{
  "id": 5193071,
  "name": "Chicago Sugar Refining Company v. M. R. Armington",
  "name_abbreviation": "Chicago Sugar Refining Co. v. Armington",
  "decision_date": "1897-01-07",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "538",
  "last_page": "539",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "67 Ill. App. 538"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "68 Ill. 290",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2627023
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/68/0290-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.549,
    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "d909323cd4a400c4acd339d921b96c22a8a213cb6ed5c3307dd2b925bd0e5084",
    "simhash": "1:c6f19bf63f2760d9",
    "word_count": 537
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:34.097112+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Chicago Sugar Refining Company v. M. R. Armington."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Gary\ndelivered the. opinion of the Court.\nThe appellee sued the appellant for refusing to take and pay for corn.\nThe only question argued by the appellant is, whether there was any contract. Premising that in the trade \u201c prompt shipment \u201d means to ship within ten days, the contract, if any there was, was made by telegrams, all on January 9, 1896, as follows. From appellee.\n\u201c Sell you ten cars white and ten cars yellow corn your works twenty-seven, prompt shipment. Answer quick.\u201d\nFrom appellant: \u201cYou are too high; we are buying at twenty-six half. Wire quick.\u201d\nFrom appellee: \u201c Accept your offer on white and yellow corn, thirty cars, prompt shipment.\u201d\nFrom appellant: \u201c Ship at once.\u201d\nNothing is in dispute but the words \u201cat once;\u201d do they mean, not that the appellant accepted \u201cprompt shipment,\u201d but made a counter proposition for shipment \u201c at once ? \u201d The words \u201c at once \u201d have no peculiar meaning, only their ordinary meaning in the trade; \u201c immediate shipment \u201d is the phrase used in contradistinction to \u201c prompt shipment \u201d for shipping forthwith.\nGoing back to the telegrams, it will be seen that the only matter of negotiation between the parties was price. Twice the appellee had used the words \u201c prompt shipment.\u201d In replies no notice was taken of them by the appellant. Had the appellant replied simply \u201c ship,\u201d it would not be contended that such reply meant a hastening of the shipment, and we regard the addition of the words \u201c at once \u201d only as a sort of urging the appellee to be as \u201c prompt \u201d as circumstances would permit.\n\u201c If a contract contains ambiguous words, or words of doubtful construction, such are to be construed most strongly against the party who executed the contract.\nIf the contracting party uses, over his own signature, language of doubtful meaning, he can not complain when the construction is favorable to the other contracting party, who is not presumed to have chosen the expression of doubtful meaning.\u201d Massie v. Bedford, 68 Ill. 290.\nWe think the appellee had the right to rely upon the last dispatch from the appellant as an acceptance of \u201cprompt shipment,\u201d and the judgment is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Gary"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Wilson, Moore & McIlvaine, attorneys for appellant.",
      "Smith, Helmer, Moulton & Price, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Chicago Sugar Refining Company v. M. R. Armington.\n1. Contracts\u2014Construction of.\u2014If a contract contains ambiguous words, or words of doubtful meaning, they should be construed most strongly against the party who executed the contract, and if a contracting party uses, over his own signature, words of doubtful meaning, they will be construed against him.\n2. Words and Phrases\u20141\u201dPrompt Shipment,\u201d and \u201cShip at Once.\u201d\u2014A sale was negotiated by telegraph, the principal difference being in regard to price, and the words \u201c prompt shipment,\u201d were used twice in the correspondence by the party wishing to sell, but the final message from the buyer was \u201cship at once.\u201d Held, that the words \u201c at once,\u201d meant as promptly as circumstances would permit, and that they were not to be taken literally.\nTranscript, from a justice of the peace. Appeal from the 'Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Francis Adams, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1896.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed January 7, 1897.\nWilson, Moore & McIlvaine, attorneys for appellant.\nSmith, Helmer, Moulton & Price, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0538-01",
  "first_page_order": 536,
  "last_page_order": 537
}
