{ "id": 5205109, "name": "City of Decatur v. Henry Besten", "name_abbreviation": "City of Decatur v. Besten", "decision_date": "1897-02-25", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "410", "last_page": "412", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "69 Ill. App. 410" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "136 Ill. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 291, "char_count": 4566, "ocr_confidence": 0.539, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.5213522101095469 }, "sha256": "52a5dc8f7d8248f8e1a18b21aeedab91ec03e5ece4a318492a25a10dd2e0bee8", "simhash": "1:11bac36889903e2b", "word_count": 813 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:55:23.961114+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "City of Decatur v. Henry Besten." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mb. Presiding Justice Boggs\ndelivered the opinion oe the Court.\nAppellee recovered judgment in the sum of $1,000, for injuries received by a fall upon a sidewalk in the appellant city.\nThe contention of the appellant city, that it did not appear it had actual notice of the unsafe condition of the sidewalk in question, can not be sustained.\nIt appeared complaint was made prior to the time appellee was hurt, to Alderman Aphrens that this sidewalk in question was in general unsafe, and that he introduced a resolution in. the city council that it be repaired. The information did not perhaps specify the precise defect which caused the appellee to be injured but it was sufficient to attract the attention of the council to the fact the condition of the walk at that point demanded attention.\nThe testimonjr of several witnesses was such as to warrant \u2022the jury in believing the sidewalk at the place where the appellee was hurt had been in bad condition for a period of six months prior thereto, so the other contention, notice of the defect, could not be imputed and must be overruled.\nWhether the appellee was in the exercise of ordinary care is much discussed in the briefs.\nIt was a question of fact, and we are unable to say the jury were manifestly wrong.in their decision upon it.\n\u00d1or can we say the damages awarded ($1,000) are excessive. There was testimony tending to show the injury is incurable, and that the appellee may be permanently lame in one leg. Whether the sidewalk had been out of repair a sufficient length of time to warrant the imputation of negligence was a question of fact.\nTherefore the court should not have advised the jury, as was done by an instruction, the evidence was sufficient upon the point if it appeared the defect\" had existed for a period of six months prior to the time of the injury to the appellee.\nBut surely no one would contend, as a matter of fact, the imputation of negligence would not arise from the existence of a defect for such a period of time when the city, as here, had actual notice the walk was in general in need of attention and repair. Hence the error in the instruction is not within itself such as to demand a reversal of the judgment.\nWe do not think ground for reversal exists because of the declaration in another instruction given for the plaintiff below, that it was the duty of the city to use all reasonable care to the end the sidewalk should be reasonably safe. The ci'iticism upon it is, \u201c all reasonable care \u201d is a higher degree of care than merely reasonable care.\nThe design of the law is, the sidewalks of a city shall be safe and free from danger. The city is not, however, charged by law with the absolute duty of making and keeping its walks safe, but is required to use reasonable exertion to accomplish that end. It may omit nothing that reasonable diligence and care would demand. Hence all reasonable care is within the rule of duty.\nThe sidewalk was within, the corporate limits, and the obligation of the city to exercise ordinary care and prudence to keep it in a safe condition, our Supreme Court has declared, was not lessened or changed by the fact it was not as much in use as walks in more frequented streets. City of Flora v. Nanney, 136 Ill. 48.\nThe action of the court in giving, refusing and modifying instructions was in harmony with the principles announced by our Supreme Court in the case cited.\nThe fourth refused instruction was fully covered by the ninth, which was given. \u2019\nInstructions \u00a1Nos. 8 and 10, which were refused, were, so far as proper to be given, repetitions of principles announced in Nos. 6, 7 and 14, which were given.\nWe do not find error of reversible character. The judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mb. Presiding Justice Boggs" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. M. Lee, attorney for appellant.", "Albert G. Webber, attorney for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "City of Decatur v. Henry Besten.\n1. Sidewalks\u2014Negligence in Repairing a Question of Fact.\u2014 Whether a sidewalk has been out of repair a sufficient length of time to warrant the imputation of negligence on the part of a city is a question of fact.\n2. Cities\u2014Duty of Keeping Sidewalks in Repair.\u2014The design of the law is that the sidewalks of a city shall be safe and free from danger, but cities are not charged with the absolute duty of making and keeping their walks safe. They are only required to use reasonable exertion to accomplish that end.\nTrespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County; the Hon. Edward P. Vail. Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the November term, 1896.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed February 25, 1897.\nJ. M. Lee, attorney for appellant.\nAlbert G. Webber, attorney for appellee." }, "file_name": "0410-01", "first_page_order": 408, "last_page_order": 410 }