{ "id": 5790509, "name": "Mary Haas v. Lizzie Metz", "name_abbreviation": "Haas v. Metz", "decision_date": "1898-09-26", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "46", "last_page": "53", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "78 Ill. App. 46" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "75 Ill. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2698858 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/75/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 N. E. Rep. 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "47 N. E. Rep. 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2451628 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/71/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Minn. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 563691 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/minn/36/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 N. E. Rep. 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "151 N. Y. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 29766 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/151/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Pa. St. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 829835 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/pa/147/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Fed. Rep. 557", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 6718177 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/f/60/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Mass. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 471381 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/168/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Mass. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 471416 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/168/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Nev. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 11273525 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/6/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2607817 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/62/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2777402 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/85/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 6046370 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/158/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5081233 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/58/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 N. Y. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 29766 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/151/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Pa. St. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 829835 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/147/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Fed. Rep. 557", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 6718177 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/60/0557-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 814, "char_count": 16045, "ocr_confidence": 0.552, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.871964132982944e-08, "percentile": 0.45979997289417257 }, "sha256": "e8ab55d1302363aac6470aa98ba5dddf42c601f50dfb4692f7c9ac39107a18b8", "simhash": "1:1329ddc2e42d9ec2", "word_count": 2825 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:24:05.225079+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Mary Haas v. Lizzie Metz." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Dibell\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis was an action on the case brought by Mrs. Lizzie Metz against Mrs. Mary Haas. The declaration contained three counts. The first was for slander, and the third for assault, and no evidence was introduced to support either. The case was tried on the second count as twice amended. It charges that plaintiff was sick and weak and confined to her bed, and that defendant willfully talked in a loud voice and in an angry manner with divers persons in her hearing, and thereby disturbed her \u2022 peace and rest and caused her sickness to be greatly aggravated, - without plaintiff\u2019s fault, and caused plaintiff to be in such a condition of body and mind that she suffered great pain and distress and was unable to control any muscle in her body for the space of thirty minutes, arid became reduced iri her nervous system\", and about once each month since that time has lost control of the muscles of her body for thirty minutes each time, during which time her muscles remained inmovable and she suffered great pain and agony of mind and body, and was hindered in her housework, and became liable to pay thirty dollars in trying to be cured; and that said maladies became permanent and incurable without her fault, whereby she sustained damages. There was a plea of not guilty, a jury trial and a verdict for one hundred dollars damages. Defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and plaintiff-had judgment on the verdict. From that judgment defendant prosecutes this appeal.\nPlaintiff\u2019s husband was a tenant, occupying a farm of defendant. Defendant owned the fruit on the .'farm, and at the time of the injury complained of there were seventy peach trees on the farm, heavily laden with fruit. On the third day after the.birth of plaintiff\u2019s third child defendant came to plaintiff\u2019s house and canned peaches for\" plaintiff. On the second day thereafter defendant came again in the-morning and stayed all day, with other women, some of whom were relatives of one or the other party and some'were not. During that day they gathered from defendant\u2019s orchard, and peeled and put up fifty-five cans of peaches, and left them for plaintiff. About ten o\u2019clock in'the forenoon some question arose whether green or ripe peaches'should be canned, and whether they should be'picked' from the trees or the trees shaken and the peaches taken from the ground. A deaf man, \u25a0 a brother of plaintiff\u2019s husband, was in the orchard picking up peaches not far frotn\" the house. The discussion began \"between defendant and the deaf man, and it was necessary to talk somewhat loudly to make him hear. Then defendant went into the house and said she \"was going to ask plaintiff. According to the \u2022 testimony for plaintiff, defendant seemed angry and talked. in a very loud voice, as loud as she could, \u00e1nd almost screamed. Plaintiff1 testified : V She was talking about the peaches- being good enough, and Mrs. Miller- said no, they wasn\u2019t, and then she says, \u2018I am going in. to see Lizzie,\u2019 and my sister says, \u2018 Don\u2019t you go in there, don\u2019t you go in there,\u2019 but-she came right into my room. She just came up to my bed and scared me so bad, and asked me if them .peaches- weren\u2019t good enough for us, and I told her they were all right, because they were peaches from the trees, and then she says, \u2018 Didn\u2019t I tell yon they were all right 1 the peaches are just what they wanted;\u2019 and then she started to holier and went out of the room and then I began to ery. I commenced to cry, and I got cold and pains come over me and in about ten minutes these spells come over me. I just got to shaking and my heart pained me, and .affected my nerves in breathing so that I got shaky and pains come around my heart.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s sister testified : \u201c She come to the summer kitchen and she show me the peaches and says, \u2018 They are good enough for you. Them peaches are good enough for you when you are getting them for nothing;\u2019- and she say, \u00a3 They are good enough for you;\u2019 and then she say, \u2018 I am going to show them to Lizzie;\u2019 and I say to her, \u2018 Mrs. Haas, stay out of Lizzie\u2019s' room!, stay out of Lizzie\u2019s room ! \u2019 But she went right into Lizzie\u2019s room, and I went into the room after her - and she saying, \u2018 These peaches are good enough for you,\u2019 and my sister was crying and going on., And she told me we cancan other peaches and them now on the ground and that' you better let go to-day. And my sister was crying all the time; and I says, \u2018 Mrs. Haas, you better go out.\u2019 Then she go out and I hear her in the summer kitchen going on, and soon she go out to the- peach trees, and my sister was crying.\u201d -\nIn the spell which- followed, plaintiff was tended and. helped chiefly by the defendant, who, in the absence of any water then hot, administered brandy and water, and helped to raise her ,up, etc. Plaintiff\u2019s witnesses testify she had six of these spells that day,, and that since then she has one about every thirty days. She had one in the presence of the jury at the trial., The only physician called upon the. stand, a man who had formerly treated plaintiff for this disorder; testified that this was \u201c a spell of hysteria;\u201d that these spells were largely in the control of the will and were often resorted to bjr peopl\u00e9 of certain temperaments to obtain sympathy and get their own way. He testified it was a mental disturbance, a nervous disease, a form of insanity. Before plaintiff was married she had' had these spells and had been treated for them by several physicians. She testified she had not had them for several years prior to the day in question. At that time she was weak, she had not slept well for several nights, had been kept awake by children in the house, and had been frightened a few days before by her oldest boy being run over, After the day above referred to she did not have another of these spells till the baby fell out of bed, and the plaintiff was frightened thereby, and one of these spells followed. There was no evidence that .defendant knew plaintiff had ever had such spells.\nThe evidence introduced by defendant tended to show \u25a0 she was not angry and did not speak in a loud or angry tone. Defendant was there to do a kindness to plaintiff. While plaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show defendant wished to have inferior fruit put up for plaintiff, defendant\u2019s evidence was to the contrary and tended to show that the controversy arose from the man picking up fruit defendant thought too green for canning. She stayed about the place all day and none of plaintiff\u2019s relatives and friends said anything implying they thought she was the cause of plaintiff\u2019s hysteria. About six months later, and after plaintiff and her husband had left that farm, defendant sued plaintiff\u2019s husband for rent, and while that case was on trial this suit was brought, thus getting service in Woodford county upon defendant, who lives in Tazewell county.\nDefendapt filed a plea in abatement, on the ground she was served in a county other than that of her residence while attending the trial of a case against her there, and that she was privileged from service of summons in that county while so attending that trial. A demurrer was sustained to the plea, and this is assigned for error. The plea and the demurrer are not abstracted, and we therefore do not consider the alleged error further than to say the action of the court seems to have been in harmony with Cassem v. Galvin, 58 Ill. App. 419, and 158 Ill. 30.\nIt is very questionable whether the preponderance of the evidence is not with the defendant upon the material facts. We do not, however, determine that question, as we have reached the conclusion that, assuming plaintiff has proved all her evidence tends to establish, still she has no cause of action. No personal violence or injury of any kind was inflicted upon plaintiff. She was not touched- by defendant. The only act or omission charged against defendant in the second count as finally amended was that.she \u201c willfully talked in a loud voice and in an angry manner with divers persons in the hearing of the plaintiff.\u201d Defendant had no knowledge that plaintiff was liable to hysteria. The second count does not charge she had such knowledge. The hysterical spell plaintiff had was not such a consequence as in the ordinary course of things would follow from asking a -sick woman, or others in her hearing, in a loud and angry tone of voice, whether certain peaches shown her were not good enough for her, or telling her \u25a0they were good enough for her. \u201c The injury in question not being one which the defendant could reasonably be expected to anticipate as likely to ensue from her conduct, we can not regard it as the natural consequence thereof for which defendant is legally responsible.\u201d Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11. Mental anguish, not connected with any bodily injury, but caused by some mental conception not arising from physical injury, does not authorize a recovery of damages. I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Stables, 62 Ill. 313. In Ewing v. P. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40, the court said: \u201c It is plain from the plaintiff\u2019s statement of her case that her only injury proceeded from fright, alarm, fear, and nervous excitement and distress. There ' was no allegation she had received any bodily. injury. If mere fright, unaccompanied with- bodily injury,, is a cause of action, the scope of what is, known as accident cases will be very greatly enlarged; for in every case of a collision on a railroad,, the- passengers, although; they may have sustained no bodily harm, will have a, cause of action against the company for the fright to. which they have been \u2022subjected. This, is- a step beyond any decision of any legal tribunal of which we.have any knowledge, * * * \u00a5e know of no well considered case in which it, has been held that, mere fright,, when unaccompanied by some injury to the person, has been held actionable. On the, contrary, the authorities so far as they exist are the other, way,\u201d In Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Company, 151 N. Y. 107, plaintiff was so frightened and excited that she became unconscious and- suffered a consequent, illness. The proof showed the mental shock she received was sufficient to produce that result. The headnote to the case is as- follows:\n\u201cMo recovery can be had for injuries sustained by fright occasioned, by the negligence of another, where there is no ' immediate personal injury.\u201d Johnson v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 6 Nev. 224, holds there can, be no recovery for pain of mind aside and distinct from bodily suffering,, but only for-mental suffering indi visibly connected with bodily pain arising from some personal injury received. The headnote to Haile\u2019s Curator v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. R. 557, is as follows:- \u201c Where-a passenger on a railroad train receives no, bodily injury from an accident caused,by the company\u2019s negligence, but, is made insane by the excitement, hardship . j and. suffering resulting- therefrom, the company is not ill liable in damages therefor,, since insanity is not a probable \u00a1I or ordinary result of exposure to- a railroad accident.\u201d In the - \u00cd) opinion the court there said: \u201c If. the.disease was notlikely to result from the accident and was not one which the defendant, could reasonably have, foreseen, in the light of the attending circumstances, then the accident was not the proximate cause. * * * The defendant had no- reason to anticipate that the result of an accident on its road -would so operate on Haile\u2019s mind as to.produce, disease\u2014the disease of insanity\u2014any more than that the exposure and hardship he suffered would produce grippe, pneumonia or any other disease.\u201d In Spade v. L. & B. R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, the court stated the question there presented to be, \u201c whether, in an action to recover damages for an injury sustained through the negligence of another, there can be a recovery for bodily injury caused by mere fright and mental disturbance.\u201d The conclusion reached was as follows : \u201c We remain satisfied with the rule that there can be no recovery. . for fright, terror,\"alarm, anxiety or distress of mind, if these are unaccompanied by some physical injury; and if this rule is to stand, we think it should also be held that there can be no recovery for such physical injuries as may be caused soleljr by such mental disturbance, where there is no injury to the person from without. The logical vindication of this rule is that it is unreasonable to hold persons who are merely negligent bound to anticipate-and guard against fright \"and the consequences of fright; and that this would open a wide door for unjust claims which could not successfully be met.\u201d White v. Sander, 168 Mass. 296. The cases above cited contain an e a dilation of many other ancient and modern cases variously stating and illustrating the general principle.\n| We conclude that the case at bar comes within the principles above laid down; that defendant could not reasonably anticipate that the words she spoke and the tone of voice she used would cause the recurrence of an hysterical malady of whose very existence she was not aware; and that it is against public policy to permit the recovery of damages for the results produced upon plaintiff by asking her a question in a loud and angry tone of voice. The judgmeijtof the court below will therefore be reversed. J\"\nFinding of Facts to be Made a Part of the Judgment.-\nWe find as a fact that appellant was not guilty of any willful dr negligent act, the probable consequences of -which would be to produce the injury complained of by appellee.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Dibell" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas Kennedy and R. M. Barnes, attorneys for appellant; Arthur Keithly, of counsel.", "James A. Riely, attorney for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Mary Haas v. Lizzie Metz.\n1. Appellate Court Practice.\u2014When the sustaining of a demurrer to a plea is assigned for error both the plea and the demurrer should be abstracted, in order that the court may consider the alleged error.\n3. Damages\u2014Physical Injuries Caused by Mental Disturbances.\u2014 There can be no recovery for such physical injuries as may be caused' solely by mere mental disturbances, where there is no injury to the person from without.\n3. Recovery\u2014For Words Not Defamatory.\u2014Where a person can not reasonably anticipate that words spoken by him and the tone of voice used will cause a recurrence of an hysterical malady of whose existence he was not aware, such words not being defamatory, no recovery can be had.\n\" Trespass on the Case, for an assault, etc. Trial in the Circuit Court of Woodford County; the Hon. George W. Patton, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal' by defendant.\nHeard in this court at the May term, 1898.\nReversed.\nOpinion filed September 26, 1898.\nThomas Kennedy and R. M. Barnes, attorneys for appellant; Arthur Keithly, of counsel.\nThe appellee\u2019s injuries in this case do not fall within the rule as to proximate damages. They are too remote; not such as the defendant could have foreseen, as the ordinary, natural, or likely result of loud' talking.. Loud talking does not as a rule throw even sick women into hysterical spells. There is no proof that it does. There is no proof that Mrs. Haas knew that her conduct would bring about any such results. There is no proof that such conduct ordinarily causes the damages complained of, hence there can be no recovery in this case. Haile, Cur., etc., v. Tex. Pac. R. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 557; Phillips v. Dickerson, 85. Ill. 11; Ewing et al. v. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. Rep. 354; Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Haltom, 71 Ill. App. 63; Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co. (Mass.), 47 N. E. Rep. 88; White v. Sander (Mass.), 47 N. E. Rep. 90.\nJames A. Riely, attorney for appellee.\nThe true principle is that where an act is malum m se, or willful, the person guilty of it is liable for all the consequences, however remote, because the act is quasi criminal in its character, and the law conclusively presumes that all the consequences were foreseen and intended. 16 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law, 434; Weick v. Lander, 75 Ill. 93." }, "file_name": "0046-01", "first_page_order": 56, "last_page_order": 63 }