{
  "id": 5255462,
  "name": "P. L. Feyreisen v. Mary Sanchez",
  "name_abbreviation": "Feyreisen v. Sanchez",
  "decision_date": "1897-05-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "105",
  "last_page": "106",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "70 Ill. App. 105"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 154,
    "char_count": 2041,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.504,
    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "b8262f8c2f90602506ea3ef4d1c8e735cbef7b2e898e0e2178a8aa7ef392689a",
    "simhash": "1:b8f50f36c8af82b8",
    "word_count": 367
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:32:17.018382+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "P. L. Feyreisen v. Mary Sanchez."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Gary\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThis is a bill to enforce the specific performance of an agreement, which we assume was by parol, for a lease from the appellee to the appellant of certain premises for one year with the option to the appellant of an extension for four years more. It is not necessary to state the fact of part performance, which takes the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds, as the appellee relies in the brief filed here wholly upon the one feature of the agreement that in it no time was specified for the commencement of the lease. But the appellant moved in, and has paid five months rent, which the appellee has accepted, and thus by their acts the parties fixed the time the term began. Oral contracts are proved not only by what the parties said, but by what they did, and as by words the parties agreed upon a term of one year, with an option of four more, so by their acts they put into their agreement the day for the beginning of the term.\nThe bill stated all the facts, and on demurrer the Court dismissed it.\nThe decree is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer, and proceed with the cause in accordance with the usage and practice of courts of equity.\nJEteversed and remanded with directions.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Gary"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Albert Martin, attorney for appellant.",
      "Wheeler, Austin & Lennards, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "P. L. Feyreisen v. Mary Sanchez.\n1. Leases\u2014Beginning of Term, Where No Time is Fixed\u2014Oral Contracts.\u2014An oral agreement for a lease fixed no time for its commencement, but the lessee moved in and paid five months rent, which the lessor accepted. Held, that oral contracts are proved not only by what the parties say but by what they do, and that in this case they had by their acts fixed the time of the beginning of the term.\nBill for Specific Performance.\u2014Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the March term, 1897.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nOpinion filed May 6, 1897.\nAlbert Martin, attorney for appellant.\nWheeler, Austin & Lennards, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0105-01",
  "first_page_order": 105,
  "last_page_order": 106
}