{
  "id": 5250322,
  "name": "John Claney and James V. Allen v. Chicago Dredging and Dock Co.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Claney v. Chicago Dredging & Dock Co.",
  "decision_date": "1897-05-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "158",
  "last_page": "159",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "70 Ill. App. 158"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "157 Ill. 57",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3142141
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/157/0057-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:0bb9f11d1a95fb85",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:32:17.018382+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "John Claney and James V. Allen v. Chicago Dredging and Dock Co."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Gary\ndelivered the opinion oe the Court.\nThe parties agree that the appellants employed the appellee to dredge the north branch of the Chicago river in front of their dock, to the depth of fourteen feet, is the appellants\u2019 version, and \u201c about \u201d that is the appellee\u2019s, as they expected a boat in drawing thirteen and one-half feet, which they wanted to get to the dock. The boat came in and grounded ten feet from the dock in thirteen feet three inches of water at her keel, eighteen feet from the dock.\nFor the appellee the court instructed:\n\u201c The court instructs the jury that, if the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff dredged the river at the defendants\u2019 dock, for the defendants, substantially fourteen feet deep, and took out 901 cubic yards, and the price agreed upon was twenty cents per cubic yard, then the jury should find the issues for the plaintiff and assess the plaintiff\u2019s damages at the sum of $180.20.\u201d\nAnd refused to instruct for the appellants:\n\u201c The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendants was, that the plaintiff should dredge the river at the defendants\u2019 dock, making the depth at that place fourteen feet, at a certain sum per cubic yard, and that the doing of this work was a condition precedent to payment, and that the plaintiff did not dredge the river to the depth of fourteen feet at the place contracted, then the jury should find for the defendants.\u201d\nThe real motive for the contract\u2014as well understood by the appellee as by the appellants\u2014was to get depth of water sufficient for the boat; and it may well be presumed that had that depth been reached, the appellants woxdd never have known what it was in feet and inches.\nAny instruction which left the jury at liberty to find for the appellee, with the purpose of the contract not accomplished, was error.\nArgument to us that after the dredging was done, and before the boat came, the earth may have filled in, or that by change of wind the depth may have been affected, does not touch the question here.\nMathematical exactness, taking the version of either party, was not required; but such depth\u2014near fourteen feet\u2014as would permit a boat drawing thirteen and one-half feet to get to the dock, was.\nThe river did not belong to the appellants.\nThere is no presumption that partial performance of a contract to deepen it was any benefit to the appellants.\nThe case has no resemblance to those in which it has been held that recovery might be had for substantial performance, of which the party sued had the benefit, leaving him to recoup his damages. 2 Chit. Cont. 825 et seq. and notes; Keeler v. Herr, 157 Ill. 57.\nIf after the word \u201c and \u201d following \u201c deep \u201d in the instruction given for the appellee, had been inserted \u201csufficient .to permit a boat drawing thirteen and one-half feet to get to the dock, and in so doing,\u201d or other language to that effect, the appellants would have had no ground of complaint as to the law, and the verdict of the jury might have been final.\nThe judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Gary"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Yermilyea, Burras & Wilcoxon, attorneys for appellants.",
      "Samson & Wilcox, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "John Claney and James V. Allen v. Chicago Dredging and Dock Co.\n1. Contracts\u2014Substantial Performance.\u2014An instruction which informs the jury that if the plaintiff has on his part substantially performed the contract sued on he will be entitled to recover, is erroneous in form, as calculated to mislead.\nAssumpsit, on a contract for dredging. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Abner Smith, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the March term, 1897.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed May 6, 1897,\nYermilyea, Burras & Wilcoxon, attorneys for appellants.\nSamson & Wilcox, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0158-01",
  "first_page_order": 158,
  "last_page_order": 159
}