{ "id": 5176159, "name": "West Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Leokadia Marzalkiewiecz", "name_abbreviation": "West Chicago Street R. R. v. Marzalkiewiecz", "decision_date": "1898-04-08", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "240", "last_page": "243", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "75 Ill. App. 240" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "143 Ill. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Ill. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5470325 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/150/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill. App. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4907564 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/20/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5503316 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/164/0331-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 344, "char_count": 5845, "ocr_confidence": 0.58, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4975956836136062e-07, "percentile": 0.6646466647283297 }, "sha256": "d18a7bdc4d5b25ae53b945853c7bfb3d565ef28065418ad493e5befb5a2859e8", "simhash": "1:ba058dc40b105c40", "word_count": 1024 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:19:06.025093+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "West Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Leokadia Marzalkiewiecz." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Me. Justice Horton,\nafter making the above statement, DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.\nAppellant argues that there had been no \u201c previous authority or appointment \u201d authorizing the father to appear and prosecute as the next friend of appellee. This objection is made for the first time in this case in this court. It comes too late.\nThe sixth instruction given to the jury at the instance of appellee, is as follows:\n\u201c The court instructs the jury that while, as a matter of law, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and it is for her to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence, still, if the jury believe that the evidence bearing upon the plaintiff\u2019s case preponderates in her favor, although but slightly, it would be sufficient for the jury to find the issues in her favor.\u201d\nAppellant objects to this instruction upon the theory that, saving to the jury that if they \u201c believe that the evidence bearing upon the plaintiff\u2019s case predominates in her favor, although but slightly, it would be sufficient for the jury to find the issues in her favor,\u201d is equivalent to saying to the jury that if the evidence offered by and on the part of the plaintiff \u201cpreponderates in her favor,\u201d the jury might find for the plaintiff. In other words, the argument is that this instruction excludes from the consideration of the jury the testimony offered on behalf of defendant. Such a criticism of that instruction can not be sustained. Juries do not analyze instructions with all the refinement that astute counsel and reviewing courts sometimes manifest. Precisely this instruction was given in Taylor v. Felsing, and it was held by the Supreme Court (164 Ill. 331)' that there is no valid objection to it.\nThe point is also made that the damages are excessive. It is now the well-settled law of this State, and binding upon this court, that \u201c it is in the power of the trial court to render judgments on verdicts reduced * * * to an amount satisfactory to the trial judge, and the entering of such judgment is not error.\u201d Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Cummings, 20 Ill. App. 333; North Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Wrixon, 150 Ill. 532.\nIs the verdict against the evidence ? This point is argued elaborately and with great force on behalf of appellant. It is not for this court to act upon the theory that, if sitting as a jury, it would not have found the verdict rendered. The rule is that \u201c where there is evidence tending to sustain the issue in behalf of the plaintiff, the weight to be given thereto must be submitted to the jury.\u201d Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Richards, 152 Ill. 72; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 251.\nIt is not necessary to review the testimony in detail. If the testimony of appellee and witnesses called by her is relied upon, the jury was warranted in finding a verdict in her favor. If the testimony of the witnesses called by the appellant was the only testimony in the case, such a verdict should not have been rendered. There was testimony tending to support the appellee\u2019s claim, as well as testimony-tending to defeat it. \"Under such a state of facts this court can not disturb the verdict.\nThe judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Me. Justice Horton," } ], "attorneys": [ "Alexander Sullivan, attorney for appellant; E. J. McArdle, of counsel.", "Case & Hogan and William P. Black, attorneys for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "West Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Leokadia Marzalkiewiecz.\nAppeals and Errors\u2014Questions Raised for the First Time on. Appeal.\u2014The authority of a person appearing as the next friend of a minor can not be questioned for the first time in a court of appeal.\n3. Trials\u2014A Mere Preponderance of Evidence is Sufficient to Prove a Plaintiff's Case.\u2014The law is correctly stated in the following instruction: \u201c The court instructs the jury that while, as a matter of law, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and it is for her to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence, still, if the jury believe that the evidence bearing upon the plaintiff\u2019s case preponderates in her favor, although but slightly, it would be sufficient for the jury to find the issues in her favor.\u201d\n8. Practice\u2014A Trial Court May Require a Remittitur to he Entered and then Render Judgment.\u2014It is in the power of a trial court to render judgment on a verdict reduced to ah amount satisfactory to the trial judge, and the entering of such a judgment is not error.\n4. Trials\u2014Weight of the Evidence a Question for the Jury.\u2014When there is evidence tending to sustain the issues in behalf of the plaintiff the weight to be given thereto must be submitted to the jury, and their verdict must control.\nTrespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Courtof Cook County; the Hon. Jonas Hutchinson, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1897.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed April 8, 1898.\nAlexander Sullivan, attorney for appellant; E. J. McArdle, of counsel.\nCase & Hogan and William P. Black, attorneys for appellee.\nStatement.\nMilwaukee avenue, in the city of Chicago, runs northwest and southeast. October 23, 1893, appellee was riding southeasterly along said avenue in an uncovered express wagon. The wagon was drawn by one horse, driven by John Barjowski. Along this avenue there was at that time a double-track street cable car line, owned and operated by the appellant. In the middle of a long block the wagon crossed the tracks from the left to the right side of the street, in front of the grip-car. The wagon had nearly cleared the tracks, when a grip-car going northwest struck the rear wheel of the wagon. The wagon was thrown over by the collision and the appellee thrown to the ground and injured.\nThis suit was brought by appellee by her father as next friend. At the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee, fixing damages at $5,000, and appellee, \u201c upon the requirement of the court, entered a remittitur of two thousand dollars ($2,000) from said verdict.\u201d The defendant below prosecutes this appeal." }, "file_name": "0240-01", "first_page_order": 240, "last_page_order": 243 }