{ "id": 5235925, "name": "Charles J. Off v. J. B. Inderrieden Company", "name_abbreviation": "Off v. J. B. Inderrieden Co.", "decision_date": "1897-12-17", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "105", "last_page": "115", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "74 Ill. App. 105" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "61 Ill. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5310238 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/70/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "46 Ill 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 425039 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/45/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Barb. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Barb.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "70 Me. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Me.", "case_ids": [ 649414 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/me/70/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Mass. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 2104130 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/107/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Allen, 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Allen", "case_ids": [ 2102305 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/87/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Mass. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 710620 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/98/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N. Y. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2168038 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/71/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Mich. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1421412 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mich/60/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 N. Y. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 509592 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/47/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 U. S. 342", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3502573 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/108/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Pick. 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pick.", "case_ids": [ 2038881 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/37/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Gray, 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gray", "case_ids": [ 1973985 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/67/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5131271 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/48/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "77 Wis. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8702709 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/77/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Minn. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 750970 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/42/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5026363 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/40/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5418366 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/131/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 6046413 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/158/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ill. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 12121509 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/130/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2688667 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/79/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3091629 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/167/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3122485 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/161/0339-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1003, "char_count": 22944, "ocr_confidence": 0.592, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1813549812920936e-07, "percentile": 0.772517818606413 }, "sha256": "471f6869ddf781523e8e20777f89c66e1c82945e611ef55c5bc19eadd593e23f", "simhash": "1:a56a2f0518b9319d", "word_count": 3960 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:43:46.097587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Charles J. Off v. J. B. Inderrieden Company." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Dibell\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nAppellee is a broker and commission merchant doing business in Chicago. Appellant is a wholesale grocer doing business at Peoria under the name of Chas. J. Off & Co. In 1893, appellant also went into the business of canning tomatoes and corn at Warrensburg, Illinois, under the name, Warrensburg Canning Company. Appellee sold canned goods for him in the years 1893 and 1894. The business was conducted in this manner : Appellee would procure orders from intending purchasers on a form hereinafter set out, and send them to appellant, and he would sign acceptances at the foot of the orders. Orders for large quantities of canned goods were takeh by appellee in 1894 and accepted by appellant. The season of 1894 was bad, and appellant\u2019s tomato crop was largely a failure, and he was unable to fill the most of the orders from the crop grown on his own land. Appellee brought this suit against appellant to recover commissions upon orders so taken for 1894 and accepted by appellant. At the trial it was conceded plaintiff could not recover commissions upon the orders of A. S. Musselman. & Co. and A. W. Pierce & Co. Plaintiff had verdict and judgment for $1,397, being the full amount of commissions claimed by it upon all orders taken and accepted for 1894, except the two above named, thus giving plaintiff commissions upon all orders which defendant was unable to fill by reason of the failure of his crop. Defendant conceded his liability for all orders he filled, but denied his liability for commissions upon orders which he was unable to fill, and. prosecutes this appeal from said judgment.\nThe first question is, what was the contract between the parties, either expressed, or to be implied from the conduct and dealings of the parties. Binder, an agent of the plaintiff, saw defendant in February, or the spring of 1893. Defendant told Binder he intended to establish a canning factory on his farm. Binder asked leave to sell his goods. Defendant answered he had made an arrangement with another party to sell in Peoria. Some understanding was reached that Binder\u2019s principal could sell appellant\u2019s goods outside of Peoria at a commission of two and one-half per cent. Binder claims the commission was to be two and a half per cent on sales, but it can not be said from his evidence that any conversation took place between himself and defendant in which that was expressly stated. He says defendant understood it perfectly well, but he would not state any conversation of defendant to that effect though pressed to do so. The assistant general manager of plaintiff testified that shortly before the trial defendant admitted to him plaintiff\u2019s commissions were to be two and one-half per cent on the sales, but on cross-examination he acknowledged that-in said conversation defendant continually insisted that he owed no commissions on orders he did. not fill. Defendant testified that he never had any conversation with Binder in which he agreed to pay commissions on orders which he did not fill. Our conclusion from the evidence is that there was no discussion or determination between the parties at that time as to whether plaintiff\u2019s commissions should be computed upon all orders accepted, or only upon orders for goods actually delivered.\nThe dealings of 1893 followed. Plaintiff took for defendant, and defendant accepted, many orders for that year which he found himself unable to fill. He-remitted plaintiff\u2019s commissions at two and one-half per cent on all orders which he filled, and nothing on orders which he did not fill. Defendant\u2019s remittance for 1893 was made June 22, 1894, after most of the orders for 1894 had been taken and accepted, and after plaintiff had sent defendant statements charging him commissions on all orders accepted in 1893, whether filled or not. The language of the letter as to the remittance was, \u201c We herewith hand you exchange covering commissions for last year\u2019s business. In justice to you we ought to have added the interest, and would have done so, but the cannery account would not stand many luxuries of that kind.\u201d We think the language used shows defendant intended this as a remittance in full for commissions due plaintiff for the business of 1893. The word \u201c covering \u201d was obviously used in the sense expressed in the following definitions of \u201c cover \u201d by the Century Cyclopedia and Dictionary, volume- 2 : \u201cto be equal to, be of the same extent or amount, be co-extensive with, be equivalent; as, the receipts do not cover the expenses.\u201d \u201c To counterbalance; compensate for; as, to cover one\u2019s loss.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s retention of the remittance constituted an acceptance of it for the purpose for which it was remitted, namely, as \u201c covering commissions for last year\u2019s business.\u201d It could not retain the remittance and assert any further demand against defendant for commissions for the business of 1893. Ostrander v. Scott, 161 Ill. 339. Defendant acknowledged receipt of the remittance, adding, \u201c which we have placed to your credit on account of commissions for last season.\u201d They never had any further correspondence or conversation concerning commissions for 1893, so far as appears. That plaintiff did accept the remittance as payment in full for 1893 is further made evident from the testimony of Inderrieden that plaintiff settled with defendant for 1893 on the orders he actually filled, and from the fact-that in bringing this suit plaintiff did not declare for, or claim anything for commissions earned in 1893 remaining unpaid. If it had a valid claim, for unpaid commissions for 1893 it would naturally have included such claim in this action. The fact then is that the business of 1893 was settled without serious difference on the basis of commissions only on orders actually filled by defendant. In determining the intention of the parties to a contract, the manner in which they have acted under other like contracts, is evidence worthy of consideration. Jamieson v. Wallace, 167 Ill. 388.\nHo new, other or different arrangement was made for the business of 1894. Under date of February 10, 1894, plaintiff wrote defendant, \u201c Please advise us if we may offer vour tomatoes and corn on this market, and at what prices. Also if we shall give our men in the country prices at which to sell both these items.\u201d An affirmative answer was returned. There was no further correspondence at that time about terms, and it is evident the business for 1894 was taken on the same basis as the business of 1893. Late in the season, after defendant\u2019s crops had failed and many cancellations of orders had been effected, there was correspondence between the parties in which plaintiff asserted its right to commissions on all orders it had taken, and defendant declared his liability was limited to commissions on the orders he had filled; but these claims made after the business had been substantially completed, and in which each asserted a self-serving view of the contract, do not aid in determining what the original agreement or understanding was. In a letter from defendant to plaintiff under date of August 30, 1894, after noting the countermand of McDonald, Watt & Co. hereinafter mentioned, and after stating he believed his tomato crop would be short, defendant said: \u201c It is possible that others to whom you have sold tomatoes would like to countermand. If that is so, do not hesitate to permit them to do so. As far as your commissions are concerned they will be just the same, as it is certain that we can not deliver in full, and I would rather be able to deliver in full to whomsoever we ship any at all, than to cut each-one down to correspond with the percentage of the amount packed.\u201d The last sentence refers to the provision of the contracts, which were like that of S. E. Grossfeldt following, except that the space after the word \u201c remarks \u201d was left blank in some orders and differently-filled in others, according to the wishes of the respective purchasers.\n\u201c Bought of Warrensburg Canning Co., Peoria, Illinois. Through J. B. Inderrieden Co., agents. 1 car 3 lb Warren-burg tomatoes @ 85 c. per dozen. 500. F. O. B. cars at Chicago,- Illinois. Terms sixty (60) days acceptance or cash less 1& per cent if paid within ten days from date of invoice. Shipments to be made when packed.\nIn case of a partial failure of the crop, we consent to the cutting down of this order pro rata with all orders taken, of twenty per cent, without liability for claim for damages, and to accept a cash payment of fifteen cents per case for the cutting down of the additional twenty per cent. In case of the destruction of the cannery by the elements, the packer is not liafile for damages for non-delivery.\nBemarks:\nS. E. Grossfeldt.\nJ. B. Inderrieden Co., Agents.\nPer B. H.\nThe above order is accepted this 23d day of February, 1894. Waerensbueg Canning Co.\nPer C. J. Off.\n24 & 26 S. Desplaines St.\nNote: The above contract to be signed by the purchaser and seller in triplicate and returned to the agent as soon as practicable, when copy will be sent to the purchaser signed by the seller.\u201d\nIt is argued said letter of August 30, 1894, is a recognition by defendant of his liability for commissions on all orders taken. We do not so read it. On June 22d, only a month and eight days before, he had remitted plaintiff the commissions for 1893, paying only on the orders, he had filled, and this had been accepted without a word of protest or objection except so far as implied, if at all, in the reply above stated. The first express statement of plaintiff that it expected commissions on orders not filled (except its statement of account for 1893, before mentioned, which it waived in accepting payment only on orders filled) seems to have been in its letter of October 2d, and defendant promptly repudiated the suggestion in his reply of October 3d. We understand the letter of August 30th to mean, \u201c As your commissions are only on the goods delivered, and as I can not wholly fill the orders, your commissions will be the same whether I ship to each an equal percentage of the quantity I have to deliver as the orders provide, or get part of the orders canceled and fill the others, and 1 prefer the latter course. \u201d We do not see in the words defendant used any concession that plaintiff was entitled to commissions on orders not filled.\nThe conversation between defendant and Binder having been silent as to the basis upon which commissions were to be computed, defendant introduced evidence tending to show a general custom prevailing in Illinois, Iowa and elsewhere, in the business of selling canned goods for future delivery, to charge and pay such commissions only on goods actually delivered. Such evidence is competent \u201c to determine the rights and obligations of the parties in respect to matters about which the contract is silent.\u201d \u201c Usage is admitted in such cases as a matter of necessity, in order to inform the court of the meaning of the parties.\u201d 22 Am. & Eng. Encv. of Law, 810. Such general customs form part of contracts in reference to the subject-matter to which the custom relates, made where the custom prevails. Doane v. Dunham, 79 Ill. 131; Samuels v. Oliver, 130 Ill. 73. We can not concede appellee\u2019s position that before defendant could show what, by general usage in the business, was meant by an agreement to pay two and one-half per cent, commissions, he must plead such custom specially. The clear preponderance of the evidence on this subject was \u2022with defendant, and as the verdict was not in accordance therewith a new trial should have been awarded. There having been proof introduced tending to show such general usage, defendant sought to show that plaintiff was governed by this usage in settling with those employed to sell its goods where it had no special contract with them on this subject, paying them commissions not on orders taken, but only on orders actually filled. The court refused to admit this evidence. Proof of these particular instances was not competent to show the existence of the custom, but we think it was competent as tending to show plaintiff\u2019s knowledge of the custom, a fact defendant had a right to prove without relying solely on the presumption that plaintiff knew the customs prevailing in its business.\nPlaintiff claimed and recovered commissions upon the order of S. E. Grossfeldt hereinbefore set out. Concerning this order under date of October 1st, plaintiff wrote defendant a letter, the body of which is as follows : \u201c On February 20th of this year, we sold to S. E. Grossfeldt, of this city, one car, 500 cases, of future tomatoes. Mr. Grossfeldt is a very good customer of ours. He called this morning and is desirous of canceling his order. The fact of the matter is, that he is rather pressed at present and does not feel that he can take these 500 cases. Of course you have his contract signed for same and can hold him to it if you desire; still, as you wrote to us some time ago that you were anxious for cancellations, we trust that you will write us canceling the order for these people, and by doing so you will oblige.\u201d To this defendant replied on October 2d, stating he had canceled the order. Plaintiff acknowledged the cancellation in a letter dated October 3d, in these words: \u201c We have your favor of the 2d inst., stating that you had canceled order for S. E. Grossfeldt, which is satisfactory. We have notified Mr. Grossfeldt to forward us contract, and as soon as we receive same will forward it to you.\u201d Plaintiff was not entitled to commission on this order canceled 'at its special request to oblige its own \u201c very good customer.\u201d\nMcDonald, Watt & Wilt (called in the correspondence McDonald, Watt & Co.) signed an order for 1000 cases of tomatoes, which defendant accepted. Under date of August 21,1894, plaintiff wrote defendant that said purchasers had asked plaintiff to have these tomatoes taken off their hands, as they had a chance to buy other goods for less money; that plaintiff had written them agreeing todo so, and would place these 1000 cases with some one else, to which letter plaintiff added in postscript, \u201c Have sold these 1000 c. Instructions later.\u201d Defendant replied on August 30th, \u201c Deferring to your letter of the 21st, and noting countermand McDonald, Watt & Co., of Fort Wayne, Ind., of 1000 cases of tomatoes, would say we can not rebook them as we will no doubt be short of tomatoes.\u201d On August.31st, plaintiff rejoined as follows: \u201c Yours of the 30th inst., to hand. We note you say you can not rebook the 1000 cases of tomatoes, McDonald & Watts\u2019 lot. How this order was not countermanded by these people, but the contract indorsed over to us, and we have sold them. However, if we can get out of the sale we will do so. Think we can.\u201d The assignment referred to was in these words: \u201cWe hereby transfer above contract to the J. B. Inderrieden Co. McDonald, Watt & Wilt.\u201d The order in question was not assignable. Plaintiff released McDonald, Watt & Wilt from the contract. Plaintiff had no authority to consent for defendant that said contract might be assigned to itself or to any one else. Plaintiff could \u25a0 not make itself a purchaser. It was acting as agent for defendant, and could not sell to itself unless defendant consented. If it found another purchaser it did not report his name, take a new order, and give defendant a chance to accept or reject it. Plaintiff should not have been allowed commission on this order.\nWe think also that in view of the evidence tending to show a general custom to pay commissions only on canned goods delivered, it was error to refuse to permit defendant to show more fully the facts with reference to the failure of his tomato crop in 1894, that he might relieve himself from any possible imputation of willfully and without reason failing to fill the orders.\nIf there be no contract or custom limiting the commissions of the broker to transactions actually completed between seller and purchaser by delivery of the thing sold, then we are of opinion the law is that where the broker procures a purchaser whom the seller accepts, and a binding contract is entered into between them, the commission is earned though the contract be not afterward performed, if the non-performance is without the broker\u2019s fault. While the broker must find a purchaser who is able to pay the price, yet when the seller accepts a purchaser whom the broker finds and enters into a valid contract with him, he must be presumed to have satisfied himself of the responsibility of such purchaser, so far at least as to thereafter assume the burden of showing his inability, if it exists. Wilson v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304; Monroe v. Snow, 131 Ill. 126; Greene v. Hollingshead, 40 Ill. App. 195. So, too, the signing by the seller of an acceptance of an order purporting to be already signed by a purchaser ought to obviate the necessity of the broker proving the signature of such purchaser, and should cast upon the seller the burden of disproving it if he thinks it is not genuine. The option reserved in this case to scale.down the sale did not operate to release the purchaser from any part of his contract. It was an option reserved to the seller alone. Dana v. St. Paul Investment Co., 42 Minn. 194. Where the purchaser is bound the option reserved for the benefit of the seller, even if availed of by the seller, does not release the latter from the payment of the agreed commissions. Willes v. Smith, 77 Wis. 81.\nFor the reasons above stated the judgment of the court below will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Dibell" } ], "attorneys": [ "Arthur Keithley, attorney for appellant.", "Bailey & Sedgwick and Peokham & Brown, attorneys for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Charles J. Off v. J. B. Inderrieden Company.\n1. Settlements\u2014Effect of Accepting Remittances by Letter. \u2014A company had in its employ an agent engaged in selling goods upon commission, between whom and the company a difference of opinion existed as to the amount of commissions due for sales during a past stated period. The company made out a statement of the account, as it claimed it to be, and inclosed it in a letter with a remittance of the amount due the agent as shown by the statement, stating it to be in full for commissions due the agent and which he retained. It was held, that his retention of the remittance constituted an acceptance of it. and that he could not assert any further demand against the company for commissions during the period covered by the statement.\n2. Construction of Contracts\u2014Determining the Intention of the Parties.\u2014In determining the intention of the parties to a contract, the manner in which they have previously acted under like contracts, is evidence worthy of consideration.\n3. - Same\u2014Custom and General Usage.\u2014In construing a contract for the sale of canned goods on commission, evidence tending to show a general custom prevailing in the business of selling such goods for future delivery, is competent for the purpose of determining the rights and obligations of the parties in respect to matters about which the contract is silent.\n4. Same\u2014Usagre, When Admitted. \u2014Usage is admitted in cases where the construction of a contract is involved, as a matter of necessity, in order to inform the court of the meaning of the parties,\n5. Custom and Usage\u2014 Particular Instances, When Competent.\u2014 Proof of particular instances is not competent to show the existence of a custom, but may be competent as tending to show a party\u2019s knowledge of the custom.\n6. Agents\u2014 When, Not Entitled to Commissions\u2014Canceled Orders. \u2014An agent selling goods on commission will not be entitled to his commission upon orders taken by him, but canceled at his request.\n7. Same\u2014Assignment of Orders.\u2014An agent who has taken an order for the sale and delivery of goods can not afterward take an assignment of the order from the purchaser to himself, and thus become a purchaser from his principal, nor can he consent to an assignment of the order to a third person so as to bind his principal.\n8. Same\u2014No Contract or Custom Limiting the Commissions.\u2014Where there is no contract or custom limiting the commissions of a broker, to transactions actually completed between the seller and the purchaser by delivery of the thing sold, if the broker procures a purchaser whom the seller accepts, and a binding contract is entered into between them, the commission is earned, though the contract be not afterward performed, if the non-performance is without the broker\u2019s fault.\n9. Same\u2014Buyer Able and Willing\u2014Signatures\u2014Burden of Proof.\u2014 In a suit by broker against seller for commissions on a sale, if the seller entered into a written contract with the buyer, the broker need not prove the buyer was able to pay, or that the contract bears his genuine signature. The burden on that subject is on the seller if he denies the genuineness of the signature or ability of the buyer.\nAssumpsit, for commissions. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas M. Shaw, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the May term, 1897.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed December 17, 1897.\nArthur Keithley, attorney for appellant.\nWhere, from the nature of the covenant, it is apparent the parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that if the performance became impossible from the perishing of the person or thing, that shall excuse such performance. Walker v. Tucker, 70 Ill. 543; Rice & Co. v. Weber, 48 Ill. App. 573; Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best and S. 826; Rugg v. Minett, 11 East, 210; Lord v. Wheeler, 1 Gray, 282; Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134; The Tornado, 108 U. S. 342; Laning v. Rintles, 2 S. E. Rep. (N. Car.) 252; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62; Shear v. Wright, 60 Mich. 159; Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40; Caden v. Farwell, 98 Mass. 137; Stewart v. Loring, 5 Allen, 306; Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514; Gould v. Murch, 70 Me. 288; Wolf v. Howes, 24 Barb. 176; 2d Benj. on Sales, Sec. 861-865, 6th Am. Ed.; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 8th Ed., note 1, on page 787, bottom paging; 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 901; 3 Addison on Contracts, 8th Ed. 800; Chitty on Contracts, 11th Ed., 1076.\nBailey & Sedgwick and Peokham & Brown, attorneys for appellee.\nA usage must be proven as a fact. It is not merely the general opinion of persons as to their rights and liabilities under certain circumstances. It is a' mode of conducting business, a course of dealing, a method of dealing with certain facts, and not a conclusion as to the rules of law pertaining to these facts. 27 Am. & Ency. Law, 736.\nThe rule from the earliest times to the present is, when a party, by his own contract, creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his cohtract. Bacon v. Cobb, 45 Ill. 47; Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill 21; Leopold v. Salkey, 89 Ill. 420; Rawson v. Clark, 70 Ill. 656; Steele v. Buck, 61 Ill. 344." }, "file_name": "0105-01", "first_page_order": 103, "last_page_order": 113 }