{ "id": 2450448, "name": "John Mathews Apparatus Co. v. Minor B. Neal et al.", "name_abbreviation": "John Mathews Apparatus Co. v. Neal", "decision_date": "1897-09-13", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "363", "last_page": "366", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "71 Ill. App. 363" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "43 N. E. 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "15 Ind. App. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind. App.", "case_ids": [ 2403434 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ind-app/15/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2963168 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/129/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5173524 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/64/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5029338 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/41/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4990378 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/33/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5187189 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/66/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5497009 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/166/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5502245 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/164/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2963168 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/129/0132-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 365, "char_count": 6884, "ocr_confidence": 0.527, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08097846631212863 }, "sha256": "055ffd0f315b9391387281057c0729561332ffbed9211f02ed0c4f40dcb71056", "simhash": "1:7e5d2323b8a4f5fe", "word_count": 1175 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:26.715064+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "John Mathews Apparatus Co. v. Minor B. Neal et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Harker\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of the County Court, rendered in favor of the defendants in a replevin suit upon a special finding of the jury, when the jury had returned a general verdict against them.\nThe question of when a court will be authorized to enter a judgment against the general verdict of the jury, because of its being inconsistent with some special finding of fact returned at the same time, has been frequently before our Supreme and Appellate Courts since the act of 1887, relative to special verdicts, was passed.\nHot only should interrogatories calling for findings upon merely evidentiary facts be refused, but if given and answered, the answer should be ignored, on a motion for judgment. The special finding must relate to ultimate facts, such as are controlling in their character. The finding may be very important as tending to prove an ultimate fact, and yet, if it is not in and of itself a controlling one in the case, it is not sufficient to support a judgment as against a general verdict. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dunleavy, 129 Ill. 132; Ebsery v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 164 Ill. 518; Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 166 Ill. 572.\nThe general rule that all reasonable presumptions will be entertained in favor of a general verdict, does not apply in aid of special findings. To control the general verdict there must be such antagonism between the special finding and the general verdict that it could not be removed by any evidence admissible under the issues tried by the jury. Hence, in determining that question, the trial court should look not to the evidence heard, but to what could have been \u25a0heard under the issues.\nUnder the issues formed by the pleadings in this case, the special interrogatory propounded to the jury did not call for an answer that was controlling. It should have been refused. It nowhere appears from the pleadings that the plaintiff\u2019s right to the possession of the property depended upon whether it regained possession of it after it was delivered to Magiil & Go., and before it was levied upon by the writs.\nThe court erred in rendering judgment on the special finding. The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment on the general verdict, or set it aside and award a new trial if a motion to that effect is made, and the court is of the opinion that a new trial should be granted. Reversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Harker" } ], "attorneys": [ "O. E. Harris and E. J. Sweeney, attorneys for appellant.", "E. B. Mitchell, Frank K. Lemon and Moore, Warner & Lemon, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "John Mathews Apparatus Co. v. Minor B. Neal et al.\n1. Special Findings-Jfusi Relate to Ultimate Facts.\u2014Special findings must relate to ultimate facts, which are controlling in their character, and although a finding may be very important as tending to prove an ultimate fact, yet if it is not in and of itself a controlling one in the case, it is not sufficient to support a judgment as a against a general verdict.\n2. Same\u2014As to Merely-Evidentiary Facts Should he Ignored.\u2014Interrogatories calling for special findings upon merely evidentiary facts should be refused, and if given and answered, the answer should be ignored on a motion for judgment.\n3. Same\u2014When They Will Control the General Verdict.\u2014All reasonable presumptions will be entertained in favor of a general verdict as against a special finding, and before a special finding can be allowed to control the general verdict there must be such antagonism between them that it could not be removed by any evidence admissible under the issues tried by the jury. The trial court should look not to the evidence heard, but to what could have been heard under the issues.\nReplevin, for goods seized under an execution. Appeal from the County Court of DeWitt County; the Hon. George K. Ingham, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the May term, 1897.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed September 13, 1897.\nStatement of the Case.\nThis was an action of replevin, by appellant, to recover possession of a soda fountain apparatus, valued at $604.33, which had been placed in the restaurant of Fred H. Magill & Co., at Clinton, Ill.\nThe declaration was in cepit and detinet. A default was entered against two of the defendants, Fred H. Magill and George W. Myers. The other defendants pleaded noncepit, non-detinet, property in Magill &Co., and three special pleas justifying the taking of the property under various writs of execution, attachment and distress warrant, which came to their hands as sheriff and constable, and which had issued against Magill & Co.\nThe plaintiff (appellant here) replied that the property was the property of Magill & Co. and not subject to the writs.\nA trial by jury was had, resulting in a general verdict for the plaintiff. At the instance of the defendants, the court propounded the following special interrogatory to the jury : \u201c After the plaintiff sold and delivered the apparatus to Magill & Co., did the plaintiff, by any authorized agent, regain possession of the same before the alleged levy of the writs in this case ? \u201d To that question the jury answered \u201c Mo.\u201d\nUpon motion of counsel for the defendant, the court entered judgment upon the special finding, notwithstanding the general verdict, and ordered the plaintiff to return the property replevied or pay off the execution.\nO. E. Harris and E. J. Sweeney, attorneys for appellant.\n\u201c If on a verdict for the plaintiff, judgment is entered for the defendant, or vice versa, it is error on the face of the record, unless' on the record something appears to justify such judgment. The justification may be on the pleadings, as when the judgment is arrested or entered \u2018 non obstante veredicto.\u2019 Unless the finding is irreconcilable with the general verdict, looking only at the pleadings, verdict and findings, the general verdict will prevail.\u201d Gall v. Beckstein, 66 Ill. App. 478; Smith v. McCarthy, 33 Ill. App. 176; Stein v. Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co., 41 Ill. App. 38; Black on Judgments, Yol. 1, Sec. 186; Hallberg v. Brosseau, 64 Ill. App. 520.\nA fact which merely tends to prove a fact in issue without actually proving it, is not inconsistent with the general verdict, whatever that may be. The court can not look to the evidence; the inconsistency must be so irreconcilable as to be incapable of being removed by any evidence admissible under the issues. Chicago & N. W. Railway Co. v. Dunleavy, 129 Ill. 132.\nThe special answers control the general verdict only when the antagonism is so great that it could not be removed by any evidence admissible under the issues. If the general verdict and special answers can both stand upon any reasonable hypothesis, having regard not to the proof actually made, but to that possible under the issues, the general verdict must be upheld. Simons\u2019 Adm\u2019r v. Beaver, 15 Ind. App. 510, 43 N. E. 478, and cases there cited.\nE. B. Mitchell, Frank K. Lemon and Moore, Warner & Lemon, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0363-01", "first_page_order": 361, "last_page_order": 364 }