{
  "id": 5190655,
  "name": "Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Francis M. Pattison",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Pattison",
  "decision_date": "1896-11-21",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "351",
  "last_page": "354",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "67 Ill. App. 351"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "142 Ill. 511",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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        3087692
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "60 Ill. App. 84",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        5154544
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/60/0084-01"
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    {
      "cite": "123 Ill. 444",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:34.097112+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Francis M. Pattison."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Boggs\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThe legislative grant authorizing the company to construct and operate the railroad, had no effect to relieve it from liability to answer in damages for nuisances, unless such nuisance arose as a necessary and natural result of the proper operation of its road. 19 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 923.\nDamages resulting from negligent operation are not presumed to have been taken into account when the right of way was procured, but only such as necessarily and naturally result, though due and proper care be exercised. O. & M. R. R. v. Wachter, 123 Ill. 444.\nWhen the injury is to physical comfort, and results in the deprivation of the wholesome and comfortable enjoyment of a home, the measure of damage is compensation for such physical discomfort and deprivation.\nThe amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff must be left to the sound judgment, experience and discretion of the jury, in view of the facts of the particular case. Gemp v. Bossham, 60 Ill. App. 84; Wood on Nuisance, 887.\nBut the court permitted appellee to introduce testimony as to the value of the property before and after the creation of the nuisance, and to show it had greatly depreciated in value. The verdict was largely based upon such evidence and is clearly excessive, if such testimony was not.competent.\nThe alleged nuisances did not effect a permanent change in the property of appellee, and were, within themselves, temporary in character. They were illegal and, the law assumes, will not continue forever.\nIt was, therefore,\" not proper to receive evidence that the property had been permanently depreciated in value.\nThe assessment should have been for past, not perspective damages.\nThe theory of law is the infliction of past damages will cause the abatement of a temporary nuisance.\nIf it does not, successive actions may be maintained, and damages, both compensatory and exemplary, awarded until the wrong-doing is discontinued. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Compton, 142 Ill. 511.\nThe judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Boggs"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John T. Dye, attorney for appellant; C. S. Conger and R. L. McKinlay, of counsel.",
      "H. S. Tanner and Eads & Eads, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Francis M. Pattison.\n1. Railroads\u2014Not Relieved from Liability by Legislative Grant.\u2014 The legislative grant authorizing the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. to construct and operate its road does not relieve it from liability to answer in damages for a nuisance, unless such nuisance arises, as a necessary and natural result of the proper operation of its road.\n2. Same\u2014Damages Resulting from Negligent Operation.\u2014Damages resulting from the negligent operation of a railroad are not presumed to have been taken into account when the right of way was procured, but only such as necessarily result where due and proper care is exercised.\n3. Measure of Damages\u2014Nuisances, Resulting from Improper Operation of Railroads,\u2014When tiie injury is to physical comfort, and results in the deprivation of the wholesome and comfortable enjoyment of a home, the measure of damages is compensation for such physical discomfort and deprivation. The amount must be.left to the sound judgment, experience and discretion of the jury, in view of the facts of the particular case.\n4. Nuisances\u2014Assessment of Damages\u2014Not Prospective.\u2014When a nuisance is temporary in its character the law presumes it will not continue forever, and in actions for damages for the same it is not proper to receive evidence that the property affected thereby has been permanently depreciated in value, and the assessment of damages should be for past and not for prospective damages.\no. Same\u2014Damages\u2014\u00bb'Successive Actions.\u2014The theory of the law is, that the infliction of past damages will cause the abatement of a temporary nuisance. If it does not, successive actions may be maintained, and damages, both compensatory and exemplary, awarded until the wrong is discontinued.\nTrespass on the Case, for a nuisance. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Edgar County; the Hon. Ferdinand Bookw alter, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the May term, 1896.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed November 21, 1896.\nStatement of the Case.\nThe declaration was in case by appellee, and charged the appellant company maintained a switch in front of and near his dwelling house, and suffered certain of its stock cars, loaded with hogs and cattle, and certain other cars in whicli stock had been transported, to stand and be upon such side track for a long space of time, etc., and that noxious, offensive and unwholesome smells and odors arose from said animals and from filth and offensive matters in the cars, and from the decaying bodies of dead animals therein, and entered and permeated his dwelling house and rendered his home unhealthy, unwholesome and unfit for habitation, and that the company unnecessarily and negligently permitted its locomotive engines to stand and remain upon said side tracks, emitting noisome, noxious and offensive vapors, fumes, smoke, smell, dust, cinders, etc., which entered his dwelling and rendered it uncomfortable, unwholesome, unhealthy and unfit for habitation. Yerdict and judgment for appellee in the sum of $1,500, and the company appealed.\nJohn T. Dye, attorney for appellant; C. S. Conger and R. L. McKinlay, of counsel.\nH. S. Tanner and Eads & Eads, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0351-01",
  "first_page_order": 349,
  "last_page_order": 352
}
