{
  "id": 5236410,
  "name": "West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Catherine Egan, Adm'x",
  "name_abbreviation": "West Chicago St. R. R. v. Egan",
  "decision_date": "1898-03-03",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "442",
  "last_page": "444",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "74 Ill. App. 442"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "151 Ill. 232",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5469409
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/151/0232-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 238,
    "char_count": 4175,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.551,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.15670932938561283
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    "sha256": "eeeb29f0f1a2fbb48d696695fe66fa347cc40234b38275f706845c552ad49c1d",
    "simhash": "1:161757c6028d7250",
    "word_count": 723
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:43:46.097587+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Catherine Egan, Adm\u2019x."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Sears\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThis suit was brought against appellant for alleged negligence in causing the death of a child, appellee\u2019s intestate. Verdict and judgment were obtained by appellee.\nThe evidence was conflicting, and such as might support a verdict for either litigant.\nThe only errors assigned, worthy of attention, are as to the giving of the first and second instructions for plaintiff below.\nBy the first instruction the care required of the child\u2019s mother, who was with her at the place and time of the injury, was stated as \u201c at the time of the accident.\u201d It is objected that this is exclusive of a time just prior to the accident, when she might be held to a like exercise of care. But the objection is disposed of by Lake S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ouska, 151 Ill. 232.\nThe second instruction is as follows: \u201cThe jury are instructed that although they may believe from the evidence that Jennie Egan, deceased, just prior to her death, was placed in a dangerous situation through her own or her mother\u2019s negligence, yet if the jury further believe from the evidence that her dangerous situation was known to the employes of the defendant in charge of the grip car in question, or that it might have been known to said employe by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and that after such dangerous situation of said child was known or could have been known by said employe by the exercise of ordinary care, said employe could have avoided the injury and death of said child by the exercise of ordinary care, then the jury will find the defendant guilty.\u201d\nThis instruction, we think, was inaccurate, in that it relieved the mother of the intestate from any result of contributory negligence on her part, not only in case the jury 1 found that the gripman actually saw the child and'willfully ran his car upon her, but as well if they found that the grip-man did not see her at all, but might, in the exercise of ordinary care, have discovered her dangerous situation, and by such care have avoided the injury. In other words, it left the jury free to find for the plaintiff, although they might find that there was only such negligence by defendant as amounted to a want of ordinary care, and although there was contributory negligence by plaintiff.\nIn a case where the evidence is conflicting, we can not assume that this instruction may not have worked prejudice to appellant.\nThe judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Sears"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Alexander Sullivan, attorney for appellant; E. J. McArdle, of counsel.",
      "O. A. Allen and Jas. B. Muir, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Catherine Egan, Adm\u2019x.\n1. Words and Phrases\u2014\u201cAt the Time of the Accident.\u201d\u2014An instruction. in a personal injury case requiring ordinary care \u201c at the time of the accident\u201d is not objectionable as restricting the exercise of ordinary care to the moment of- the injury, but should be held to refer to the entire transaction.\n2. Negligence\u2014An Instruction Held Erroneous as Allowing Contributory Negligence.\u2014In a suit against a street railroad company for alleged negligence in causing the death of a child, an instruction was given informing the jury that although they might believe from the evidence that the deceased, just prior to her death, was placed in a dangerous situation through her own or her mother\u2019s negligence, yet if they further believed from the evidence that her dangerous situation might by the exercise of ordinary care have been known to an employe of the defendant in charge of the car causing the injury, and that, after such dangerous situation could have been known by said employe by the exercise of ordinary care, he could have avoided the injury to said child by the exercise of ordinary care, then the jury should find the defendant guilty. Held, that the instruction was erroneous, in that it relieved the mother of the deceased from the results of contributory negligence on her part.\nTrespass oil the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Edmund W. Burke, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1897.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed March 3, 1898.\nAlexander Sullivan, attorney for appellant; E. J. McArdle, of counsel.\nO. A. Allen and Jas. B. Muir, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0442-01",
  "first_page_order": 440,
  "last_page_order": 442
}