{ "id": 5234039, "name": "Caroline Young et al. v. Isham Harris", "name_abbreviation": "Young v. Harris", "decision_date": "1898-03-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "667", "last_page": "670", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "74 Ill. App. 667" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "164 Ill. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5384940 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/120/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 820182 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/67/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5216802 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/36/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2455212 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/32/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5248945, 5249678 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/27/0426-02", "/ill/27/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4866504 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/13/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2817920 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/101/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5294813 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/42/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 826293 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/89/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2634216 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/69/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5340007 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/88/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5317262 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/73/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2617865 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/65/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5504075 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/164/0116-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 352, "char_count": 5599, "ocr_confidence": 0.564, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.15668538976596705 }, "sha256": "bd106601d1aa016ebc4f0662bb07f8442f59449d56b9185893d63a3e254a7aa4", "simhash": "1:d2599b6b07a4bf69", "word_count": 960 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:43:46.097587+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Caroline Young et al. v. Isham Harris." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Creighton\ndelivered the opinion oe the Court.\nThis was a proceeding in chancery, in the Williamson Circuit Court, by appellee against appellants, as widow and heirs of William W. Young, deceased, to foreclose a mortgage purporting to have been executed and delivered by William W. Young, in his lifetime, and his wife, Caroline Young, to appellee, to secure one promissory note for \u00a7650, due two years after date, bearing eight per cent interest. At the return term appellants filed their answer to appellee\u2019s bill; the widow filed a separate answer, setting up joint fraud on the part of her late husband and appellee, in procuring her signature to the mortgage in question, and filed her cross-bill making appellee and her co-defendants in the original bill defendants to her cross-bill. The cause was tried and a decree rendered sustaining the original bill and dismissing the cross-bill. Appellants except and bring the case to this court.\nWhile errors are assigned in many forms, those urged are: That the evidence does not sustain the decree; that appellants ought to have been allowed a credit of \u00a7236.90; and that mortgage, being upon homestead, is a nullity.\nThe genuineness of the acknowledgment, as evidenced by the notary\u2019s certificate attached to the mortgage, is admitted by appellants, and they admit, also, that there was no bad faith or wrongdoing on the part of the notary who took the acknowledgment. Counsel for appellants say our theory of the case is that Mrs. Young and the officer taking the acknowledgment were both victims of a cunningly-devised scheme of deception on the part of appellee and W. W. Young to obtain the signature of Mrs. Young to the mortgage.\nThe certificate of an officer to an acknowledgment to a deed is in the nature of a record, and is as conclusive as a record. In Brady v. Cole, 164 Ill. 116, it is said : \u201c It is a rule that the acknowledgment of a deed can not be impeached for anything but fraud, and in such cases the evidence must be clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d\nWe have carefully examined this evidence, and are of opinion that it falls far short of measuring up to the requirement. In our opinion fraud is not conclusively proven. We are also of opinion that the evidence fails to establish appellant\u2019s claim for a credit of $236.90, and that the mortgage is not a nullity.\nThe certificate of acknowledgment recites the release and waiver of the right of homestead. Where the husband and wife join in the execution of a mortgage on the homestead, and the certificate of acknowledgment contains a release and waiver of the right of homestead, the mortgage is not a nullity.\nWe find no error in the record. The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Creighton" } ], "attorneys": [ "Clemens & Warder and George W. Young, attorneys for appellants.", "L. D. Hartwell and E. E. Fowler, attorneys for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Caroline Young et al. v. Isham Harris.\n1. Acknowledgments\u2014Impeachment of.\u2014The acknowledgment of a deed can not be impeached for anything but fraud, and in such cases the evidence must be clear and convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.\n2. Mortgage\u2014On a Homestead, When Not a Nullity.\u2014When the husband and wife join in a mortgage upon the homestead and the certificate of acknowledgment contains a release and waiver of the right of homestead the mortgage is not a nullity.\nMortgage Foreclosure.\u2014Appeal from the Circuit Court of Williamson County; the Hon. Oliver A. Barker, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the August term, 1897.\nAffirmed.\nOpinon filed March 1, 1898.\nClemens & Warder and George W. Young, attorneys for appellants.\nL. D. Hartwell and E. E. Fowler, attorneys for appellee.\nAs between the immediate parties to the deed, the acknowledgment may be impeached for fraud, collusion or imposition, but not otherwise; and the evidence to warrant the cancellation or setting aside of a deed upon the ground \u2022that the acknowledgment was secured through fraud, collusion or imposition, must, as we have held, by its completeness and reliable character, fully and clearly satisfy the court that the certificate is untrue and fraudulent. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 100 Ill. 389; Marston v. Brittenham, 76 Ill. 614; Lickmon, etc., v. Harding, 65 Ill. 505.\nTo overcome an officer\u2019s certificate of acknowledgment to a deed, the evidence must be clear and convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. Russell v. Baptist Theological Union, 73 Ill. 337; McPherson v. Sanborn, 88 Ill. 150.\nThe certificate of an officer to the acknowledgment of a deed is conclusive to the same extent as that of a record and can not be impeached for anything but fraud, and such proof must be clear and convincing. Kerr v. Russell, 69 Ill. 666; Blackman v. Hawks, 89 Ill. 512.\nIt seems to be held in the following cases that the certificate of acknowledgment can only be impeached by showing fraud or collusion between the party and the officer, and that a simple negative of the facts will not avail. Graham v. Anderson, 42 Ill. 514; Kerr v. Russell, 69 Ill. 666; Strauch v. Hathaway, 101 Ill. 11.\nThe denial of a wife\u2019s acknowledgment to a deed by herself and her husband can not prevail over the officer\u2019s certificate and his testimony. Washburn v. Roesch, 13 Ill. App. 268.\nFraud is never presumed. It must be affirmatively shown like any other fact. Wright v. Grover, 27 Ill. 426; Boies v. Henney, 32 Ill. 130; People v. Lott, 36 Ill. 447; Carter v. Gunnels, 67 Ill. 270; Schroeder v. Walsh, 120 Ill. 403.\nIt is laid down as a rule in one of the latest cases reported that the acknowledgment of a deed can not be impeached for anything but fraud, and in such cases the evidence must be clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable doubt. Brady v. Cole, 164 Ill. 122." }, "file_name": "0667-01", "first_page_order": 665, "last_page_order": 668 }