{
  "id": 5192960,
  "name": "High Court Catholic Order of Foresters v. Minnie Malloy",
  "name_abbreviation": "High Court Catholic Order v. Malloy",
  "decision_date": "1897-01-07",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "665",
  "last_page": "668",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "67 Ill. App. 665"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "53 Ill. App. 680",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        858621
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/53/0680-01"
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    {
      "cite": "72 Iowa, 682",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Iowa",
      "case_ids": [
        8651206
      ],
      "opinion_index": 1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/iowa/72/0682-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "42 Hun, 212",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Hun,",
      "opinion_index": 1
    },
    {
      "cite": "61 N. H. 137",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.H.",
      "case_ids": [
        4480490
      ],
      "opinion_index": 1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nh/61/0137-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 369,
    "char_count": 6793,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.508,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.3393676619756596
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    "simhash": "1:e9fe0b10383f66dc",
    "word_count": 1167
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:34.097112+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "High Court Catholic Order of Foresters v. Minnie Malloy."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Gary\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nNovember 6, 1889, the appellant, which is a fraternal benefit society, issued to James Gorman an \u201cendowment certificate,\u201d by which it promised to pay to his wife, Maggie,\n$1,000 upon his death, upon condition, among others, that he complied with the laws and regulations then governing the order, \u201c or that might be thereafter enacted.\u201d\nAt that time the \u201c laws \u201d were such that in the event of the death of Maggie before the death of James, which event did happen, the money ought to be paid to relatives named \u201cif he (James) shall have made no other or further disposition thereof.\u201d\nSuch \u201c laws \u201d also gave him the privilege to surrender the certificate at any time, and take a new one payable to some other person, of certain classes.\nThe appellee is within those classes.\nBefore his death, James made his will, giving the appellee, his sister, what might come to his estate from the appellant.\nAfter the certificate was issued the appellant enacted a by-law as follows:\n\u201c No entry shall be made in any application or endowment certificate, or otherwise, permitting the designation by or ascertainment by reference to, any will of the person or persons, trustees or beneficiaries, to whom any endowment shall be payable, or the amount or share of any benefit. Ho will shall be permitted to control the appointment or distribution of or rights of any person to any endowment payable by this order.\u201d\nThe validity of this by-law, we do not think admits of question; the effect of it is the subject of inquiry.\nThe certificate implied that James might, in the event of the death of his wife during his life, make \u201c other or further disposition \u201d of the sum payable under the certificate.\nThe privilege could not be exercised under the provision that he might surrender the certificate, and take a new one payable to some other person, for such action would not be \u201c other or further disposition \u201d of the sum payable under the original certificate, but an abandonment of that certificate.\nThe privilege of \u201c other or further disposition \u201d was to be exercised only in the event of the death of Maggie while James lived, and it was the money to which she would have been entitled, had he died first, of which the \u201c other or further disposition \u201d could be made.\nIf, therefore, the by-law quoted had not been enacted, the right of the appellee would be clear.\nHow, the first sentence of that by-law does not refer to the will of the person who took out the certificate; but to the will of some person who is to take a benefit under it.\nThe second sentence is ambiguous. Broken up into clauses, it may be read: \u201c Ho will shall be permitted to control the appointment of any person to any endowment. Ho will shall be permitted to control the distribution of any endowment. Ho will shall be permitted to control the rights of any person to any endowment.\u201d\nBut as the right to make \u201c other or further disposition,\u201d if Maggie died, was reserved to James, and no mode of its exercise .named, he might exercise it in any way not in conflict with the laws of the appellant, or with general law.\nAny law of the appellant restricting the exercise of the right, should be reasonably plain, not requiring the abstruse reasoning of a doctor of laws to arrive at its meaning. \"Upon the maxim noscitur a sdciis, the second sentence refers only to such wills as the first sentence does.\nReferences to many authorities are in City of Cairo v. Coleman, 53 Ill. App. 680; Broom, L. M. 588.\nIn our judgment the will of James was a valid disposition of the sum payable under the certificate, and entitled the appellee to the money. That he intended that the words he used in his will should give the money to her, can not be doubted, and in construing the will, his intention is the primary consideration.\nThe judgment is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Gary delivered the opinion of the Court."
      },
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Waterman,\ndissenting.\nSec. 3 of Art. 12 is as follows: \u201cA member may at any time, when in good standing, surrender his endowment certificate, and a new certificate shall be thereafter issued payable to such beneficiary or beneficiaries as such member may direct, in accordance with the laws of the order, upon the payment of a fee of fifty cents. Said surrender and direction must be made in writing, signed by the member and forwarded under seal of the subordinate court with the endowment certificate to the high secretary.\u201d\nThe member, in taking his certificate, agrees to be bound by the by-laws then in force and such as might thereafter be adopted.\nThe following by-law was thereafter adopted:\n\u201c No entry shall be made in any application or endowment certificate, or otherwise, permitting the designation by, or ascertainment by reference to, any will of the person or persons, trustees or beneficiaries, to whom any endowment shall be payable, or the amount or share of any benefit. Mo will shall be permitted to control the appointment or distribution of or rights of any person to any endowment payable by this order.\u201d\nIt is manifest that it was intended by the by-law last set forth, to put at rest all claim, of right to designate by will a beneficiary.\nI see no reason why the plain meaning of the by-law should not be enforced:\nThe member, by his will, instead of designating appellee as the beneficiary, willed to her \u201c all the remainder of his personal estate, including anything that may come to his estate by reason of his insurance,\u201d etc.\nHothing goes to his estate by reason of the insurance.\nWills are to be construed according to the intention of the testator, and it may, perhaps, be fairly said that the deceased thought that the insurance money would go to his estate, and so willed it to his sister instead of, in a proper manner, exercising the power of appointment which he had, and which the new by-law forbade the exercise of by will.\nThe mode of changing the beneficiary specified in the contract must be substantially followed. \u00cd\u00ediblack on Benefit Societies, Sec. 218; Mellows v. Mellows, 61 N. H. 137; Ireland v. Ireland, 42 Hun, 212; Wendt v. Iowa Legion, 72 Iowa, 682.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Waterman,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "E. S. Cummings, attorney for appellant.",
      "Carpenter Bros., attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "High Court Catholic Order of Foresters v. Minnie Malloy.\n1. Fraternal Benefit Societies\u2014Construction of By-Laws.\u2014 Amendments to the by-laws of a fraternal benefit society, restricting the exercise of rights possessed by its members, should be reasonably plain, and if ambiguous, will be construed favorably to the party claiming rights granted by the by-laws as they were before amended.\nAssumpsit, on an insurance certificate. Appeal from the Circuit Court, Cook County; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1898.\nAffirmed.\nMr. Justice Waterman dissenting.\nOpinion filed January 7, 1897.\nE. S. Cummings, attorney for appellant.\nCarpenter Bros., attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0665-01",
  "first_page_order": 663,
  "last_page_order": 666
}
