{ "id": 5195831, "name": "J. E. Ricketts v. The Chicago Permanent Building & Loan Association et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Ricketts v. Chicago Permanent Building & Loan Ass'n", "decision_date": "1896-11-05", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "71", "last_page": "73", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ill. App. 71" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "145 Ill. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5486544 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/145/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Paige Ch. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Paige Ch.", "case_ids": [ 480825 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/paige-ch/8/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Paige Ch. 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Paige Ch.", "case_ids": [ 2050491 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/paige-ch/4/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 U. S. 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5631389 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/101/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Wall. 289", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wall.", "case_ids": [ 3412003 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/88/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5417706 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/131/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5102061 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/54/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3121946 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/161/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3006493 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/139/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2871578 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/114/0065-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 350, "char_count": 5872, "ocr_confidence": 0.485, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2110679779197637e-07, "percentile": 0.5959891870143781 }, "sha256": "42ff3e69246bcb2c3c9a33e8610792f3991e1c67f822dba4a3e2cec3b6517376", "simhash": "1:c8d3e433f61f66d6", "word_count": 1029 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:34.097112+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "J. E. Ricketts v. The Chicago Permanent Building & Loan Association et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Me. Presiding Justice Shepard\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThis writ of error questions an order granting a writ of assistance against the plaintiff in error, who was in possession of certain premises, which had been sold and bid in by the defendant in error, and deeded to it, by virtue of and under proceedings in a foreclosure suit to which the plaintiff in error was not a party.\nAlthough we might regard the affidavit of Marsh, referred to in the order, that Ricketts was in possession of the premises through Draper as agent for Barrett, one of the parties defendant, as being, if not denied, a sufficient justification for the issuance of the rule against Ricketts to show cause why he should not surrender possession, yet when, in answer to such rule, it was shown to be untrue that Draper was agent for Barrett, but that he was agent for one Brown, who was the owner of an independent title to the premises, which had been acquired through a sale of the premises for taxes, and a tax deed thereof issued by the County Clerk to Brown\u2019s grantor, neither Draper nor Brown, nor Brown\u2019s grantor, being a party to the foreclosure suit, nor coming in pendente lite under anybody who was a party\u2014quite other considerations arose.\nIt was made to appear that Ricketts held possession under one holding a tax title, which, if valid, would be paramount to the mortgage and everybody claiming through it; and the chancery court could not, in a proceeding to put a purchaser at the mortgage foreclosure sale into possession, try a question between totally independent titles, such as was thus presented. Harding v. LeMoyne, 114 Ill. 65.\nBut it is said by defendant in error, that the insertion into the record of the affidavits and lease read upon the hearing of the application for a rule to show cause, was without lawful sanction.\nThe rule in chancery is, that affidavits filed and read in a cause are a part of the record, and do not require to be preserved by a certificate of evidence. Dilworth v. Curts, 139 Ill. 508.\nAgain, lib is said by defendant in error that the granting of the writ rested in the sound discretion of the chancellor, and that the presumption that he wisely exercised his power in that regard, stands unrebutted. Whether such presumption is rebutted or not, depends upon what the entire record shows. Where the record contains evidence which establishes with certainty facts that show affirmatively that the order was an improvident one, the effect of such facts can not be overcome by a recital of only a part of them in the order made. The whole record must be looked at.\nIt is familiar doctrine that an order or decree in equity must find support and justification, either in the facts specifically found by it, or by evidence appearing in the record. First Nat. Bank v. Baker, 161 Ill. 281; Adair v. Adair, 54 Ill. App. 502; Baird v. Powers, 131 Ill. 66.\nAlthough had there been nothing in the record except the affidavit of Marsh, it being recited that for what was thereby made to appear, the order was granted, we might say there was sufficient justification for awarding the writ of assistance, yet, it appearing from the other evidence, not denied, in the record, that an entirely different state of facts existed, and that Ricketts did not come into possession pendente lite under any party to the suit, but entered under one who was neither a party nor privy, claiming an independent title to the premises involved, we think it was clear error to award the writ. Terrell v. Allison, 21 Wall. 289; Howard v. Railway Co., 101 U. S. 837 (849); Frelinghuysen v. Colden, 4 Paige Ch. 204; Van Hook v. Throckmorton, 8 Paige Ch. 33.\nThe decree awarding the writ of assistance must, therefore, be reversed and the cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Me. Presiding Justice Shepard" } ], "attorneys": [ "Firebaugh & Draper, attorneys for plaintiff in error.", "Dow, Walker & Walker, attorneys for defendants in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "J. E. Ricketts v. The Chicago Permanent Building & Loan Association et al.\n1. Courts of Chancery\u2014Jurisdiction in Issuing Writs of Assistance. \u2014A court of chancery can not, in a proceeding to put a purchaser at a m ortgage foreclosure sale into possession, try a question between totally independent titles.\n2. Equity Practice\u2014Affidavits, When a Part of the Record,\u2014 Affidavits filed and read in a cause are a part of the record and do not require to be preserved by a certificate of evidence.\n3. Decrees and Orders\u2014Must be Supported by the Record.\u2014An order or decree in equity must find support and justification either in the facts sufficiently found by it or by evidence appearing in the record, and facts shown by the record can not be overcome by a recital of only a part of them in the order made. The whole record must be looked at.\n4. Writs of Assistance\u2014When Improper to Award.\u2014When a party does not come into possession of premises pendente lite, under any party to the suit, but enters under one who was neither a party nor privy, claiming an independent title to the premises in question, it is error to award a writ of assistance against him.\nForeclosure.\u2014Writ of assistance. Writ of error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1896.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed November 5, 1896.\nFirebaugh & Draper, attorneys for plaintiff in error.\nDow, Walker & Walker, attorneys for defendants in error.\nA writ of assistance is the ordinary process used by a court of chancery to put a party, receiver, sequestrator or other person into possession of property when he is entitled thereto either upon a decree or interlocutory order. Beach, Modern Eq. Pr., Sec. 897.\n\u201cAn application by the purchaser of land, sold under a decree of foreclosure for the writ of assistance to put hrm in possession of the land, is not the institution of a new suit, but is auxiliary or incidental to the decree previously entered whereby the rights of the parties have become fixed and determined.\u201d Vahle v. Brackenseik, 145 Ill. 231." }, "file_name": "0071-01", "first_page_order": 69, "last_page_order": 71 }