{
  "id": 5176217,
  "name": "Joseph Elguth v. Josefa Grueszka",
  "name_abbreviation": "Elguth v. Grueszka",
  "decision_date": "1898-04-08",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "281",
  "last_page": "283",
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    {
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      "cite": "75 Ill. App. 281"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "57 Ill. App. 193",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:19:06.025093+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Joseph Elguth v. Josefa Grueszka."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Shepard\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThis cause was in this court once before (57 Ill. App. 193), upon appeal from a judgment for $500 in appellee\u2019s favor, when it was reversed and remanded for error in the admission of evidence, and it now comes here again upon appeal from a judgment for $300, upon a verdict for that sum obtained at the second trial.\nIf we were able to discover a sufficient justification for any judgment at all against the appellant, in the case as made, we should be exceedingly loth to disturb this second verdict.\nBut the evidence, in our opinion, preponderates so greatly against the right of the appellee to have any judgment against the appellant as to make it our duty to reverse the judgment now before us.\nThe action was for assault and battery alleged to have been committed by the appellant upon the appellee, a woman.\nThe evidence disclosed, without contradiction, that the assault, by whomsoever made, occurred in a shop or store owned and conducted by appellant\u2019s wife, in which appellant had no interest, although at the time in question he was there present.\nIt is not necessary to detail .the circumstances of the quarrel or the extent of the injuries. The only question in that connection that is of any importance in this suit, is whether the appellant was in any degree responsible'for the injuries received by the appellee.\nThe testimony of the appellee stands alone and unsupported upon the main fact upon which her right to a recovery depends. On the other hand, she is explicitly contradicted by the testimony of all other persons who were present and witnessed what occurred\u2014four in number. True it is, that such witnesses consisted of the appellant, his wife, their son and appellant\u2019s brother. But, with the possible exception of the one last named, there is nothing in the record except their interest in the result, which manifestly was no greater than that of the appellee, and the testimony of the appellee, that tends to impeach their credibility as witnesses.\nThe question then arises as to the duty of an appellate tribunal concerning a verdict obtained upon the testimony of the plaintiff alone, where every material fact testified to by her, and upon which her right to recover primarily depends, is particularly denied by four witnesses of equal credibility and equal means of knowing the truth with herself.\nAt an early day our Supreme Court said : \u201c The rule of law is well established, that, in cases where the verdict of the jury has been given contrary to the evidence or where there is no evidence at all to support the verdict, the court will interfere to relieve the party prejudiced by such finding, by the granting of a new .trial. But where there is a contrariety of evidence on both sides,- and the facts and circumstances, by a fair and reasonable intendment, will warrant, the inferences of the jury, courts will reluctantly, if ever, disturb their verdict, notwithstanding it may appear to be against the strength and weight of the testimony.\u201d Lowry v. Orr, 1 Gilm. 70.\nAnd the general rule so expressed has been reiterated and adhered to until it can neither be questioned nor require the citation of authorities to.support it. Illinois C. R. R. Co. v. Gillis, 68 Ill. 317.\nBut under the rule that verdicts will be set aside when contrary to the evidence, they will be set aside when against the strong preponderance of the evidence, especially where apparent injustice has been done. Chase v. Debolt, 2 Gilm. 371.\nThus in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 277, it is said: \u201c If the verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence,\u201d it should be set aside.\nAnd so it is held in Reynolds v. Lambert, 69 Ill. 495, to be \u201c the settled rule to reverse where there is no evidence to sustain the verdict, or where the verdict is manifestly against the weight of evidence.\u201d\nThe great preponderance of the evidence shows that appellant was not responsible for the injuries received by the appellee, and had no connection with their occurrence, except by being present, and it would be manifestly unjust to him that a judgment, though small in amount, should stand against him.\nIt being apparent that the appellee could make no better case against the appellant at another trial, the judgment will be reversed, but without remanding the cause.,",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Shepard"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Johnson, Herring & Brooke, attorneys for appellant.",
      "John H. Southworth and John C. Bain, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Joseph Elguth v. Josefa Grueszka.\n1. Verdicts\u2014Will he Set Aside When Against the Strong Preponderance of the Evidence.\u2014Under the rule that verdicts will be set aside when contrary to the evidence, they will be set aside when against the strong preponderance of the evidence, especially when apparent injustice has been done.\nTrespass oil the Case, for an assault and battery. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1897.\nReversed without remanding.\nOpinion filed April 8, 1898.\nJohnson, Herring & Brooke, attorneys for appellant.\nJohn H. Southworth and John C. Bain, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0281-01",
  "first_page_order": 281,
  "last_page_order": 283
}