{ "id": 5791458, "name": "North Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Sarah B. Brown", "name_abbreviation": "North Chicago Street R. R. v. Brown", "decision_date": "1898-06-21", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "654", "last_page": "659", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "76 Ill. App. 654" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "157 Ill. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3140073 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "p. 366" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/157/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 6045789 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/158/000?-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 865032 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/18/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5335854 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/88/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2610492 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/63/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5310691 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/71/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5111691 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/51/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5113538 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/51/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5074962 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/45/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5119432 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/50/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5316074 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/76/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 817846 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/56/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2601651 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/49/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 424994 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/45/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5269482 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/47/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5387947 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/121/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5266055 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/43/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Gilm. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "case_ids": [ 2466216 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/6/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2701858 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/75/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2623381 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/66/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5248190 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/27/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2770526 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/86/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 824043 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/78/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 821717 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/77/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Gilm. (Ill.) 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2613666 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/63/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2610599 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/63/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2606187 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/62/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460347 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/61/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5236386 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/58/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5237334 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/58/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5240446 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/57/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5240472 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/57/0059-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 593, "char_count": 11709, "ocr_confidence": 0.567, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3022358842768954e-07, "percentile": 0.622438026309642 }, "sha256": "75e093af5824e12b12aa06606af60b5f68b0eca76114340159097b44c7a18d61", "simhash": "1:1bf769b2029f0161", "word_count": 2052 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:45.168189+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "North Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Sarah B. Brown." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Horton\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an action by Sarah B. Brown to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been sustained through the negligence of the North Chicago Street Railroad Company. The declaration consists of one count, and alleges that on the evening of February 15, 1891, the appellee was a passenger on one of the appellant\u2019s Lincoln avenue cable cars; and that upon its arrival at Larrabee street, in the city of Chicago, and while the appellee was about to alight with due care, the appellant negligently caused the car to be suddenly started, thereby throwing her to the ground, causing the injuries complained of.\nAs appears from the evidence, the appellee, while attempting to alight from a car of the appellant at the time and place stated, fell and received certain injuries. Whether this was caused by the negligence of the appellant, while the appellee was in the exercise of ordinary care, is the issue.\nAt the trial the jury found the issues for the appellee and assessed her damages at \u00a75,000, and judgment having been entered on the verdict, the defendant below brings the record to this court for review.\nThe jury upon a former trial returned a verdict for the sum of $10,800 damages.\nFirst. The first point urged by appellant is that the verdict and judgment are contrary to the evidence, or, as counsel say in concluding their argument upon this point, \u201c contrary to the preponderance of the evidence.\u201d As stated above, this is the second verdict in this case, and is for less than one-half the amount of the first.\nIt is not necessary to review at length the testimony. As is usual where several witnesses are called to give the details of an accident, they differ. But here the differences are not so great as to justify this court in interfering with the verdict of the jury.\nSecond. The next point urged by appellant is that the verdict and judgment are excessive. The injury to appellee was serious. Before the injury she was a strong, healthy woman. For four weeks after the injury she lay at the residence of a Mr. Thomas, and for over five months thereafter she was at the County Hospital. During these six months she suffered much pain. For some eight months after leaving the hospital she was compelled to use crutches, and up to the time of the second trial, over six years after the accident, she was still using a cane. There is testimony tending to show injury to the hip joint. At the time of the injury she was thirty-five years of age. There is also testimony tending to show that the injury may be permanent. The testimony is such that there is no warrant for an inference that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice. We can not interfere with this verdict upon the theory that it is excessive.\nThird. The only other point urged by appellant is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Complaint is made as to the giving of two of appellee\u2019s instructions, the first of which is as follows, viz:\n\u201c If the jury believe from the evidence in this case, that the defendant controlled and operated, for the purpose of carrying passengers for hire, certain street cars upon Lincoln avenue, in the city of Chicago, Cook county, Illinois, and that the plaintiff on or about the loth day of February, 1891, was a passenger for hire on one of the said cars of the defendant, and that the defendant, by its servant, caused the said car to be stopped for the purpose of allowing passengers to alight therefrom, and the plaintiff was in the act of alighting from said car while said car was so stopped, and while in the act of alighting from said car was using all reasonable care and caution to avoid the injury complained of in the declaration, and that the defendant, through its servant, negligently and carelessly caused said car to be set in motion while the plaintiff was so alighting from said car, and that thereby the plaintiff was injured, then' the jury should find the defendant guilty. \u201d\nThe reasons urged against the correctness of this instruction are: (1) That there is no testimony tending to shovy care on the part of the appellee, upon which to base the instruction; (2) that it entirely omits the question as to \u25a0whether negligence of appellee \u00a1was the proxi mate cause of the injury; and (3), that it requires of appellee reasonable care, but does not instruct the jury as to what is reasonable care.\nThese objections to this instruction can not be sustained. We do not agree with the counsel that there is no testimony tending to show care on the part of the appellee. All her actions at the time of the injury were fully stated by witnesses. Of course no witness was asked .if appellee was exercising proper care; or whether there was negligence on her part. \u201c Want of proper care\u201d and \u201cnegligence\u201d are substantially synonymous terms. Whichever term is used, the fact is one to be determined by the jury from all the circumstances developed by-the testimony. When this instruction is considered with all the other instructions in the case, it will be seen that the jury could not have been misled or left in ignorance as to what constitutes \u201c reasonable care.\u201d\nThe other instruction complained of is this, viz.:\n\u201cThe court instructs the jury that if,under the evidence and instructions of the court, the jury find the defendant guilty, then in assessing the plaintiff\u2019s damages, the jury may take into consideration not only the loss and immediate-damage arising-from the injury received at the time of the accident, but also the permanent loss and damage, if any is proved by'the evidence, arising from any disability resulting to the plaintiff from the injury-in question, which renders her less capable of attending to her business than she. would have been if the injury had-not been received.\u201d\nWe give appellant\u2019s criticism of this instruction in the language of its counsel in their argument, viz.: , .\n\u201c This instruction, as will be seen, also leaves entirely out of view the question whether the injury for which the jury might assess damages was the natural and proximate result of the negligence of the defendant, and- it practically tells the jury that they may assess any damage, whether it be the proximate and natural result of the negligence or that which is more remote.\u201d\nIt should be stated that there is no evidence tending to show any other reason or cause than that of the injury complained of for appellee\u2019s illness, pain and suffering or lameness. It is no doubt the law that appellee can not recover in this case for any damages which are not the natural and proximate result of the injury complained of. There is nothing in this instruction which infracts that rule. Indeed, this instruction definitely limits the recovery to damages directly resulting from the injury in question. The language is as to damages, if any, \u201c arising from any. disability resulting to the plaintiff from the injury in question.\u201d If the disability \u25a0 resulted in whole or in part from any cause other than the injurjr to appellee produced by her fall when alighting from appellant\u2019s car, the jury could not, under this instruction, assess damages therefor.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Horton" } ], "attorneys": [ "Egbert Jamieson and John A. Rose, attorneys for appellant.", "Arnd & Arnd and Lynden Evans, attorneys for-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "North Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Sarah B. Brown.\n1. Questions of Fact\u2014Where Witnesses Differ.\u2014Where witnesses are called upon to give the details of an accident, and differ,, such difference must be great to justify this court in interfering with the verdict.\n2. Damages\u2014$5,000 Not Excessive.\u2014Before the injury plaintiff was a strong, healthy woman; for four weeks afterward she lay at the residence of a friend, and for over five months thereafter at the County Hospital. She suffered much pain and for eight months after leaving the hospital was compelled to use crutches, and over six years after was still using a cane. There was testimony tending to show that the injury was to the hip joint and might be permanent. Held, that the verdict for $5,000 was not excessive.\n3. Instructions\u2014In Personal Injury Oases.\u2014The court passes upon and holds proper several instructions given for the plaintiff.\n4. Negligence\u2014And Want of Proper Care.\u2014\u2018 \u2018 Want of proper care \u201d and \u201cnegligence\u201d are substantially synonymous terms; whichever term is used the fact is one to be determined by the jury from all the circumstances developed by the testimony.\nTrespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Thomas Gr. Windes, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, $5,000. Appeal by defendant.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court, Fust District, at the March term, 1898.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed June 21, 1898.\nEgbert Jamieson and John A. Rose, attorneys for appellant.\nEven where the evidence is conflicting, if it preponderates strongly in favor of defendant, a verdict against him should be set aside and a new trial granted, and if refused the judgment will be reversed for that error. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Herring, 57 Ill. 59; Columbus, C. & I. C. Ry. Co. v. Troesch, 57 Ill. 155; Wade v. Atkins, 58 Ill. 64; Janney v. Birch, Adm\u2019r, 58 Ill. 87; Peaslee v. Glass, 61 Ill. 94; Lincoln v. Stowell, 62 Ill. 84; Davenport v. Springer, 63 Ill. 276; Schwartz v. Lammers, 63 Ill. 500.\nArnd & Arnd and Lynden Evans, attorneys for-appellee.\nWhere the evidence is conflicting and irreconcilable, the verdict will not be set aside on appeal or error, as against the weight of the evidence, unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to warrant the inference that it is the result of passion or prejudice or misunderstanding. Kincade v. Turner, 2 Gilm. (Ill.) 613; Chapman v. Burt, 77 Ill. 337; Miller v. Balthasser, 78 Ill. 302; Stickle v. Otto, 86 Ill. 161.\nThe verdict can not be set aside as against the weight of evidence, where the evidence is conflicting, inconclusive and irreconcilable, there being nothing to show improper motives; the weight of evidence is for the jury. Pulliam v. Ogle, 27 Ill. 189; Dunning v. Fitch, 66 Ill. 51; Kightlinger v. Egan, 75 Ill. 141.\nThe verdict can not be set aside as against the weight of evidence, where the evidence is conflicting and by a fair and reasonable intendment warrants the finding, although the preponderance appears to be the other way. Lowry v. Orr, 1 Gilm. 70; Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 Ill. 338; Shevalier v. Seager, 121 Ill. 564.\nWhere the evidence is conflicting and irreconcilable, it is for the jury to weigh it and reject such as it thinks unworthy of belief. Brown v. Berry, 47 Ill. 175.\nWhere there is much conflicting evidence, the verdict will not be set aside merely because it is against the weight of evidence. Morgan v. Ryerson, 20 Ill. 344.\nA new trial will not be granted on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence, unless the verdict is manifestly wrong. Where the evidence is in conflict, it is for the jury to weigh it and decide according to the balance. Johnson v. Moulton, 1 Scam. (Ill.) 532; Clark v. Pageter, 45 Ill. 185; Jacquin v. Davidson, 49 Ill. 82; Lawrence v. Hageman, 56 Ill. 68; Somers v. Stark, 76 Ill. 208.\nThe verdict and the judgment are not excessive. Illinois C. R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 50 Ill. App. 205; City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 45 Ill. App. 266; Chicago A. P. B. Co. v. Rembarz, 51 Ill. App. 543; West Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Bode, 51 Ill. App. 440; T. W. W. R. Co. v. Fredericks, 71 Ill. 294; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 63 Ill. 167; Illinois C. R. R. Co. v. Parks, 88 Ill. 373; C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. Holland, 18 Ill. App. 418.\nThe court did not err in instructing the jury. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Yorty, 158 Ill. 321; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 157 Ill. 354, p. 366." }, "file_name": "0654-01", "first_page_order": 652, "last_page_order": 657 }