{ "id": 5196042, "name": "Francis T. Murphy et al. v. Christian Kohlsaat et al., Trustees, etc.", "name_abbreviation": "Murphy v. Kohlsaat", "decision_date": "1897-02-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "579", "last_page": "582", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "68 Ill. App. 579" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "145 Ill. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5484866 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/145/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 R. I. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "R.I.", "case_ids": [ 1329112 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ri/11/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N. Y. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2161949 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/64/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5420365 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/132/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2422556 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/30/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5308711 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/64/0162-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 427, "char_count": 6797, "ocr_confidence": 0.504, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.40576461183852e-08, "percentile": 0.4430333583154848 }, "sha256": "a6286bfce90362834d5fb3dad2913eb9dac033ec056b37d0c62bb5d0f01279d0", "simhash": "1:088491913366f0e2", "word_count": 1202 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:19:54.666299+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Francis T. Murphy et al. v. Christian Kohlsaat et al., Trustees, etc." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Gary\ndeliveeed the opinion of the Couet.\nThis suit began in the Circuit Court as a petition by the Ketch am Lumber Company against Francis D. Bood and others for a mechanic\u2019s lien. A great many parties got into it; among others the appellants, as owners of the fee if all incumbrances were off.\nThe appellee above named has no interest in any question to be considered on this appeal.\nIt appears that the building, for the construction of which liens are claimed for labor and materials, was never finished; how far it stops short we do not find stated in the case.\nThe questions in the case are under the law as it stood before the revision of June 26, 1895.\nWhen all parties had got their pleadings in the cause was referred to a master, who reported that the Compound Lumber Company, which had furnished mill work to the amount of $3,559.38, was not entitled to any lien, because $1,600, which had been paid to that company, more than paid for all that the company had furnished which had actually gone into the construction of the building. The court sustained exceptions to the report, not upon any difference between the court and the master as to the fact, but upon the ground that the \u201c Compound Lumber Company fully completed its contract \u201d and that the then owner \u201c upon the delivery of said materials, took possession of the same and proceeded to incorporate the same into said building, which was then in course of construction,\u201d\nThere was no conflicting testimony as to how much of the material went into the construction of the building; what testimony there was upon the subject accorded with the finding of the master. It must have been the theory of the court that the Compound Lumber Company, having furnished the materials in compliance with its contract, incurred no risk as to the use they might be put to; a true theory as to the liability personally of the purchaser, but inapplicable to the question of lien upon the premises. Such lien attached only for what was annexed. Coleman\u2019s Mechanic\u2019s Lien, Sec. 105 et seq.\n\u201c Furnish labor or materials * * * in building,\u201d was the language of the statute.\nNow the finding of the court that the then owner \u201c proceeded to incorporate,\u201d gives no idea of how far she went, though there may be an implication as to the intent she had in starting. The lien given by the decree to that company is wrong.\nThe master reported in favor of Henry Gf. Sohns a lien for a balance of $217. The court found that he had a contract for steam heating for the lump sum of $6,800;\u201d \u201c that the reasonable value of the materials furnished and labor performed was $702.54;\u201d that \u201c he discontinued said work without any default on his part;\u201d and that it was \u201c wholly impracticable * * * to estimate the compensation for the part performed in proportion to the price stipulated for the whole.\u201d\nUnder Sec. 11 of the act as amended in 1891, such impracticability is a bar to a lien, for it is only for compensation in such proportion that the lien is given. Therefore the decree in favor of Sohns is wrong.\nThe premises on which liens are claimed were at the time of the various transactions owned by Annella Eood, wife of Francis D. The latter and David Walsh entered into a contract under seal, by which Walsh undertook the performance of services in the construction of the building, and Francis D. covenanted to pay Walsh for them. It is settled in this State that at law, on an instrument under seal, remedies are confined to the parties to it. Moore v. House, 64 Ill. 162; Harms v. McCormick, 30 Ill. App. 125, contra, reversed in 132 Ill. 104.\nAnd in New York, where, under the code, law and equity are mingled, the same rule is held. Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357.\nIn Ehode Island, on the equity side of the court, also. City of Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 272.\nThe waiving of the point in Campbell v. Jacobson, 145 Ill. 389, is not authority to the contrary. The decree in favor of Walsh is therefore wrong.\nIt is only as to the three decrees we have mentioned that error is separately assigned; nor is it apparent that as to the others any substantial injustice is done. The assignments of error by which they are questioned are only that all of the several decrees are wrong, specifying some particulars why.\nEach appellee is independent of every other. It is no good assignment of error to bunch them and say they are all wrong.\nSee the subject of assignment of errors treated under that title in 2 Eucy. PL & Pr., 920.\nThe three decrees\u2014one in favor of Compound Lumber Company, one in favor of Henry G. Sohns, and one in favor of David Walsh\u2014are reversed.\nThe other decrees shown by the record are affirmed.\nThe whole costs here will be added together, and the appellant will pay one-half of them, and the Compound Lumber Company, Henry G. Sohns and David Walsh will each pay one-sixth of them. The form of the judgment to arrive at that result need not be stated here.\nReversed in part and affirmed in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Gary" } ], "attorneys": [ "M. A. Dempsey and Williams, Linden, Dempsey & Gott, attorneys for appellants.", "Hollett & Tinsman, attorneys for appellees Gray, Tut-hill & Co., William G. 0. Lanpher and Wm. E. Barnard.", "B\u00falele y, Geay & Mobe, attorneys for appellee Compound Lumber Co." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Francis T. Murphy et al. v. Christian Kohlsaat et al., Trustees, etc.\n1. Mechanics\u2019 Liens\u2014Riera Attaches only to What is Used.\u2014A person who furnishes labor or materials to a building contractor, for use in constructing a building, takes the risk as to the use such labor or materials shall be put to, and a mechanic\u2019s lien attaches only for such part thereof as is actually used in such building.\n2. Same \u2014Proportionate Compensation for Partial Performance.\u2014 A decree for a mechanic\u2019s lien found that it was wholly impracticable to estimate the compensation for the part performed in proportion to the price stipulated for the whole.\u201d Held, that under such circumstances a decree for a lien should have been refused, as it is only for compensation in such proportion that the lien is given.\n3. Same\u2014 Contracts Under Seal with Persons Other than the Owners, \u2014The husband of the owner of a lot entered into a contract under seal for the performance of services in the construction of a building on such lot. Held, that on an instrument under seal remedies are confined to the parties to it, and that no lien attached.\n4. Assignment of Errors\u2014On Several Decrees Rendered in the Same Suit.\u2014It is not a proper assignment of error to say that all of the several decrees, in favor of different complainants in the same suit, are wrong.\nMechanic\u2019s Lien proceedings. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1896.\nReversed in part and affirmed in part.\nOpinion filed February 1, 1897.\nM. A. Dempsey and Williams, Linden, Dempsey & Gott, attorneys for appellants.\nHollett & Tinsman, attorneys for appellees Gray, Tut-hill & Co., William G. 0. Lanpher and Wm. E. Barnard.\nB\u00falele y, Geay & Mobe, attorneys for appellee Compound Lumber Co." }, "file_name": "0579-01", "first_page_order": 577, "last_page_order": 580 }