidence that would warrant a recovery of so large a sum by way of compensation, but we are not disposed to overturn the verdict which has been approved by the trial judge, merely because it partakes considerably of punishment.\nIt is no light matter for one to have his or her home intruded upon by trespassers, who, in the winter time, tear away part of the side and roof of the house, and break a large hole from the outside into a room where the occupant lies in bed sick; and when the person found to be responsible for such a trespass is proved to be worth a half million of dollars, and, therefore, able to pay without much sacrifice, he may not successfully complain that a verdict of $2,000 is excessive.\nThe motion to tax against appellant the costs of the additional abstract, is denied. We have not found it to be necessary to a fair understanding of the record of the cause.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court will be affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Shepard"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gage & Deming, attorneys for appellant.",
      "Oliver & Mecartney and Simmons & Winston, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Henry Harms v. Caroline Steir.\nl. Appellate Court Practice\u2014Improper Remarks by Counsel\u2014 When Ground for Reversal.\u2014This court will not reverse a judgment on account of improper remarks by counsel, unless it is plain that justice was in some way subverted or defeated thereby, but will in most instances rely upon the trial judge to protect against any injurious consequences from the indiscretion and over-zeal of counsel.\nTrespass, for breaking into a dwelling house. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Francis Adams, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1896.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed December 14, 1896.\nGage & Deming, attorneys for appellant.\nOliver & Mecartney and Simmons & Winston, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0634-01",
  "first_page_order": 632,
  "last_page_order": 635
}
